Project Tom-Tom

Project Tom-Tom was originated by the United States Air Force’s Strategic Air Command as a way to provide its long range heavy bomber fleets with a fighter umbrella by towing them on semi-fixed wing links.

The concept of the MX-1018, the programs official call-sign, was devised from the FICO (Fighter Conveyor) system. A program initiated by the US Air Force in the 1950s to test the feasibility of utilizing a B-29 Superfortress bomber as a ‘mother ship’ from which a pair of Republic’s F-84 Thunderfalsh fighters would operate. FICO became fully operational in 1955, but only a handful of missions were ever flown.

In the Tom-Tom structure, the parasite fighter plane would shut down its engine to save fuel while it’s been towed. It will restart and detach from the moving airplane to intercept enemy aircrafts, rejoining the bomber once it has accomplished the mission.

For this configuration, two F-84Ds (versions 48-641 and 48-661) from the BASUT based at Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio were especially modified to carry a lance-like structure on their port and starboard wingtips platforms. The re-configurated aircraft was given the EF-84D designation.

For the initial test phase of the concept, a modified EB-29A-60-BN, tail number 44-62093 was selected. The bomber was fitted with booms installed at the wing tips onto which the F-84D’s lance would be attached to just before being withdrawn into the mother ship’s wing to lock both planes together.

The first hook-on trials were carried out on July 21st 1950 in the skies above Long Island, New York. With Major Clarence Anderson flying the starboard and Major John Davis running the port plane, the initial connecting test proved a resounding success. In the beginning both F-84Ds experienced heavy turbulence in their pitch and yaw while in the process of hooking into the booms, but after that the ride proved to be more smothering than many anticipated. Re-engaging the Thunderflash’s engine was also relatively easy and after several months, the program was ready for it next phase.

The morning of September 15th 1952 marked another milestone in the project’s life when the Thunderfalsh made their first, long lasting link up with the bomber. That was followed by another 43 additional connections. After a brief, inactive period, testing resumed in full swing on March 1953.

A month later, tragedy hit the program. On April 24th during an engaging maneuver, Major Davis’s F-84D lost surface control, rolling upside down hitting the upper wing structure of the EB-29A. Both aircrafts plummeted into the Peconic Bay with the lost of Davis and the entire bomber crew.

The news of the accident hit the program hard, but it did not end it. After several months, the program was back on track. Now two new RF-84s, this time an F variant (tail number 51-1848 and 51-1849) would attempt to connect, but not with a now obsolete B-29, but with the new and massive B-36 Peacemaker. JRB-36F, serial number 49-2707, was fitted with a new link up platform that would cope with the small fighter’s swept wing arrangement. The system consisted on a hinged arm on the ‘mother ship’ that trapped the fighter in a jaw-type position on its wingtip structure. The first test connection was made on April 24th 1956. With Beryl A. Eickson at the controls, the improved Thunderfalsh performed several quick, connection-detachment operations.

Almost 50 hookups were made during a five month period. Then, on the afternoon of September 26th, tragedy almost hit the program again. While engaging the connecting mechanisms, Eickson’s plane began to rift out of control, very much like Davis’ did three years before. Fortunately for both aircrafts, he was able to detach in time and both airplanes were able to land at Carswell AFB in Texas.

Although only minor damages were reported, most of them on the RF-84F, the AF decided to cancel the entire program soon after the incident.

Concept Aircraft: Prototypes, X-Planes and Experimental Aircraft, Editor Jim Winchester, Thunder Bay Press 2005
Air Power: The men, machines, and ideas that revolutionized war, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II, Stephen Budiansky, Penguin Books 2004
Air Power in the Age of Total War, John Buckley, Indiana University Press 1999

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

Germany’s Air Assault On England - 1914

“Nobody said it will be easy, but I think that this (bombing) campaign can shorten the ground war to a minimum. In fact, there’s a good enough chance that Britain’s public would rise and force its government to the negotiating table”, said a boastful Paul Behncke, Deputy Chief (Konteradmiral) of the German Imperial Navy Staff and one of the most ardent proponents for a saturated air attack on England’s capital, on a July 17th 1914 meeting of the German Army High Command. The Konteradmiral’s remarks were based on his, and other high placed officers inside the armed forces, profound belief in the power of the airship.

<p>Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin is considered by most to be the father of the dirigible. He was the first to take a powered machine to the air when Zeppelin I took off on July 2nd, 1900. Further development on lighter-than-air technology enabled the Count to built additional models, each more advanced than the preceding one. Although designed primarily as a commercial platform, it wasn’t long before the military began to realize the potential of the airship. In early 1909, the Army purchased two (Zeppelin I or Z.I and Z.II) units. Two additional samples were ordered in the fall. Not to be outdone, the Imperial Navy joined the fray and in 1912 ordered its first dirigible.</p>

<p>At the outbreak of hostilities in August 1914, the Imperial German Army possessed 10 operational airships. Nine of them Zeppelins, three of them DELAG units militarized and one Schutte-Lanz. Johann Schutte and Karl Lanz entered the airship-building industry in 1909 and began selling its platforms to the armed forces, mainly the Navy, in 1911. Four of those Zeppelins were assigned to the Western Front while three others took station on Prussia’s eastern frontier. The Navy’s sole sample, L.3, was posted on western Germany (Duren).</p>

