Project Tom-Tom

Project Tom-Tom was originated by the United States Air Force’s Strategic Air Command as a way to provide its long range heavy bomber fleets with a fighter umbrella by towing them on semi-fixed wing links.

The concept of the MX-1018, the programs official call-sign, was devised from the FICO (Fighter Conveyor) system. A program initiated by the US Air Force in the 1950s to test the feasibility of utilizing a B-29 Superfortress bomber as a ‘mother ship’ from which a pair of Republic’s F-84 Thunderfalsh fighters would operate. FICO became fully operational in 1955, but only a handful of missions were ever flown.

In the Tom-Tom structure, the parasite fighter plane would shut down its engine to save fuel while it’s been towed. It will restart and detach from the moving airplane to intercept enemy aircrafts, rejoining the bomber once it has accomplished the mission.

For this configuration, two F-84Ds (versions 48-641 and 48-661) from the BASUT based at Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio were especially modified to carry a lance-like structure on their port and starboard wingtips platforms. The re-configurated aircraft was given the EF-84D designation.

For the initial test phase of the concept, a modified EB-29A-60-BN, tail number 44-62093 was selected. The bomber was fitted with booms installed at the wing tips onto which the F-84D’s lance would be attached to just before being withdrawn into the mother ship’s wing to lock both planes together.

The first hook-on trials were carried out on July 21st 1950 in the skies above Long Island, New York. With Major Clarence Anderson flying the starboard and Major John Davis running the port plane, the initial connecting test proved a resounding success. In the beginning both F-84Ds experienced heavy turbulence in their pitch and yaw while in the process of hooking into the booms, but after that the ride proved to be more smothering than many anticipated. Re-engaging the Thunderflash’s engine was also relatively easy and after several months, the program was ready for it next phase.

The morning of September 15th 1952 marked another milestone in the project’s life when the Thunderfalsh made their first, long lasting link up with the bomber. That was followed by another 43 additional connections. After a brief, inactive period, testing resumed in full swing on March 1953.

A month later, tragedy hit the program. On April 24th during an engaging maneuver, Major Davis’s F-84D lost surface control, rolling upside down hitting the upper wing structure of the EB-29A. Both aircrafts plummeted into the Peconic Bay with the lost of Davis and the entire bomber crew.

The news of the accident hit the program hard, but it did not end it. After several months, the program was back on track. Now two new RF-84s, this time an F variant (tail number 51-1848 and 51-1849) would attempt to connect, but not with a now obsolete B-29, but with the new and massive B-36 Peacemaker. JRB-36F, serial number 49-2707, was fitted with a new link up platform that would cope with the small fighter’s swept wing arrangement. The system consisted on a hinged arm on the ‘mother ship’ that trapped the fighter in a jaw-type position on its wingtip structure. The first test connection was made on April 24th 1956. With Beryl A. Eickson at the controls, the improved Thunderfalsh performed several quick, connection-detachment operations.

Almost 50 hookups were made during a five month period. Then, on the afternoon of September 26th, tragedy almost hit the program again. While engaging the connecting mechanisms, Eickson’s plane began to rift out of control, very much like Davis’ did three years before. Fortunately for both aircrafts, he was able to detach in time and both airplanes were able to land at Carswell AFB in Texas.

Although only minor damages were reported, most of them on the RF-84F, the AF decided to cancel the entire program soon after the incident.

Concept Aircraft: Prototypes, X-Planes and Experimental Aircraft, Editor Jim Winchester, Thunder Bay Press 2005
Air Power: The men, machines, and ideas that revolutionized war, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II, Stephen Budiansky, Penguin Books 2004
Air Power in the Age of Total War, John Buckley, Indiana University Press 1999

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

Air Attack on the German Oil Industry

The swift focus of the Allied bomber campaign against the German’s oil industry had immediate and far-reaching effects, compared with the 175,000 tons of aviation fuel it produced in April 1944. In June of that same year, German oil production fell to just over 55,000 tons, less than a third of the previous years output. Unless something was done, and done very soon, the Luftwaffe could find itself with insufficient aviation fuel to continue to sustain air operations. As an initial move to change the situation, large numbers of anti-aircraft batteries were transferred from other areas inside Germany, to protect the oil industry refineries. The 14th Flak division was assigned responsibility for the defense of the industry district at Leipzig, which included the most vaunted oil production plants at Leuna-Merseburg, Bohlen, Troglitz, Espenhain and Mucheln. All would receive the bulk of the anti aircraft pieces, a move made in order to strengthen the Division. By the beginning of May, the Division had in its possession 374 heavy caliber guns, 342 of the 8.8cm caliber, 24 of 10.5cm and 8 of 12.8cm caliber. Immediately after the combined allied offensive against the oil industry commenced, the energetic General Adolf Gerlach was appointed to the command of the Division. He received a visit from Riechsminiter Albert Speer, who made it clear that unless the sector refineries were kept working, the war was as good as lost. When Gerlach assumed command of the Division, there had been 104 heavy guns protecting the large Leuna-Merserburg production complex, he demanded, and received, sufficient weapons to bring about a six fold strengthening of the flack defenses ringing that particular target.

