The Story Behind the Termination of the U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Powered Aircraft Program

During the early days of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union commenced research programs looking into the feasibility of utilizing nuclear power to propel a long range, heavy bomber. Each country invested vast amounts of human, as well as financial resources into their respective programs. Much was achieved, and in the end, each program proved that with the overall state of technology, a nuclear powered bomber was more than feasible; it could have been built. Nevertheless, each country decided to abandon their programs around the same time. Why the United States and the Soviet Union, clearly on a path to develop and produce a serviceable nuclear powered air platform; decided to terminate their respective programs? If the technology was there, what was missing?

As with any program involving the military, there are political and social forces driving it. These same forces that drove the U.S. and U.S.S.R. into investing so many resources were the same ones that drove their programs to a halt. The nuclear powered aircraft program of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. started in a time when atomic energy was viewed as a “do it all” energy source. But here is where the similarities ended. From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, atomic power was viewed very favorable by the general population in the United States. Atomic energy was being used to supply electricity to cities and small towns across the country. The U.S. military rapidly responded to this new found energy source with its own research and development programs. Besides the ordinance harness of the atom, such as in bombs or missiles; nuclear propulsion was an intriguing subject among military leaders. The U.S. Navy began to experiment with nuclear reactors aboard vessels, especially aircraft carriers; with the purpose of generating an unlimited source of steam to drive them. Submarine use of nuclear propulsion was also researched and vigorously tested during this period. Seeing their main competitor for funds implementing nuclear propulsion programs, the newly formed United States Air Force decided to join the fray. Immediately, the Air Force recognized the strategic bomber as the platform that would argument its operational profile if it were nuclear powered. Aircrafts do not have the capacity to carry enough fuel to achieve maximum operational capability. For long distance flights or combat patrols, bombers usually needed to make more than one re-fueling stop. Subtracting time from the mission profile. A nuclear powered aircraft could solve this problem. As stated in the articles before, studies had demonstrated that the U.S. possessed the technical ability to produce a workable nuclear powered bomber. Here is where the political aspect of the equation enters. Through its history, the nuclear powered aircraft program was plagued by a lack of short term vision and political interfering. The Air Force, who was tasked the oversight of the program by the Department of Defense, almost immediately failed to set short-term, achievable goals for the program. Major shifts in the program’s objectives were made with relative frequency. Causing the program managers to shift resources from one aspect of the program to another. This lead directly to wasting of valuable time and financial resources. One example was the construction of massive test facilities for the program at great expenses, only to be demolished after they were never used. In March of 1953, the program was placed on termination phase by then Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson due to a lack of progress. However, with the Soviets successful launch of Sputnik changed all of this. Sputnik did more than start the space race; it brought back to center stage the nuclear technological race between the superpowers. Congressmen were flowing letters to the Eisenhower Administration to re-invest in the nuclear powered bomber program at once. Vigorous lobbying on behalf of the Air Force created an increase in available funds for the program. At this moment, and adding to the public sentiment of fear; reports began to surface about an experimental Soviet nuclear powered bomber flying test runs near the Polish border. The net effect on the program was an influx of funds and human resources. A new life, albeit, a short one.

As the political situation worsened. Desk officials were overriding field managers on key aspect of the program. Datelines were frequently missed. Goals were half-met, if met at all. The program was also plagued by a lack of a central, unified voice. A voice that could command respect and inspire the personnel working on the project. And in the end, this was the undoing of the whole program. Critics had pointed to the development of more accurate Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles or a serviceable mid-air refueling system, or even the ecological effects of a crash landing by one of these “special” bombers; as the main reasons behind the cancellation of the program. These facts played an important role in the program’s demise, but the factor that ultimately undid the program was mismanagement. The atmosphere surrounding the program’s operational management team never fully complemented the team on the ground. Waste after waste of scarce financial resources as well as major time delays, gave the access the politicians coveted to take a measure of control over the program; and in the end, destroying any hope a achieving a successful conclusion.