<p>The Army was slow at recognizing the true power projection of the Zeppelin. In the beginning of the war, Army’s airships were used more as a low-level platform supporting the infantry crossing into Holland and Belgium. Because of its relative low operational range, British and French troops deployed in the Belgium frontier were able to shoot them down with some ease. In the first five weeks of the conflict, the German army lost 3 dirigibles. Before August ended, one more airship was lost at the Battle of Tannenberg in the eastern front. That left just 4 (3 army, 1 navy) units, including one Schutte-Lanz, available for operations.</p>

<p>That number (4) began to increase steadily after August ended. The Navy was the first to augment its fleet two-fold. On September 1st, the service received the first of the M-class of dirigibles, the L.4. Next January, the L.10 joined the ranks. Not to be outdone on September 3rd, the army placed an order for the newer Zeppelin P-class ship. With a hull of 531 feet, a gas capacity of 1,126,00 cubic feet and the addition of a fourth engine which gave it a top operational speed of 62 mph, the P version was the most advanced airship in the world. Twenty two (22) Ps were purchased. The first to be delivered was the LZ.38, which officially became operational on April 3rd 1915. The rest of the units were incorporated to the service between May and July.</p> 

<p>With an increase in fleet size, fleet housing them became a top priority. Since early 1913, the navy and army began selecting locations where to build the huge sheds needed to service the airships. Places such as Nordholz and Cuxhaven, both located in northern Germany, were the first airship bases in Europe. Each of these locations was fitted to house four dirigibles. Other bases included Tondern, Hamburg, Duren and Wittmundhaven. Later on during the war, Namur (Belgium) and The Hague (Holland) were incorporated. The army bases were located at Düsseldorf and Spich (Germany). After August and following the invasion of the Lower Countries, the German army erected several strategically located facilities. Belgium became the center of operations for the army’s fleet. No less than five (Maubeuge, Eterbeek, Berchem Ste. Agathe, Gontrode and Evere) bases were developed with the sole purposes of attacking Britain.</p>

<p>With ships and bases ready to go, the process now shifted to the strategists inside Germany. With most of the airship commanders urging their superiors to unleash their platforms and bomb England, German Kaiser Wilhelm and his advisors, wanting to slip the Western Allies, decided to hold-off the decision until the following summer. Unfortunately for the Kaiser, events on the ground forced his hand.</p>

<p>Lead by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, the British struck first hitting several of the newly constructed sheds. On October 8th, the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) bombed the army complex at Düsseldorf destroying Z.IX. On the 21st of November, the RNAS attacked the main Zeppelin factory at Friedrichshafen causing severe damage to the facility’s production line. A month later, on a clear Christmas Eve afternoon, the British attempted their most daring raid up to date. The target was the newly built Nordholz sheds. Although the attack failed to hit any structure, the German navy was very concerned that if these types of attacks continued, England would eventually be able to destroy their nascent airship fleet before it could mount an offensive operation. Similar concerns were ushered by army officials. The pressure on the Kaiser was too much to bear and on January 15th 1915 he finally gave the go-ahead to bomb much of England. London would be spared for at least a few more months as the Kaiser restricted attacks on the British capital.</p>

more coming soon….

An article by Raul Colon: <a href=”mailto:rcolonfrias@yahoo.com”>rcolonfrias@yahoo.com</a>

Anti-Aircraft Defenses of German U-Boats

In the early years of World War II, Germany’s U-Bootwaffes roamed, almost with impunity, the sea trade routes of the Western Allies, engaging and sinking their extremely vital ships at an alarming rate. It wasn’t until the Allies began to implement a sophisticated system of long rage, air patrols over the Atlantic that the tide of the submarine war finally began to turn in their favor.

Because most of Germany’s U-boat force was incapable of prolonged, submerged patrol times, they became easy targets for praying allied medium and heavy bombers covering the North Atlantic.

Engaging and hitting allied patrol airplanes became the sub’s main objective from late 1943 to the end of the war in May ‘45. In an attempt to achieve this task, each boat was fitted with a vast array of defensive weapon systems.

The submarine’s main anti-aircraft weapon was the 2CM Flak Gun. Two basic designs of this uninspired looking but tremendously effective flak system were employed. The first operating 2CM was the No. 30. The thirty was a single barrel weapon with a 360 degree traverse and capable of a two degree depression and 90 degree elevation. It fired a 0.32kg shell capable of reaching distances of up to 12,350 meters. What made this weapon so effective was it impressive cycle rate of 480 rounds per minute.

The second improved version of the 2CM was Flak 38. Similar to the 30 but capable of reaching a cycle rate of 960 rounds per minute, the 38 was arguably the best German, light attack weapon of World War II.

Another light weapon used by U-Boats to fend-off attackers was the 3.7CM M/42 Flak Gun. In the bottom half of the war, most German submarines were fitted with the 42nd platform. It fired a .73Kg shell up to a distance of 15,350m. Maximum firing cycle was 50 rounds per minute.

Those two weapon systems accounted for almost 85 percentage of all hit allied aircraft. Official numbers regarding hit aircraft varies from source to source, but the most reliable figure (coming from British-generated documents released in the mid 1950s) puts the amount at 247 from the spring of 1944 to April 1945.