Having secured as much of the larger guns he needed, Gerlach set about to increase its tactical effectiveness. During the attack at the plant, US heavy bombers dropped huge quantities of “chaff” and radiated a cacophony of noise jamming that effectively neutralized the German Wuzburg flack control radar system. As a result of this tactic, during day bombing, the gunners were forced to abandon the use of radar-laid fire and resorted to optical predicted fire. If the clouds and enemy countermeasures prevented accurate predicted fire, the gunners would put up a box barrage. All guns fire at the same point in the sky just short of where it was calculated that the bombers would release the bombs, by disrupting the bombing run in this way, the accuracy of the attack could be greatly reduced. This method was highly extravagant in the use of ammunitions, however, and it was permitted to be used only in the direct defense of high priority targets such as oil refineries. US bomber crews rated the oil refineries and chemical plants around Leipzig as the most heavily defended areas against air attack. In addition to these active defense measures, passive measures were also introduced to lessen the effects of the constant bombing. Concrete reinforced blast walls were built around items of vulnerable machinery, and a warren of deep shelters under the plants enable its workers to remain near at hand during the bombing attacks and emerge afterwards to extinguish the fires before they took hold. Although by this time the German Army was short of skilled manpower, they shifted seven thousand engineers for employment in rapid repair brigades at the refineries and a large number of slave workers, primarily Russian prisoners of war, were drafted in to assist with this work. Finally, to ensure that morale at these facilities did not flag under the intense Allied bombardment, the work force came under “special supervision” from Heinrich Himmler’s feared Security Service.

As a further measure to safeguard German’s precious oil production, Edmund Geilenberg was appointed head of a far reaching program to build a network of new refineries that would be far less vulnerable to air bombardment. For the indispensable production of aviation fuel, he and his staff laid plans for the construction of seven underground hydro generation plants. Lower grade motor fuel was to be produced in 41 much smaller facilities situated above ground but widely dispersed in woods and quarries, each carefully camouflaged and individually too small to make an attractive target to the bombers. Geilenberg made full use of the authority given to him to tale labor and materials from other industries, and his labor force was built up rapidly to more than a third of a million workers. He was planning to have several of the motor fuel producing plants ready to enter service by the autumn of 1944, but despite great efforts by Geilenberg and his staff, the first underground plant was not due to produce aviation fuel until well into the spring of 1945. In fact, no aviation fuel came from this source as the war ended on April 1945. During this period, German rocket fighters went into action several times in defense of refineries in the Leipzig area. On the 16th of August, the US Eighth Air Force, known as the Mighty Eight, put up a thousand bombers to attack a spread of targets in central Germany, including the oil refineries at Bohlen. Five Me 163s were scrambled, and two were promptly shot down without inflicting any damage to the raiding force.

The Messerschmitt 163 achieved its first aerial victory just one week after the event, on August 24th. Eight of the smaller fighters took off from fields on Brandis to engage a bomber force of some 185 B-17s running into attack the refinery at Marseburg. Feldwebel Siegfried Schubert carried out a successful interception of the force and shot down two Flying Fortresses, other pilots from the same unit shot down two more units. Two Me 163s were damaged, one by return fire from a B-17 gunner and the other by a landing accident. It had been a successful day for this new jet fighter and seemed to be important for its future as a bomber-destroyer airplane. But in the end, when the Me163s scored four bombers destroyed that day, were to be the high mark point of its operational career. On September 24, Squadron 400 reported that it had nineteen Messerschmitt Me 163s in operation, of which just eleven were serviceable. By that time over a hundred of these jet fighters had been delivered to the Luftwaffe, and it is clear that the factor limiting operational employment was not aircraft but trained pilots. Now it was clear that the hope for salvation for the German Fighter Force was not going to come from this quarter. During September, Squadron 400 operated on five different occasions, the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and the 28th. The largest of these operations was the last one, when nine of the diminutive planes were committed.

The relative short range of the Me 163 meant that accurate ground control was essential if the fighters were to be used effectively. Such controled operations was not always forthcoming, however, and only a small proportion of the fighters reached firing positions. During September 1944, the Me 163 program suffered a disaster from which it would never recover fully. In bombings attacks on the towns of Leverkusen and Ludwigshaven that month, two of the main sources of hydrazine and hydrate suffered serious damage and production was greatly reduced by it. For the remainder of the war, shortages of this chemical fuel would dog the 163. A major competitor for this limited chemical fuel was the Fi 103 flying bomb, which used it to power the catapult system that fires them into the air. The Fi 103 enjoyed a higher priority for supplies than the Me 163 programs. At the same time, the piston engine fighter units continued to mount defensive attacks against bomber formations, and from time to time they were able to pick their way past the American fighter screens and deliver their special brand of saturation attacks on an unexpected bomber. On September 27th, Squadron 4 delivered a sharp attack on the 445th Bomber group and in three furious minutes, it shot down 28 Liberator bombers out of a total of 37 dispatched. It would be the heaviest loss ever suffered by the US Bomber Group on a single mission. On the following day, the Squadron No. 3 assailed the 41st Combat Wing and shot down eighteen Flying Fortresses before the arrival of strong forces of escorts, preventing the slaughter to continue. Just over a week later, October 6th, a Squadron drawn from the 4th and 300th fought a similarly brisk battle with the 4th combat Bomber Wing and shot down fourteen B-17s.

Despite that such actions brought disaster upon the individual bomber units involved, their effect on the US bombing offensive as a whole was not. During the three days mentioned before, heavy bombers of the US Eight Army Air Forces flew a grand total of 3,275 successful sorties for a loss of some 81 units, less than 2.5 percent of the total. And that, it must be stressed, was on three days when the German defenders were relatively successful. Each passing day, when the weather permitted, the US Eighth and Thirteen Air Forces would send more than a thousand heavy bombers to attack targets across Germany and the occupied territories and on most days, losses were less than 1 percent of the total force involved. The German night fighter force had not recovered from the neutralization of its early warning radar system when it suffered a further calamity. The loss of French territory to the Allies had torn a gapping hole on Germany’s early tracking radar chain, which the Royal Air Force now exploited by routing bombers from that direction during attack on the south and western parts of Germany. Even as signals personnel struggled to reposition radar dishes to plug this breach there came a further blow; the fuel famine started to take effect and forced a curtailment of night fighter activities.

