United States Deterrence Systems and Strategies at the Beginning of the Cold War

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When World War II ended in September 1945, the United States of America was the most powerful economic and military country in the world. Sole possessor of the mighty atom bomb, in possession of the most advance conventional weapon systems in the world and the world power that was the least affected by the destruction of four dramatic years of fighting. The US, confident that peace would reign in the world for at least a decade, started demobilizing its massive armed force apparatus and curtailed the development of new weapon systems. World events changed all this very quickly. The wartime military relationship that existed between America and the Soviet Union promptly soured. In the years that followed the end of the war, the Soviet regime moved to consolidate its hold on the countries of Eastern Europe. They did not stop there. The Soviets wanted to spread communism to all parts of the globe. After Eastern Europe, they planned to move towards Asia. In America, the US armed forces continued their downsizing in 1946 despite the increasing evidence that Red Russia were continuing to build their military forces. During the early years of World War II, the Soviet Union was forced to move most of its industrial base outside their capital, Moscow. As a result, by mid to late 1940s, they possessed a large, albeit crude, military complex. The Soviets started a crash course to develop new weapon systems to increase their already massive land and air forces. Gathering information from espionage activities around the world, their own scientific research data and capture of German scientists, the Soviet Union was by mid 1946 in a full rearmament mode. In the meantime, their leaders were moving promptly in securing their country’s position as an equal to that of the United States. Political and military leaders in the West watched these disturbing developments within their former allied with uneasiness.

In March 1946, former wartime British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, gave a powerful and prophetic speech at Westminster College stating that: “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across Europe”. He was right of course. Tension would increment when on October 23rd, 1947, American intelligence officials noted the existence of a high number of Soviet made Tu-4 “Bull” bombers. The Bull was a textbook case of reverse-engineering a copy of the huge Boeing B-29 bomber. The Soviets got their hands on a few examples of the B-29 when they crash landed on Soviet territory after sustaining damages during bombings runs over Japan late in the war. These bombers gave the Soviet Union for the first time the ability to hit targets in continental America. By the beginning of 1948, all but the essential communication links between the one-time allies had ceased. Then on the morning of April 1st, 1948, the Soviets closed all land access to the divided city of Berlin, deep behind the Soviet Occupation Zone. The land blockade lasted until September 30th, 1949; three days after President Harry Truman informed a stunning nation that the Russians had succeeded in exploding an atom bomb, ending the short-lived United State monopoly on nuclear weapons. All these developments, occurring in such a short times span, prompted concern in the ability of the US armed forces to defend the homeland. Accordingly to the times in 1947, the United States government proceeded to make one of the most overwhelming reorganizations of its political and military structure. The War Department, stabled since the incorporation of the Colonies, was replaced with the new Department of Defense. The Army retained all of its ground forces, the Navy retained their assets, but the air arm of the Army became a separate service, the newly and independent military service was the US Air Force. As soon as the new Air Force enters service, it started to flex its political power. It was often at odds with the Army brass over the control of nuclear weapons systems as well as who should be in control of the country’s air defenses. As the 1940s passed and the 1950s began, US weapons development systems were in constant turmoil because of the inter service rivalry that was forming between the three services. Both the Army and the Air Force fought feverishly for control over the development and deployment of a surface-to-air missile system, and the three services sought to develop independently long range ballistic missile programs.

The outbreak of hostilities in the Korean Peninsula in 1950 put all the squabbling to rest. The US Army de-activated most components of its artillery department and reorganized them in the newly created Army Anti-Aircraft Command (ARAACOM). The ARAACOM was assigned the task to deploy antiaircraft artillery on sixty six key locations inside the United States as a stopgap until a missile defense system were available. About the same time, the US Air Force was assigned control of America’s ballistic missile research and developing program. In the mid 1950s the Air Defense Command (ADC) became the main strategic command, coordinating the defenses of continental United States. With this massive undertaking, the Air Force was awarded a bigger piece of the budgetary pie. Funds were now available for the development of new types of nuclear weapons, new long range heavy bombers and the big prize, the guided long range ballistic missile. The priority of funding went to the research and development of a strategic long range surface-to-surface missile, an offensive missile system. The leaders at the Pentagon envisioned an offensive missile system so powerful that it by itself deterred any possible preemptive nuclear attack by the Soviets. The deployment of these missiles clearly implies the ability of the US to achieve a massive retaliation capability upon the attacker. The role of these missile and that of their ability to lunch a massive un-surviving counterattack would be discussed during most of the years of the Cold War. Military, as well as political leaders would use the leverage that this system gave to them to bargain and to achieve political and military concessions from the Soviets and America.

Because the design and development of an operational guided long range ballistic missile system seems to many in Washington as a more technical plausible weapon platform than the development of a comprehensive strategic missile defense system. The decision was made to pursue the offensive ballistic missile system first. Working on the strategic defense system was put on the back burner. America’s strategic doctrine underwent numerous changes during the course of the Cold War. Then, during the 1950s, the Eisenhower Administration pursued a military doctrine that called for a scale back in conventional force military expending and increasing the nuclear strike force in order to make it clear to the Soviet Union that the United States had the weapons and the means to deliver a massive nuclear blow at the Soviet Union if they decided to launch a first strike campaign. Critics of this new policy, known as New Look, pointed to the administration that there was no assurance that the US arsenal could survive a Soviet nuclear attack. When the new Kennedy Administration took office in 1961, they brought a fresh look at the world strategic situation. Flexible Response was born. This new military doctrine called for a mixture of conventional and nuclear forces, which could be tailor made to threats in a proportionate manner. The success of this new policy would be the backbone of United States Military posture during the next thirty five years.