Although it was not intended as a primary anit-aircraft weapon, the vaunted 8.8CM Schiffskanone Deck Gun was also used in that role, especially towards the end of the war. This remarkable 8.8 gun employed by the German navy was not directly related to the more famous, 8.8 Acht-Acht flack gun utilized by the army as an anti-tank weapon. The CM was purely a naval gun developed in the waning days of World War One.

The gun was mounted on a low box, forward of the conning tower. It could traverse through a field of 360 degrees. Its -4 degrees depressed parameter and 30 degree elevation capacity were two of the most impressive features of this remarkable weapon. The gun fired a 13.7kg high explosive shell at a 700m/sec muzzle velocity. It had a solid impact range of up to 12,350m.

Manned by a three man crew, the CM was a powerful, horizontal weapon that when used against sea-based platforms, it caused heavy damage. As the U-Boats began to sustain alarming losses to Allied preying bombers, German crews commenced utilizing their main armament on incoming enemy aircraft. Although their use on that type of environment wasn’t tested before the war, the gun performed well.

Data on the numbers of downed allied aircraft hit by the 8.8CM is not reliable. But unofficial accounts put the numbers in the low 50s. Much of that amount was accounted for between the autumn of 1944 and the spring of 1945.

Aside from those three defensive weapons, German submarines carried a limited amount of small caliber fire arms including 9mm and 7.62mm hand guns. Nine mm machine guns and some 7.92mm rapid fire rifles. No data on hit aircraft by these weapons are available.

Of course, no weapon can be effective if the enemy isn’t spotted. For long range detection, the U-boats employed the Funkmessorungsgerat (Fu) MO-29 Radar. The MO-29 was used primarily on Type IV boats as well as some Type VIIs. The 29 was simple to utilize thanks to its twin horizontal rows of eight dipoles on the upper front part of the conning tower.

On the top row laid the transmitters and in the lower one, the receivers. An improved version of the 29 was introduced in the summer of 1942. In that version, known as No. 30, the diploes were replaced by a retractable antenna which was housed in a slot in the tower. Although relative powerful for the time, this system barely was able to detect surface vessels because of the low position of it’s mounting in respect to the horizon.

A more complex system, FuMB1 or the ‘Metox’ was introduced in the fall of 1942. This system was utilized in conjunction with a raw, wooden cross antenna strung with copper wire know as the ‘Biscay Cross’. But as with the early Fus platforms, this unit wasn’t that reliable. In fact, a case could be made that their use was highly detrimental to the sub’s survival thanks to the Metox’s volatile emissions which were easily detectable by Allied radars.

By November 1943, the Germans had finally developed what would become the world’s first true, all around naval radar. Born out of desperation, FuMB7 combined Metox and Naxos emissions to give U-boat commanders a first rate, long range detection system. Further enhancements were performed (the FuMB24 and 25) to the base MB7 giving it an extended operational radius.

Aside from the radar, maybe the most ingenious defensive measure used by German submarines was the Focke-Achgelis. The ‘Focke’ was basically a manned rotary glider with a triple blade rotor. It was as simple to operate as it was to assemble. Housed in a storage cylinder on the afterdeck, the Focke was quickly armed and launched. It remained connected to the U-boat by an umbilical cord. From its advantageous position high above the sub (10-12,000 feet), the pilot could spot any target approaching the boat. Unfortunately for the Focke, if the U-boat came under direct attack, there was no time to reel it in, thus the sub cut the cord and left the pilot to defend himself until all was cleared to surface back again.

More effective than the Focke-Achgelis was the Aphrodite. It was a basic devise consisting of a large (one meter diameter) hydrogen-filled balloon from which dangled small strips of metal foil. It was attached to the sub by way of an anchor weight. Its main purpose was to confuse allied aircraft utilizing radar navigational systems.

Largest Airplane Ever

Can you believe that the largest airplane ever measured was more than 275 feet long and featured a wing span of 290 feet? Well, it did! The Russian An-225 Cossnak may be considered the largest airplane ever built, but there are other largest airplane ever facts out there to consider when learning about super-large-scale aircraft. Here are just a few:

• the An-225 Cossnack had a miximum takeoff weight of 1,322,770 pounds!
• The An-124 Condor is the second largest plane to be produced in the world (it too is Russian). It measures 226 feet 8.5 inches, and has a wingspan of 240 feet 5.75 inches.
• The C-5 Galaxy (an American-made plane) ranks third with a length of only 247 feet 10 inches, a wingspan of 222 feet 8.5 inches. It carries a mere 837,000 pounds compared to its Russian counterparts.
• The largest pusher plane in the world is the B-36 Peacemaker, made by Convair - USA. It is 162 feet 1 inch long and features a 230 foot wingspan
• The HK-1 Spruce Goose (more commonly known as the H-4) I featured the largest wingspan in aviation history — 320 feet long, with a height of 80 feet, a length of 218 feet, 6 inches.

For aviation specialists, it can be difficult to choose the largest airplane ever built since so many things can be considered in the calculation: the body length; wingspan and of course lift-off capacity.

Lyndon Johnson Helicopter s51

It may not seem odd these days to watch a political candidate whirl into a campaign stop riding a private plane or helicopter, but in 1948 it sure was. Imagine the excitement when the Lyndon Johnson helicopter s51 flew all over Texas, carrying Senate candidate Lyndon Baines Johnson to and from a variety of campaign stops.