Then, to add to the worsening situation, No 100 Group of the RAF began to make its present felt during the night air battles. The Group operated five squadrons of heavy bombers modified into special jamming aircrafts, B-17 Fortresses, B-24 Liberators, Halifaxes and Stirlings. These aircraft were able to carry a large quantity of “windows” of all types, as well as noise-jamming equipment to counter the German’s Wurzburg fire control system and the Freya, Mammut, Wassermann and Jagdschloss radars that made up the German early warning chains. In addition, some of the aircraft carried “Jostle”, a high power jammer to blot out the night fighter’s radio communication channels. No 100 comprised of six squadrons of Mosquito night fighters carrying special systems to enable them to operate against their Luftwaffe counterparts deep inside the Third Reich. Homing on to radar emissions was a game that two could play, and in addition to AI radar some of the Mosquitos carried “Serrate”, which enabled them to home in on emissions from the German night fighter’s SN-2 radars. Other Mosquitos carried “Perfectos”, which transmitted interrogating pulses to trigger the identification friend or foe (IFF) sets of German aircraft in the area. When Germans IFF sets replied, their signals betrayed the range and bearing of the aircraft and identified it to the Mosquito crews as hostile. Several German aircrafts were shot down following “Perfectos” contacts, and many others were lost when German crews, having heard of the system, flew with IFF switched off and were shot down by their own flak.

But despite the presence of the Mosquito in the night battles, the German night fighter force suffered a far lower rate of attrition than its day fighter counterparts. But No. 100 group’s operation imposed considerable pressure on the German defenses, which in combination with the other factors, allowed the RAF night bombers to operate at will over the German sky with minimal losses. Throughout this period, the German oil industry was hit hard and repeatly. An example of the fate of the German oil industry, in the hands of the Allied bombing offensive happened in the spring of 1944, when one of the largest producers of synthetic oil, the Amoniakwerk Merseburg plant at Leuna, who produced about one sixth of the total German production. The huge plant sprawled over an area of 757 acres, and in addition to liquid fuels it produced ammonia, methanol and various types of industrial alcohol from coke and brown coal. The first large scale attack that happened at the plant was from 224 Flying Fortresses of the Eighth Air Force, which took place on May 12th, even before the Allied main offensive against the German oil industry began. That initial attack brought a halt to fuel production. During the next six months, the plant was attacked twelve more times. Time after time the plant was hit hard and production halted, as if one of the prize-fighters had been knocked to the ground. But each time it picked itself up and production resumed. At first the recovery was quickly and almost complete, but as the accumulation of punishment began to tell, the recovery became progressively slower and less complete.

Compared with 175,000 tons of aviation fuel produced in April, in August there were only 16,000 tons and in September a mere 7,000 tons. Throughout that summer, the Luftwaffe kept going on its fat, the reserves of over half a million tons of aviation fuel it had accumulated previously. With consumption running far in excess of production, by the beginning of September more than half this reserve had been consumed; from a high point of about 580,000 tons at the beginning of May, stocks were only about 180,000 tons at the end of September. Now the harsh reality of the shortfall of fuel production could not be avoided. Operation by the Luftwaffes medium and heavy bombers were sharply curtailed, the use of aerial reconnaissance was limited, air operations in support of the Army were permitted only in decisive situations, and the number of night fighter sorties was cut back. Only day fighter operations in defense of the Fatherland were allowed to continue at their previous level. Meanwhile, in Germany the production of combat aircrafts, and in particular fighter types, had risen to unprecedented levels. The Luftwaffe was about to stage a remarkable recovery in fighting strength.

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

Revolution in the Air: Gallaudet’s D-5, DM-5 and D-7 Models

In the winter of 1917, the Gallaudet Engineering Company finally completed their much anticipated land monoplane that used their patented Gallaudet-Drive Mechanism, a revolutionary engine driving a remote, mid-fuselage mounted propeller. The newly produced aircraft, call signed D-5, were to be the Company’s first true landplane platform after years of experimenting with the famous D-2 biplane.

In early January 1918, the company was submerged in developing the D-4 project, a tactical fighter for which they would receive a construction contract the following month from the United States Navy. But despite the immense work being done on the 4 model, Gallaudet engineers still found time to explore new ideas such as the 5 type. This new design was to use the reliable Liberty engine, first tested years before on American Expeditionary Force’s Farmans. Gallaudet designers use the D-5 project as a test bed for new technology. Chief among them was a cantilever wing structure with a thick airfoil, which have the distinction of being the first such wing design fitted into an American-develop air platform.

On the morning of January 7th, the company officially submitted a proposal to W.F. Durand; chairman of the influential NACA, for transmittal to the Aircraft Board for the building of what Edson Gallaudet called a “200-mph fighting monoplane”. The 5’s general arrangement is dated January 6th, so this proximity to the proposal and the lack of another competing design at this period, makes it almost certain that the D-5 was the 200-mph plane. Attached to the letter Durand received on the 7th were several detailed blueprints and specification sheets, with one of them being the D-5.

The designed D-5 was a mid-winged monoplane powered by a Liberty engine mounted on the nose. It had a 39′ wing span. The fuselage was 30′4″ in length and possessed a height of 7′-9″. The vaunted Liberty drove a mid-frame two blade propeller. The pilot was seated in an open cockpit between the engine and the propeller. The reconnaissance officer or observer as was call at the times, sat behind the propeller. Two fuel tanks were fitted at the front and the rear of the pilot’s seat. Tail surfaces were identically to the D-4, except for the absent of stub fins. The tail skid was an extension of the small rudder post. A cantilevered, thick and tapered wing gave the plane a distinct look.