The Soviet approach to their program was, from the early start, very different than that of the U.S. Their main goal in achieving a nuclear powered bomber was to enhance their ability to strike deep into Continental America. At the time, the leaders at the Kremlin were alarmed at the U.S. installation of offensive medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe and Turkey. These developments were added to the fact that the Soviet Union had failed in its attempts at develop a truly intercontinental and technological advance heavy bomber platform. After the first reports of an interest in the part of the U.S. to commence research into the possibility of an atomic plane, the U.S.S.R., partially motivated by pride and the reality that one superpower was getting technological superior to them, started a crash program to look into the possibility of producing an atomic plane. The nature of the Soviet political system did not allow for much political squandering. After the Kremlin made its decision to start or back a development program, especially one of this scale, full resources were allocated for the project without political interference. That is how the Soviet effort began. As with the American program, extensive research was performed and valuable data collected. Also, as it was the case of the American program, technology pointed to the possibility of producing a workable nuclear powered bomber in relative short time. Then why did the Soviets, so close at realizing the program’s main objective, decide also to abandon it? Managerial practices were not to play a role on the program’s demise. The Kremlin gave orders to start or terminate any program, but in those days, they did not micromanage a program. So, what was the reason? In the mid 1950s, the U.S.S.R. made a political decision in regards to their strategic offensive nuclear force. They calculated that with advances made in tracking radar systems and the development of accurate surface-to-air missiles batteries, a nuclear powered bomber would be hard press to penetrate the U.S. airspace; missiles on the other hand, possessed a greater survival capability over the enemy’s airspace. The other aspect of the political decision was maintenance. The Soviets calculated that with the financial resources needed to maintain an airworthy atomic bomber force, it can field a vast array of Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles systems. Soviet leaders, watching the development of their space program, a program that was centered on the launching of massive rockets, fell in love with the ICBM. Missiles are relative inexpensive to produce and maintain compare to atomic planes. And enough deployable missiles would allow the Soviet Union to implement their long standing military doctrine of brute force. They calculated that the possession of an overwhelming number of missiles and the ability of these missiles to shower the United States, they would be able to deter the U.S. from taking any offensive action against the Soviet Union or its interests around the world.

Another key development was the introduction of nuclear propulsion into the Soviet Union’s submarine force. This, coupled with the introduction of the Sea Launch Ballistic Missile, gave the Soviet another potent brute force type of platform from which to deter the U.S. The Soviets decided to invest vast amounts of resources in the development of a nuclear submarine force. A feat they were able to achieve with impressive results. When the Cold War ended, the Soviet Union possessed the largest nuclear missile carrying force in the world. Those factors combined to make the nuclear powered bomber program obsolete accordingly to the new Soviet doctrine that relays on the ability of the missile to get through a dense air defense network.

In both cases, politics, not technology, was the primary factor in abandoning their respective nuclear powered aircraft program. One can only imagine what would have happened if these atomic planes were built to an operational status. Although today there is still interest in the concept, major advances in unmanned air platforms have rendered the concept almost obsolete. But almost did not mean, completely. One example of almost but not completely is the long forgotten Custer’s Channel Wing Concept of the early 1950s. As of today, the concept is being revised for possible application to today’s airframes. Can this sort of renewed interest happen with the atomic air platform?

Story By: Raul Colon
e-mail:rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

Related Articles:

1. Nuclear Powered Aircraft Video Some footage taken on site where the U.S. Nuclear Powered...
2. A Brief Look at the United States Defensive Missile Systems from 1945 to 2004 - Part 1 During the years that followed the end of World War...
3. Nasa’s F-15 Program There are few fighters that capture the imagination in the...
4. French Nuclear Deterrent France had possessed nuclear weapon systems since the 1950s. In...
5. Germany’s ICBM Program When Adolf Hitler plunged Germany into the Second Word War...