With unlimited funds, the wealthy Johnson was able to buy an s51 helicopter to travel the state during the campaign which he ultimately won. He was the first politician to use a helicopter as a transportation devise during a campaign. Here are a few basic facts about the Lyndon Johnson Helicopter s51:

• The s51 helicopter became available for commercial use in 1946. It was only the second commercial helicopter ever sold to the public.
• Lyndon B. Johnson used an s51 helicopter during the spring and summer of 1948 in his campaign for the U.S. Senate in Texas
• The s51 is a twin engine helicopter
• The Lyndon Johnson helicopter s51 was the first ever used in a U.S. political campaign
• The s51 was manufactured by American helicopter company, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation

Although Lyndon Johnson may have been the first politician to utilize the helicopter for quick entry and exits on his campaign stops, he certainly wasn’t the last. Today, the helicopter is used frequently as an inexpensive form of transportation for politicians and businessmen alike.

United States Deterrence Systems and Strategies at the Beginning of the Cold War

When World War II ended in September 1945, the United States of America was the most powerful economic and military country in the world. Sole possessor of the mighty atom bomb, in possession of the most advance conventional weapon systems in the world and the world power that was the least affected by the destruction of four dramatic years of fighting. The US, confident that peace would reign in the world for at least a decade, started demobilizing its massive armed force apparatus and curtailed the development of new weapon systems. World events changed all this very quickly. The wartime military relationship that existed between America and the Soviet Union promptly soured. In the years that followed the end of the war, the Soviet regime moved to consolidate its hold on the countries of Eastern Europe. They did not stop there. The Soviets wanted to spread communism to all parts of the globe. After Eastern Europe, they planned to move towards Asia. In America, the US armed forces continued their downsizing in 1946 despite the increasing evidence that Red Russia were continuing to build their military forces. During the early years of World War II, the Soviet Union was forced to move most of its industrial base outside their capital, Moscow. As a result, by mid to late 1940s, they possessed a large, albeit crude, military complex. The Soviets started a crash course to develop new weapon systems to increase their already massive land and air forces. Gathering information from espionage activities around the world, their own scientific research data and capture of German scientists, the Soviet Union was by mid 1946 in a full rearmament mode. In the meantime, their leaders were moving promptly in securing their country’s position as an equal to that of the United States. Political and military leaders in the West watched these disturbing developments within their former allied with uneasiness.

In March 1946, former wartime British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, gave a powerful and prophetic speech at Westminster College stating that: “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across Europe”. He was right of course. Tension would increment when on October 23rd, 1947, American intelligence officials noted the existence of a high number of Soviet made Tu-4 “Bull” bombers. The Bull was a textbook case of reverse-engineering a copy of the huge Boeing B-29 bomber. The Soviets got their hands on a few examples of the B-29 when they crash landed on Soviet territory after sustaining damages during bombings runs over Japan late in the war. These bombers gave the Soviet Union for the first time the ability to hit targets in continental America. By the beginning of 1948, all but the essential communication links between the one-time allies had ceased. Then on the morning of April 1st, 1948, the Soviets closed all land access to the divided city of Berlin, deep behind the Soviet Occupation Zone. The land blockade lasted until September 30th, 1949; three days after President Harry Truman informed a stunning nation that the Russians had succeeded in exploding an atom bomb, ending the short-lived United State monopoly on nuclear weapons. All these developments, occurring in such a short times span, prompted concern in the ability of the US armed forces to defend the homeland. Accordingly to the times in 1947, the United States government proceeded to make one of the most overwhelming reorganizations of its political and military structure. The War Department, stabled since the incorporation of the Colonies, was replaced with the new Department of Defense. The Army retained all of its ground forces, the Navy retained their assets, but the air arm of the Army became a separate service, the newly and independent military service was the US Air Force. As soon as the new Air Force enters service, it started to flex its political power. It was often at odds with the Army brass over the control of nuclear weapons systems as well as who should be in control of the country’s air defenses. As the 1940s passed and the 1950s began, US weapons development systems were in constant turmoil because of the inter service rivalry that was forming between the three services. Both the Army and the Air Force fought feverishly for control over the development and deployment of a surface-to-air missile system, and the three services sought to develop independently long range ballistic missile programs.

The outbreak of hostilities in the Korean Peninsula in 1950 put all the squabbling to rest. The US Army de-activated most components of its artillery department and reorganized them in the newly created Army Anti-Aircraft Command (ARAACOM). The ARAACOM was assigned the task to deploy antiaircraft artillery on sixty six key locations inside the United States as a stopgap until a missile defense system were available. About the same time, the US Air Force was assigned control of America’s ballistic missile research and developing program. In the mid 1950s the Air Defense Command (ADC) became the main strategic command, coordinating the defenses of continental United States. With this massive undertaking, the Air Force was awarded a bigger piece of the budgetary pie. Funds were now available for the development of new types of nuclear weapons, new long range heavy bombers and the big prize, the guided long range ballistic missile. The priority of funding went to the research and development of a strategic long range surface-to-surface missile, an offensive missile system. The leaders at the Pentagon envisioned an offensive missile system so powerful that it by itself deterred any possible preemptive nuclear attack by the Soviets. The deployment of these missiles clearly implies the ability of the US to achieve a massive retaliation capability upon the attacker. The role of these missile and that of their ability to lunch a massive un-surviving counterattack would be discussed during most of the years of the Cold War. Military, as well as political leaders would use the leverage that this system gave to them to bargain and to achieve political and military concessions from the Soviets and America.