Another departure from the D-4 was the use of rectangular spars in the fuselage’s cross section. The ailerons had an inverse taper with a wide base at the tips. A tall, fixed landing gear was fastened between the two wing spars near the wing root, which is estimated to be at 12 percent, thicker than usual for the era. The relative small air frame made it a necessity for the Liberty engine’s upper and down sections to be expose to the air stream.

During the early part of the March 1918, Gallaudet surprised the nascent aviation industry with another monoplane design, DM-5. the ‘M’ designation suggest a modified version of another platform, although no official documentation has been found to prove it. At the heart of the new version lay basically an improved D-5. The airframe was extended to 3′6″ wide and by 4′ high in order to fully enclose the Liberty engine. Still, the motor was big enough, in comparison with the mid frame, that the bottom oil sump was not covered. The wing was now a constant chord with a thin airfoil and no longer cantilevered, with a streamlined bracing line on top and bottom to the front and rear spars.

The ‘M’ concept called for two rectangular outlines on the wing’s surfaces near the root, which served as airfoil radiators similar to the ones used on the D-4. The biggest departure from the D-5 model was the incorporation of a retractable landing gear. A single leg per wheel retracted forward into the nose section beside the engine. The front of the airframe was composed on tubular longerons connected with cast bronze fittings braced by thin wires. The engine bearers appeared to have been built-up, sheet metal channel type as used on the D-4. There were three wing spars. All widest at the brazing wires attachment points and tapered from there towards both the tips and fuselage. The spars were rectangular in section and constructed out of metal sheet. The top and bottom parts of the aircraft were channel-shaped of .0625″ of thickness and the webs were .025″. All held together by an eight to a quarter diameter rivets.

Another of Gallaudet’s lesser known designs is the D-7 Mail Carrier. The drawing, which probably was made accordingly to a mid-1918 request by the United States government, was the project less coveted by Edson Gallaudet at that time frame. Unfortunately, little is know about the concept beyond its indented purposes of transporting mail through the air. But the few sketches that had survived pain a picture of a truly remarkable aeroplane. The design looks like a slightly larger, fixed landing gear version of the ‘M’ version. There are no indications of pilot seating or cockpit arrangement. No engine area is visible on the incomplete blue print. Span was to be around fifty feet. Fuselage length was 30′3″ with a total wing area of 337.5 square feet. The wing had two spars which were only indicated by a single dotted line on the paper. The rest of the data is missing or inconclusive.

It’s a testament to his innovating vision that almost a century later, all three models, D-5, DM-5 and D-7, are once again gaining the interest of aviation aficionados the world over.

The Aeroplane as a Long Range Gun, Journal of the Royal Artillery, R.G. Cherry, June 1919
Alpha, Bravo, Delta: Guide to the U.S. Air Force, Walter J. Boyne, editor, Penguin Books 2003
The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, Robert Jackson, Parragon Publishing, 2002
The Early Aviation History, American Years, Edward Von der Porten, Crowell Company, 1969

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

FY2010 Air Force Budget: Do more with a lot less

This past summer, the United States’ President, Barack Obama sent to Congress his proposal for the Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Authorization Bill. As anticipated, the new Bill is full of deep cuts across all four branches of the military. A plethora of weapon system programs were slashed almost in half. Others, weren’t so lucky as twenty-two current projects were officially terminated.

Hardest hit among the Services is the US Air Force. The structure many believe to be the country’s first line of defense recieved the brunt of the massive cut backs, forcing it to borrow a phrase most commonly associated with NASA, ‘to do more with less’.

The Air Force (AF) faces many cuts in its projected aircraft procurement over the next year. That ,on top of a proposed reduction of existing operational frames, have negotiators from the Executive and Legislature branches at odd.

The first AF-related item in the Bill calls for the retirement of 250 aircraft, most of them drawn from Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units located all around Continental America. The removal of these operational airframes will save upwards of $400 millions dollars in total costs during the next year and around $3.3 billion over a five year span, according to Administration officials.

The aircrafts slated to be decommissioned are 112 F-15C/Ds Eagles, 134 F-16sC/D Fighting Falcons and three A-10 tank busting planes. Five additional airframes, four old F-16s and one F-15, are also rumored to be in line for decommission. But those five samples are not included in FY2010. All 254 deactivated units will be placed in storage at Davis-Monthan AFB, the so-called ‘aircraft graveyard’ in the Arizona desert. The overall lost of airframes is equal to nine fully-manned squadrons.

The saved funds will be used accordingly to the budgetary outline, to update current fighter and bomber platforms’ on-board systematic capabilities. Some funds will go to several, still in development, air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions programs.

The House of Representatives version of the Bill had a provision attached to it in which they ask for the Defense Department Secretary to submit a detailed report regarding the possible degradation of the overall force strength if these cuts were made a reality. Until that moment, the House had added $345 millions for the continuing operation of those 254 airplanes.

As an operational system, no one aircraft was hit hardest in FY2010 that the F-22 Raptor. The fifth generation air supremacy fighter has been fighting the budgetary axe ever since 1999. But 2010 may mark the end of the road for this unique aircraft. The Senate version of the Bill calls for a production cap of 187 airplanes. But a House version, which authorized $369 million for the continuation of F-22 component development, added funds for twelve additional units, which will elevate the total number of Raptors approved to 199 by FY2011.