Because the design and development of an operational guided long range ballistic missile system seems to many in Washington as a more technical plausible weapon platform than the development of a comprehensive strategic missile defense system. The decision was made to pursue the offensive ballistic missile system first. Working on the strategic defense system was put on the back burner. America’s strategic doctrine underwent numerous changes during the course of the Cold War. Then, during the 1950s, the Eisenhower Administration pursued a military doctrine that called for a scale back in conventional force military expending and increasing the nuclear strike force in order to make it clear to the Soviet Union that the United States had the weapons and the means to deliver a massive nuclear blow at the Soviet Union if they decided to launch a first strike campaign. Critics of this new policy, known as New Look, pointed to the administration that there was no assurance that the US arsenal could survive a Soviet nuclear attack. When the new Kennedy Administration took office in 1961, they brought a fresh look at the world strategic situation. Flexible Response was born. This new military doctrine called for a mixture of conventional and nuclear forces, which could be tailor made to threats in a proportionate manner. The success of this new policy would be the backbone of United States Military posture during the next thirty five years.

A Brief Look at the United States Defensive Missile Systems from 1945 to 2004 - Part 1

During the years that followed the end of World War II, the Western Democracies, lead by the United States, and the Soviet-lead Eastern Bloc were locked in a political, economical, ideological and sometimes military battle known as the Cold War. In the military arena, both main superpowers, were developing more advanced offensive weapon systems like the long-range bomber and the new intercontinental ballistic missile system as a mean to safeguard each country against the possibility of a preemptive strike by the other superpower.

A counterweight was needed to be found in order to defend the United States against this possibility. With the development of the nuclear bomb and later the thermonuclear bomb, the battlefield was changed for ever. All existing defensive systems were rendered obsolete the moment the bomb was delivered to Nagasaki. The awesome power of this new weapon altered the Pentagon’s defense strategy.

In the past, the United States mainland defenses were focused at an conventional invasion attempt. Now, with the realization that a massive nuclear attack could cripple most of the country in hours, the United States military planners began to construct a new defense posture. The new posture was centered around the means of stopping the enemy ability to produce a surprise nuclear strike. This means stopping the bombers and the offensive ballistic missiles. By the mid 1950s, after an extended period of research and the development, the U.S. was able to field a first generation antiaircraft missile system that was capable of delivering conventional or nuclear warheads at incoming bomber formations. At the same time, both the United States and the Soviet Union were moving ahead with the development of a series of offensive missile platforms that could deliver a bigger nuclear payload against ground targets located thousand of miles away. The need to defend the home land was more imperative now that at any time in the history of the United States. The development and fielding of workable defensive missile system was giving top priority by the U.S. government.

These missile systems were the ultimate in weapon development of the era. Massive amounts resources were invested in the research and development of these missile systems. This book will provide the reader with an overview of the fixed, land-based defensive missile systems developed by the United States during the years of the Cold War. The NIKE, BOMARC and Safe Guard programs will be discussed as well as the deterrence missile systems, the Atlas, Titan, Minuteman and Peacekeeper will also be discussed. The book end with a brief look at the future of the United States antiballistic missile defenses in the 21st century.

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

Flying Home Made Machines

Is flying home made machines safe? Just ask Wilbur and Orville Wright. They tried and failed. Then they tried again and again, finally succeeding in getting man in the air (if only briefly) in 1903. Maybe the most famous aviation explorers in American history this team of brothers didn’t let fear stand in their way of success. Still, their journey towards building the very first airplane didn’t come without a few close calls.

Since that fateful day more than a century ago thousands of other aviation enthusiasts have tried to build their own man-made airplanes. If you are one of them, steadfastly working on your own handmade airplane, flying scooter or even hot air balloon in your garage, then you will need to learn how to make flying home made machines as safe as possible to avoid disaster. Take a few of these tips from the Wright Brothers:

• Never test any aircraft (but especially a homemade one) alone. Always work in a team to keep a disaster at bay.
• Never cold-test any type of flying machine with a human – always test your machine with a robot or even a stuffed animal first.
• Be sure that you know what you are doing. If you are not absolutely certain that your machine will fly, do not climb in!
• Pre-test at low altitudes first. Try testing your aircraft from a low roof or hill before heading toward the closest cliff.
• Use every available caution. Wear a parachute; let local emergency personnel know about your test (better yet, have someone on hand to help out in an emergency); etc.

Building and flying home made machines can be exhilarating, but always be sure that you take safety seriously. After all, you want to be healthy – and in one piece – top enjoy your homemade aircraft for years to come.

Air Attack on the German Oil Industry

The swift focus of the Allied bomber campaign against the German’s oil industry had immediate and far-reaching effects, compared with the 175,000 tons of aviation fuel it produced in April 1944. In June of that same year, German oil production fell to just over 55,000 tons, less than a third of the previous years output. Unless something was done, and done very soon, the Luftwaffe could find itself with insufficient aviation fuel to continue to sustain air operations. As an initial move to change the situation, large numbers of anti-aircraft batteries were transferred from other areas inside Germany, to protect the oil industry refineries. The 14th Flak division was assigned responsibility for the defense of the industry district at Leipzig, which included the most vaunted oil production plants at Leuna-Merseburg, Bohlen, Troglitz, Espenhain and Mucheln. All would receive the bulk of the anti aircraft pieces, a move made in order to strengthen the Division. By the beginning of May, the Division had in its possession 374 heavy caliber guns, 342 of the 8.8cm caliber, 24 of 10.5cm and 8 of 12.8cm caliber. Immediately after the combined allied offensive against the oil industry commenced, the energetic General Adolf Gerlach was appointed to the command of the Division. He received a visit from Riechsminiter Albert Speer, who made it clear that unless the sector refineries were kept working, the war was as good as lost. When Gerlach assumed command of the Division, there had been 104 heavy guns protecting the large Leuna-Merserburg production complex, he demanded, and received, sufficient weapons to bring about a six fold strengthening of the flack defenses ringing that particular target.

Having secured as much of the larger guns he needed, Gerlach set about to increase its tactical effectiveness. During the attack at the plant, US heavy bombers dropped huge quantities of “chaff” and radiated a cacophony of noise jamming that effectively neutralized the German Wuzburg flack control radar system. As a result of this tactic, during day bombing, the gunners were forced to abandon the use of radar-laid fire and resorted to optical predicted fire. If the clouds and enemy countermeasures prevented accurate predicted fire, the gunners would put up a box barrage. All guns fire at the same point in the sky just short of where it was calculated that the bombers would release the bombs, by disrupting the bombing run in this way, the accuracy of the attack could be greatly reduced. This method was highly extravagant in the use of ammunitions, however, and it was permitted to be used only in the direct defense of high priority targets such as oil refineries. US bomber crews rated the oil refineries and chemical plants around Leipzig as the most heavily defended areas against air attack. In addition to these active defense measures, passive measures were also introduced to lessen the effects of the constant bombing. Concrete reinforced blast walls were built around items of vulnerable machinery, and a warren of deep shelters under the plants enable its workers to remain near at hand during the bombing attacks and emerge afterwards to extinguish the fires before they took hold. Although by this time the German Army was short of skilled manpower, they shifted seven thousand engineers for employment in rapid repair brigades at the refineries and a large number of slave workers, primarily Russian prisoners of war, were drafted in to assist with this work. Finally, to ensure that morale at these facilities did not flag under the intense Allied bombardment, the work force came under “special supervision” from Heinrich Himmler’s feared Security Service.

As a further measure to safeguard German’s precious oil production, Edmund Geilenberg was appointed head of a far reaching program to build a network of new refineries that would be far less vulnerable to air bombardment. For the indispensable production of aviation fuel, he and his staff laid plans for the construction of seven underground hydro generation plants. Lower grade motor fuel was to be produced in 41 much smaller facilities situated above ground but widely dispersed in woods and quarries, each carefully camouflaged and individually too small to make an attractive target to the bombers. Geilenberg made full use of the authority given to him to tale labor and materials from other industries, and his labor force was built up rapidly to more than a third of a million workers. He was planning to have several of the motor fuel producing plants ready to enter service by the autumn of 1944, but despite great efforts by Geilenberg and his staff, the first underground plant was not due to produce aviation fuel until well into the spring of 1945. In fact, no aviation fuel came from this source as the war ended on April 1945. During this period, German rocket fighters went into action several times in defense of refineries in the Leipzig area. On the 16th of August, the US Eighth Air Force, known as the Mighty Eight, put up a thousand bombers to attack a spread of targets in central Germany, including the oil refineries at Bohlen. Five Me 163s were scrambled, and two were promptly shot down without inflicting any damage to the raiding force.

The Messerschmitt 163 achieved its first aerial victory just one week after the event, on August 24th. Eight of the smaller fighters took off from fields on Brandis to engage a bomber force of some 185 B-17s running into attack the refinery at Marseburg. Feldwebel Siegfried Schubert carried out a successful interception of the force and shot down two Flying Fortresses, other pilots from the same unit shot down two more units. Two Me 163s were damaged, one by return fire from a B-17 gunner and the other by a landing accident. It had been a successful day for this new jet fighter and seemed to be important for its future as a bomber-destroyer airplane. But in the end, when the Me163s scored four bombers destroyed that day, were to be the high mark point of its operational career. On September 24, Squadron 400 reported that it had nineteen Messerschmitt Me 163s in operation, of which just eleven were serviceable. By that time over a hundred of these jet fighters had been delivered to the Luftwaffe, and it is clear that the factor limiting operational employment was not aircraft but trained pilots. Now it was clear that the hope for salvation for the German Fighter Force was not going to come from this quarter. During September, Squadron 400 operated on five different occasions, the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and the 28th. The largest of these operations was the last one, when nine of the diminutive planes were committed.