The new fiscal Bill asks for funds to further the development of an additional 30 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, another contentious program. The Senate version, although still calling for the production of 30 F-35s, does curtail further development of the aircraft’s new, alternative engine. In the House, negotiators agreed to extend funds for more Research and Development (R&D) on the project, adding $255 additional million for it.

Among the aircraft programs slated to face massive cuts are the US Navy’s F/A-18E/F and EA-18G fighters. The Senate approved only $560 million for nine additional units, while the House went further with its reduction, funding only two units on a $108 million supplemental package.

The Senate made no alteration to the administration’s request for three C-40 Transport aircraft. But the House decided to add $105 million for an additional unit to be included in FY2010. The C-40 is a militarized version of Boeing’s 737-700 business jet. The planned use is VIP transportation.

The most prominent program to get axed, if the current Bill is signed, is the highly controversial Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter (CASR-X). Both chambers concurred with the President’s request to terminate all activities around the program. Congress also agreed with the administrations proposed cuts to the UH-1Y/AH1Z Helicopter platforms. The concurring version slashed $283 millions or 10 units, from the program.

The much hyped MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, darling of the media, was not spared either. The House and the Senate agree on a full-scale reduction of the units planned to be built for next year. As its currently set up, funds are only available for twelve additional units.

If there are any winners on this Bill it has to be the A160T Hummingbird helicopter. The little known and highly controversial unmanned system recieved $86 million for additional research and development. The Boeing program has produced just four prototypes so far and one successfuln May-2009 flight in ten years.

Overall, this is the deepest a Defense Appropriation Bill has cut since the Bill Clintonn years.

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

The A-5 Fantan: The Low Priced Ground Attack Aircraft

The Nanchange A-5, code named “Fantan” by NATO, gave the Peoples Republic of China an effective, low cost supersonic strike aircraft. A step that helped China demonstrate to the world their ability to alter and improve an existing aircraft platform. The Fantan is based on the 1950’s MiG-19 airframe. During the late 1950s, the Chinese military leaders identified the need to field a supersonic strike aircraft capable of supporting the Chinese ground forces. After many design studies, the Chinese decided to alter an existing airframe and inject it with the most advanced avionic package available to them. Design work commenced on the summer of 1960 and on June 4th, 1965 it took to the air in its maiden flight. Developed by the Chinese without the traditional help of the Soviet Union, the A-5 evolved as an inexpensive alternative to Third World countries, enableling the aircraft to become one of the few export success stories of Chinese design in those early days of the Cold War.

The original Chinese design called for the new aircraft to carry more free-fall bombs and missile platforms than its cousin, the MiG-19. The A-5 was also designed to operate at much further distances. With the added weight of ordinance and extra fuel tanks, the A-5 was not as agile to maneuver as its cousin. Over one thousand units of the Fantan were produced. The three main export countries for the A-5 were Pakistan, which acquired a fleet of fifty-two units at a price tag of just under 2.6 million dollars per aircraft, about a quarter of the cost of an F-16A Falcon. Bangladesh bought twenty examples and North Korea acquired around forty units. At one time during the 1970s, the Fantan equipped most of the squadrons of the Chinese Air Force. The aircraft was so successful bombing at low altitudes during its trial test phase that the Chinese modified some units to carry free fall nuclear ordinances. One Fantan actually dropped a nuclear bomb during a firing test in 1970. The Fantans first combat action occurred during a minor border conflict with Vietnam in the spring of 1979. Since then, the aircraft had been upgraded several times.

The current version of the A-5 is equipped with an advanced Italian-built avionics package. The AMX system incorporated a state-of-the-art laser range finder connected to an Alenia heads-up display and internal navigation computer, filtering information to the cockpit. The simplicity of the aircrafts design and the need to mass produce the type, forced Chinese engineers to forfeit several electronic platforms such as a full radar system. As of today, no A-5 is fitted with a modern radar array, although there’s space available for it inside the aircraft’s nose cone. The aircrafts fuselage did not resemble a MiG-19. The only clear sign of its ancestor is the Fantan’s swept tail section and an all-moving slab tail plane. The wing structure is fitted with two types of wing pylons. The inboard pylon can accommodate fuel tanks with capacity for 201g of aviation fuel. The outboard pylons can also be used to accommodate fuel tanks, but most units use them to carry free fall bombs. Two external pylons are used to carry air-to-air missiles. The current field version of the A-5 used the MATRA Magic air-to-air missile system. The defensive missile system could be augmented by a pair of 23mm cannons, each capable of holding one hundred rounds of ammunitions, mounted in two intermediaries under wings pylons.

SPECIFICATIONS



Single seated ground attack aircraft

Length 51′-4″

Height 14′-2″

Span 31′-9″

Total Wing Area 301sq ft

Maximum Weight 26,081lb

Operational Range 1,243 miles

Service Ceiling 52,000′

The A-5 was powered by two Liming (LM) Wopen-6a turbojet engines, each capable of generating 6,617lb of thrust dry and 8,272lb with afterburners. Although the whole Fantan concept is based on economics, the engines used in the aircraft were anything but. They required a major overhaul very one hundred flight hours, making the power plant the only un-economical aspect of the Fantan. Although the aircraft’s engines are capable of reaching speeds of 739mph, the fatigue of the airframe and the relative poorly designed engines, the Fantan can only muster operational speeds of around five hundreds miles per hour. Another performance factor affected by the engine design is the operational range, which is much smaller than its western counterparts.

Today, China still operates the largest fleet of Fantans in the world. But it’s Pakistan that operates the most advanced A-5 fleet today. Its Fantans were upgraded in the early 1990s with an improved avionics system and even a British Martin-Baker ejection seat was installed. The Pakistani use a different version of the aircraft, the Q-5, specially modify to carry a 20Kt nuclear weapon.