The relative short range of the Me 163 meant that accurate ground control was essential if the fighters were to be used effectively. Such controled operations was not always forthcoming, however, and only a small proportion of the fighters reached firing positions. During September 1944, the Me 163 program suffered a disaster from which it would never recover fully. In bombings attacks on the towns of Leverkusen and Ludwigshaven that month, two of the main sources of hydrazine and hydrate suffered serious damage and production was greatly reduced by it. For the remainder of the war, shortages of this chemical fuel would dog the 163. A major competitor for this limited chemical fuel was the Fi 103 flying bomb, which used it to power the catapult system that fires them into the air. The Fi 103 enjoyed a higher priority for supplies than the Me 163 programs. At the same time, the piston engine fighter units continued to mount defensive attacks against bomber formations, and from time to time they were able to pick their way past the American fighter screens and deliver their special brand of saturation attacks on an unexpected bomber. On September 27th, Squadron 4 delivered a sharp attack on the 445th Bomber group and in three furious minutes, it shot down 28 Liberator bombers out of a total of 37 dispatched. It would be the heaviest loss ever suffered by the US Bomber Group on a single mission. On the following day, the Squadron No. 3 assailed the 41st Combat Wing and shot down eighteen Flying Fortresses before the arrival of strong forces of escorts, preventing the slaughter to continue. Just over a week later, October 6th, a Squadron drawn from the 4th and 300th fought a similarly brisk battle with the 4th combat Bomber Wing and shot down fourteen B-17s.

Despite that such actions brought disaster upon the individual bomber units involved, their effect on the US bombing offensive as a whole was not. During the three days mentioned before, heavy bombers of the US Eight Army Air Forces flew a grand total of 3,275 successful sorties for a loss of some 81 units, less than 2.5 percent of the total. And that, it must be stressed, was on three days when the German defenders were relatively successful. Each passing day, when the weather permitted, the US Eighth and Thirteen Air Forces would send more than a thousand heavy bombers to attack targets across Germany and the occupied territories and on most days, losses were less than 1 percent of the total force involved. The German night fighter force had not recovered from the neutralization of its early warning radar system when it suffered a further calamity. The loss of French territory to the Allies had torn a gapping hole on Germany’s early tracking radar chain, which the Royal Air Force now exploited by routing bombers from that direction during attack on the south and western parts of Germany. Even as signals personnel struggled to reposition radar dishes to plug this breach there came a further blow; the fuel famine started to take effect and forced a curtailment of night fighter activities.

Then, to add to the worsening situation, No 100 Group of the RAF began to make its present felt during the night air battles. The Group operated five squadrons of heavy bombers modified into special jamming aircrafts, B-17 Fortresses, B-24 Liberators, Halifaxes and Stirlings. These aircraft were able to carry a large quantity of “windows” of all types, as well as noise-jamming equipment to counter the German’s Wurzburg fire control system and the Freya, Mammut, Wassermann and Jagdschloss radars that made up the German early warning chains. In addition, some of the aircraft carried “Jostle”, a high power jammer to blot out the night fighter’s radio communication channels. No 100 comprised of six squadrons of Mosquito night fighters carrying special systems to enable them to operate against their Luftwaffe counterparts deep inside the Third Reich. Homing on to radar emissions was a game that two could play, and in addition to AI radar some of the Mosquitos carried “Serrate”, which enabled them to home in on emissions from the German night fighter’s SN-2 radars. Other Mosquitos carried “Perfectos”, which transmitted interrogating pulses to trigger the identification friend or foe (IFF) sets of German aircraft in the area. When Germans IFF sets replied, their signals betrayed the range and bearing of the aircraft and identified it to the Mosquito crews as hostile. Several German aircrafts were shot down following “Perfectos” contacts, and many others were lost when German crews, having heard of the system, flew with IFF switched off and were shot down by their own flak.

But despite the presence of the Mosquito in the night battles, the German night fighter force suffered a far lower rate of attrition than its day fighter counterparts. But No. 100 group’s operation imposed considerable pressure on the German defenses, which in combination with the other factors, allowed the RAF night bombers to operate at will over the German sky with minimal losses. Throughout this period, the German oil industry was hit hard and repeatly. An example of the fate of the German oil industry, in the hands of the Allied bombing offensive happened in the spring of 1944, when one of the largest producers of synthetic oil, the Amoniakwerk Merseburg plant at Leuna, who produced about one sixth of the total German production. The huge plant sprawled over an area of 757 acres, and in addition to liquid fuels it produced ammonia, methanol and various types of industrial alcohol from coke and brown coal. The first large scale attack that happened at the plant was from 224 Flying Fortresses of the Eighth Air Force, which took place on May 12th, even before the Allied main offensive against the German oil industry began. That initial attack brought a halt to fuel production. During the next six months, the plant was attacked twelve more times. Time after time the plant was hit hard and production halted, as if one of the prize-fighters had been knocked to the ground. But each time it picked itself up and production resumed. At first the recovery was quickly and almost complete, but as the accumulation of punishment began to tell, the recovery became progressively slower and less complete.

Compared with 175,000 tons of aviation fuel produced in April, in August there were only 16,000 tons and in September a mere 7,000 tons. Throughout that summer, the Luftwaffe kept going on its fat, the reserves of over half a million tons of aviation fuel it had accumulated previously. With consumption running far in excess of production, by the beginning of September more than half this reserve had been consumed; from a high point of about 580,000 tons at the beginning of May, stocks were only about 180,000 tons at the end of September. Now the harsh reality of the shortfall of fuel production could not be avoided. Operation by the Luftwaffes medium and heavy bombers were sharply curtailed, the use of aerial reconnaissance was limited, air operations in support of the Army were permitted only in decisive situations, and the number of night fighter sorties was cut back. Only day fighter operations in defense of the Fatherland were allowed to continue at their previous level. Meanwhile, in Germany the production of combat aircrafts, and in particular fighter types, had risen to unprecedented levels. The Luftwaffe was about to stage a remarkable recovery in fighting strength.