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

The Incredible M-4: The Birth of the Bison

After spending almost a decade ‘outside’ the bomber design business, Vladimir Myasishchev officially returned with a bang in the mid 1940’s. By early 1950, one of the most prolific Soviet aircraft designers of all time, in collaboration with GN Nazarov from Experimenta Design Bureau (OKB) # 22 and the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI), commenced a full, state-funded study into the feasibility of developing a strategic long range bomber or SDB (Strategichesky Dahl’ny Bombardirovschchik). The concept, originally devised by Myasishchev in the summer of 1948, embraced the parameters he and his engineering team had set up as part of TsAGI’s overall specifications.

In February 1951, Myasishchev made his first serious proposal for an advanced SBD. The preliminary study showed an aircraft powered by six VK5 engines that would give the concept speeds in the vicinity of 470 miles per hours. Total payload was estimated at 6,614 pounds with an operational range of 7,460 nautical miles. TsAGI specifications called for total carrying load of 44,092lbs and an absurd range of just short of the 7,500nm mark. To be able to achieve these mindboggling characteristics, Myasishchev needed to radicalize the design. A high tense, swept flying surface will hold a shoulder mounted wing structure. Four massive Mikulin AMRD-3 engines will be housed on the center wing sections. At the time of its conception, Project M, as the program would be referred to by Soviet authorities, was the largest ever undertaken by an aircraft Bureau. The Soviet Union Ministry officially authorized the project on March 24th 1951.

Armed with a new ‘referral’, Myasishchev was able to re-establish his beloved OKB at the famous Factory 23, on the outskirts of Moscow, and recruit the best and the brightness from the Moscow Aviation Institute. By the summer, work on the project, now known as VM-25, was at full swing. Hundreds of engineers and managers were hard at work in developing what they and the government believes was the most advanced program of its kind. Heading the program was Leonid Selyakov who was pushed to complete the first blue print in a three month period so the Soviet Union could chip away the United State lead in the real bomber race.

Selyakov’s first design featured an aircraft with straight wings; wing root power plants and sweep back V-tail structure. In his next concept, the wings were swept. In his third design, the VM-25 was fitted with a conventional swept fin and tail. The engines still were housed on wing roots. It was not until the fourth blue print that the enormous engines were placed on under wings pods, one per side with two units in each nacelle. The fifth design was similar to the last. Eight powerful Kuznetsov TV-2F turboprops driving an eight-bladed, counter rotating propeller mechanism which was placed back-to-back in the nacelles. The forward engine on each structure acted out as a tractor while the aft served as pusher.

The aircraft Selyakov envisioned were to be a 165′8″ behemoth. It would have a total wing area of 3,269 feet. Maximum takeoff weight would have been 385,800 pounds. But the fifth wasn’t the final version. Not by a long shoot. Two more attempts were realized before Selyakov and the rest of Myasishchev settle on a final layout. The new and now final design was a compromise between version two, four and fifth. A swept wing tail unit model powered by four AM-3 engines would give the USSR, accordingly to the OKB engineering team, the best and most advanced bomber in the world. The decision to go with the highly productive but poor takeoff action performance engines was made because the AL-5 power plant did not meet the OKB’s standards.

By August 1st 1952, the prototype blue print was finalized and on May 15th the aircraft itself entered the final assembly phase. By mid November, the first VM-25 was cleared for manufacture flight testing. Then, in December, the much anticipated rollout was made. Hundreds of OKB personnel and SovMin officials crowded Factory 23 to see the homeland’s newest technical marvel. On the clear morning of January 20th 1953, VM-25 took to the air for its maiden flight. The initial test phase went smoothly. It also confirmed the aircraft’s operational profile which was set at a 6,650 nautical mile range with a top payload of 11,023lbs.

Several small modifications were made to the concept in order to expand both parameters. Although the planes performance met the entire specifications request, it still falls short of the new Andrei Tupolev’s design, the incomparable Tu-95. The M-4, as the Myasishchev heavy bomber was named, could fly faster than its turboprop driven competitor. The problem was that the Tu95 had a longer operational range, nearly 3,000 mile more, than the M-4. To close this gap, Selyakov thought the idea of installing four NK-12 turboprops contra-rotating engines to power the massive bomber. But this concept was contrary to Myasishchev’s insistence for elegance in the model. As it was, the concept never made it out of the pre-design stages.

Nevertheless, the shortfall in profile needed to be addressed. Two ideas came to the forefront. The first was to change several aspects of the M-4’s aerodynamic structure to fit new power plants with a lower consumption rate. The other was to introduce an In Flight Refueling System (IFR). The first Soviet foray into the complex field of IFR took place on December 18th 1953 when the SovMin approved the development of the experimental Tu-16 tanker. Even without an adequate answer to the range question, the SovMin gave the M-4 full Operational Service Status with a short decree signed in on April 17th 1954.

In May 1954, the M-4 participated in the important USSR’s Mayday Parade. It was there that the West got their first look at the new strategic bomber. Call signed ‘Bison’ the new, streamline concept sent chills through the West defense apparatus which immediately considered the Bison the first true threat to Continental United States. In all, only 35 M-4s were built, including two units designated to be test bed aircrafts. From the summer of 1958, production M-4s were converted into refueling tankers. A role they performed admirable for more than a decade.

Soviet X-planes, Yefim Gordon and Bill Gunston, Midland Publishing 2000
Early Soviet Jet Bombers, Yefim Gordon, Midland Publishing 2004
Myasishchev M-4 and 3M-The First Soviet Strategic Jet Bomber, Yefim Gordon, Midland Publishing 2003

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

The Russian Front: A brief look at the Imperial Air Service

The war between the Central Powers, mostly Imperial Germany and Tsarist Russia lasted three hard fought years. It ended abruptly on October 1917 when the Bolshevik seized power in Moscow.

When the Great War started on August 1914, Germany and Russia shared a vast frontier that stretched from the midway between Danzig and Riga near the Baltic coast, running west of Warsaw to south through Galicia, finally ending on the mouth of the Danube in the Black Sea.

The first phase of the air action took place in two main sectors of the border; the northern area and Galicia. Initially, German air assets in the east were limited. Nevertheless, this token force would have been enough to annihilate the disarticulated Russian air force.

In 1914, the strength of infant Imperial Russian Air Service consisted of 244 airplanes, 12 airships and 44 observation balloons. Of the 244, 145 were operational and deployed near the combat theater. Most of them were French designed and built under license by Russian manufactures such as Duks and the Russo-Baltic Wago Works. During the months prior to the war, the Imperial Flying Corps received most of its assets from France. Aircraft such as the Farman MF-IIs, Morane-Saulniers, Nieuport IIs, Nieuport 17s and Spad VIIIs found their way the Corps ranks.

Russian manufactures did built indigenous flying machines as the Anata DS and Lebed. But both were inferior copies of foreign designs, and because of it, they never saw extended action. The only Russian-designed air platform to see action during the first year of the war was the massive Sikorsky four engine bomber. Seventy three of the Ilya Mouromez G-9 heavy bombers were constructed from 1914 until 1917.

The G-9 began offensive operations on February 1915. As was the case in the Western Front, early air combat tactics in the east were primitive and unimaginative. Still, the Russian high command placed much of its war strategy in the Air Service’s ability to disrupt the vaunted German rail road access system near its border. But that was never the case. By 1915, the combined strength of Germany and Austria-Hungary managed to push back large Russian army formations without much harassment from the skies.

As the Russian army retreaded to the Ukraine, its air service began mount for the first time in the conflict, combined offensive operations. From the Lutsk and Kovel regions, young Russian pilots took to the air in an effort to engage German troop columns moving deeper inside their homeland. As their territory was savagedly invaded, more and more Russians joined the armed forces, most of them went into the air force.

One particular airman distinguished itself on the cold Eastern Front, his name was Aleksandr Kazakov. Kazakov was born in the Kherson province. After attending the prestigious Yelizavetgrad Cavalry School in 1908, Kazakov joined the Gatchina military aviation school, completing his training by 1914.

In 1915 Aleksandr was sent to the Ukraine with the purpose of shoring up air operations in the region. It was there that his reputation as a top ace was formed. Flying Morane-Saulnier, Spad - S2, Nieuport 11 and Nieuport 17 planes, the young airman is credited with shooting down 17 Central Power aircraft, top among Russian pilots at the time. There was a rumor that the number is actually 32 but because the Russian only counted aircrafts which crashed on its territory, seventeen is the figure recorded in the history books.

In 1917 he was assigned command of the newly formed No. 1 Fighter Group, but the unit was disbanded when the Bolshevik took control in October. In November, Kazakov made his way north to Archangelsk to join in with the British who landed there in 1918. He perished in August 1st, 1919, while practicing aerobatics for the Russian White Army. Overall, 18 medals, including the British Distinguished Service Order and the French Legion d’honneur Order; were awarded to this aviation pioneer.

Another trailblazing Russian pilot was Alexander de Seversky. As with fellow inventor, Igor Sikorsky, Seversky’s path will ultimately lead him to America. But not before he made an invaluable contribution to the Russian war effort. Stationed in the Gulf of Riga, Seversky, a naval aviator with the rudimentary Russian Naval Air Service, performed his first combat sortie, a solo attack against a German destroyer. While diving for his bomb run, he was shot down by anti-aircraft fire only seconds before he was set to drop his bomb. As the plane crashed, the bomb exploded on contact with the sea, killing his spotter and blowing his right leg. After healing, he returned to active duty and was assigned the mission of coordinating all fighter aviation units in the Baltic sector.

Seversky is cited with 13 kills, but, as with many of the records of the era, this fact is disputed. He was in America when the revolution started. Shortly after which he applied for full citizen status. In the spring of 1922 he founded the Seversky Aero Corporation.

The fact the many Russian pilots became World War I aces, despite flying obsolete platforms and applying dreadful tactics, were a tribute to their skill and training. In general, the bulk of the Russian Air Service assets, although lagging almost a year behind in technology, still were good enough to hang in with the experienced German-Austro pilots. The weakling was the command structure. The officer corps was filled with Tsarist-created nobility. As was the case with much of the armed forces, they simply collapsed in the face of attrition.

It was the collapse of discipline all along the front, particularly in the Ukraine, in the aftermath of the Revolution that inspired a counter political and military movement. Despite explicit order from the new Soviet regime, many Russian air force personnel continued to resist the Germans. One of them, Lieutenant Commander Viktor Utgov, of the Black Sea Fleet, flying his Grigorovich M-9 seaplane out of the seaplane tender Imperator Nicolai Pervyi, attacked a German U-boat. After the war, Pervyi joined the large cradle of Russian pilots immigrating to the United States.

Besides the East, Imperial airman found their way to the Western Front where they participated actively with the British Royal Flying Corps. Some British and a great number of French airmen fought with the Russians in the east. In a footnote of history, one of the first women to see combat action was Princess Eugine Shakhovskaya. She flew reconnaissance missions on the Riga region.