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

Revolution in the Air: Gallaudet’s D-5, DM-5 and D-7 Models

In the winter of 1917, the Gallaudet Engineering Company finally completed their much anticipated land monoplane that used their patented Gallaudet-Drive Mechanism, a revolutionary engine driving a remote, mid-fuselage mounted propeller. The newly produced aircraft, call signed D-5, were to be the Company’s first true landplane platform after years of experimenting with the famous D-2 biplane.

In early January 1918, the company was submerged in developing the D-4 project, a tactical fighter for which they would receive a construction contract the following month from the United States Navy. But despite the immense work being done on the 4 model, Gallaudet engineers still found time to explore new ideas such as the 5 type. This new design was to use the reliable Liberty engine, first tested years before on American Expeditionary Force’s Farmans. Gallaudet designers use the D-5 project as a test bed for new technology. Chief among them was a cantilever wing structure with a thick airfoil, which have the distinction of being the first such wing design fitted into an American-develop air platform.

On the morning of January 7th, the company officially submitted a proposal to W.F. Durand; chairman of the influential NACA, for transmittal to the Aircraft Board for the building of what Edson Gallaudet called a “200-mph fighting monoplane”. The 5’s general arrangement is dated January 6th, so this proximity to the proposal and the lack of another competing design at this period, makes it almost certain that the D-5 was the 200-mph plane. Attached to the letter Durand received on the 7th were several detailed blueprints and specification sheets, with one of them being the D-5.

The designed D-5 was a mid-winged monoplane powered by a Liberty engine mounted on the nose. It had a 39′ wing span. The fuselage was 30′4″ in length and possessed a height of 7′-9″. The vaunted Liberty drove a mid-frame two blade propeller. The pilot was seated in an open cockpit between the engine and the propeller. The reconnaissance officer or observer as was call at the times, sat behind the propeller. Two fuel tanks were fitted at the front and the rear of the pilot’s seat. Tail surfaces were identically to the D-4, except for the absent of stub fins. The tail skid was an extension of the small rudder post. A cantilevered, thick and tapered wing gave the plane a distinct look.

Another departure from the D-4 was the use of rectangular spars in the fuselage’s cross section. The ailerons had an inverse taper with a wide base at the tips. A tall, fixed landing gear was fastened between the two wing spars near the wing root, which is estimated to be at 12 percent, thicker than usual for the era. The relative small air frame made it a necessity for the Liberty engine’s upper and down sections to be expose to the air stream.

During the early part of the March 1918, Gallaudet surprised the nascent aviation industry with another monoplane design, DM-5. the ‘M’ designation suggest a modified version of another platform, although no official documentation has been found to prove it. At the heart of the new version lay basically an improved D-5. The airframe was extended to 3′6″ wide and by 4′ high in order to fully enclose the Liberty engine. Still, the motor was big enough, in comparison with the mid frame, that the bottom oil sump was not covered. The wing was now a constant chord with a thin airfoil and no longer cantilevered, with a streamlined bracing line on top and bottom to the front and rear spars.

The ‘M’ concept called for two rectangular outlines on the wing’s surfaces near the root, which served as airfoil radiators similar to the ones used on the D-4. The biggest departure from the D-5 model was the incorporation of a retractable landing gear. A single leg per wheel retracted forward into the nose section beside the engine. The front of the airframe was composed on tubular longerons connected with cast bronze fittings braced by thin wires. The engine bearers appeared to have been built-up, sheet metal channel type as used on the D-4. There were three wing spars. All widest at the brazing wires attachment points and tapered from there towards both the tips and fuselage. The spars were rectangular in section and constructed out of metal sheet. The top and bottom parts of the aircraft were channel-shaped of .0625″ of thickness and the webs were .025″. All held together by an eight to a quarter diameter rivets.

Another of Gallaudet’s lesser known designs is the D-7 Mail Carrier. The drawing, which probably was made accordingly to a mid-1918 request by the United States government, was the project less coveted by Edson Gallaudet at that time frame. Unfortunately, little is know about the concept beyond its indented purposes of transporting mail through the air. But the few sketches that had survived pain a picture of a truly remarkable aeroplane. The design looks like a slightly larger, fixed landing gear version of the ‘M’ version. There are no indications of pilot seating or cockpit arrangement. No engine area is visible on the incomplete blue print. Span was to be around fifty feet. Fuselage length was 30′3″ with a total wing area of 337.5 square feet. The wing had two spars which were only indicated by a single dotted line on the paper. The rest of the data is missing or inconclusive.

It’s a testament to his innovating vision that almost a century later, all three models, D-5, DM-5 and D-7, are once again gaining the interest of aviation aficionados the world over.

The Aeroplane as a Long Range Gun, Journal of the Royal Artillery, R.G. Cherry, June 1919
Alpha, Bravo, Delta: Guide to the U.S. Air Force, Walter J. Boyne, editor, Penguin Books 2003
The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, Robert Jackson, Parragon Publishing, 2002
The Early Aviation History, American Years, Edward Von der Porten, Crowell Company, 1969

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

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