Way of the Fighter, Claire Chennault, Putman Books 1949
The First World War, Hew Strachan, Penguin Books 2003
The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, Robert Jackson, Parragon Publishing Books 2006

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

The Ejercito Del Aire - The Spanish Air Force

I. Early History

The Spanish Air Force has been around since the first operational balloons began to appear over the Iberian Peninsula back in 1895. But it was not until April 10th, 1910, that the country formally introduced the nascent military air service as part of its overall armed forces structure. On the afternoon of November 5th, 1913, a rudimentary fitted Spanish squadron had the distinction of being the first true organized force to stage an offensive operation. On that tragic day, Spanish airplanes dropped a few simple shrapnel-type bombs on a number of rebellious Moroccan villages.

After almost two decades of mitigating action, Spain’s military air force was completely unprepared when the country’s Civil War erupted on July 18th 1936. During the war, two distinct air arms existed within the integrated structure of the force. The Spanish Republic Air Force was developed by the Republican forces fighting with the established government. At the beginning, the Republican AF was understaffed and more importantly, poorly equipped to influence events on the ground. They were fitted with obsolete Nieuport-Delage NiD-52 fighters, Breguet 19 reconnaissance bombers, a small fleet of Vickers Vildebeest torpedo-bombers and other old foreign aircraft.

The other air force unit derived from the base force was the National Aviation Force. The ‘Aviacion Nacional’ was created by the Army formations that revolted against what they believed was a repressive government The Nationalist, as this group was called, were lead by the charismatic, albeit, ruthless general Francisco Franco. If the Republican AF was undermanned, then the Nationalist’s was a hallow shell.
Nazi Germany promptly figured out a theater of war where they can test their new equipment and tactics: the Spanish skies. By late July, scores of German-built Junkers Ju-52/3m bomber -transport planes were ferrying Nationalist troops from Spanish Morocco to the mainland. By mid August, Italian-made Savoia Marchetti SM-81, Fiat CR-32 and German Heinkel He-51 were filling the Iberian sky.

The Republican AF also got a boost from foreign countries. Sixty French Dewoitine (D.372, 372, 501 and 510) as well as twenty Potez 54s and a squadron of Bleriot-Spad S.510s; joined the force.

Before the war ended on March 28th 1939, Dorniers, Messerschmitt and other top of the line aircraft tilted the balance of power in favor of the rebels. Franco himself secured the victory when his forces entered Madrid on March 27th.

II. World War II

After the war ended, Franco and his staff, clearly impressed by the role air power played in their ascension to power, established the modern Spanish air force; the ‘Ejercito del Aire’ (EDA). Formed on October 7th, 1939, the ‘Ejercito’ would play a relatively small but significant part in World War II.

When news of the German invasion of Red Russia reached the Spanish government, the new Fascist government’s Foreign Ministry, Ramon Serrano Suñer; offered military assistance to the Nazis by way of the German Ambassador, Eberhard von Stohrer. Adolph Hitler wanted a full pledge declaration of war against the Allies, but Franco and Serrano were kindly aware that any such move will place the country’s struggling economy at the mercy of Great Britain’s oil embargo.

If they could not assist Germany directly, then Franco, though an all volunteer force, similar to the German-deployed Condor Legion during the Civil War, could be mustered. On July 1941, 18,000 men from all walks of life joined in what would be called the Blue Division; a ground force unit that would see heavy action in the Eastern Front. Attached to the division was a limited air expeditionary force known as the Blue Squadron or ‘Escuadrilla Azul’.

The Blue Squadron was part of the overall Army Group Center assets from 1941 until 1944. A total of five Spanish Squadrons flying BF-109 and later FW-190, flew a total of 1,918 sorties as part of Jagdgeschwader 51, also known as “Molders”. The squadrons worked in succession beginning with the first arriving on early June 1941 until the last official one on February of 1944. They had the distinction of being the only Spanish unit to have fought in the Battle of Kursk. Its combat record consisted of 277 air kills and 74 aircraft destroyed, with a total combined loss of seven Spanish pilots.

III. Post War Organization

Following the end of the War, the Spanish government allied themselves with the Western countries in their struggles against the Soviet Union. On March 18th 1946, Spain’s first dedicated paratroop unit was formed. The establishment of a mobile force and key changes in the Ejercito mid level structure made it possible for the country to receive, on a continuing base, top flight aircraft from the United States.

Between the fall of 1950 and the spring of 1959, the Ejercito incorporated its first jet powered platforms; US-built F-86 Saber fighters, Lockheed T-33 trainers and DC-3s and 4s transports were delivered to the Spanish government. Most of those first generation jet systems were replaced in the mid-to-late1960s. It was in the spring of 1968 that the Spanish government initiated an aggressive re-armament effort that culminated with the incorporation of top shelf F-4Cs Phantoms and F-5s Freedom Fighters.

The 1970s brought in another refurbishing phase with the assimilation into the Ejercito of French-developed Mirage III and F-1s. Dassault’s deltas, as the III was commonly refer to, formed the backbone of the Spanish AF for much of the 1970s and early 80s. The Mirage III was one of the biggest success stories in the field of post-WW II combat aircraft design. The vaunted Mirage III first flew on November 17th, 1956 which made the system more than a decade old when it joined the Ejercito.

The other major platform utilized by the AF was the Mirage F-1. The F-1 is a single seat strike fighter which made its maiden flight on December 23rd, 1966. It became operational with the French Air Force in the spring of 1974. The F-1 was one of Dassault’s biggest export success stories.

In the middle of the 80s, the Ejercito received its most advanced air weapon up to date, the US-supplied F/A-18 Hornet. Since its operational deployment in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Hornet became the cornerstone of Spain’s air deterrence and offensive strike capability. A fact that became apparent during NATO’s air war over Kosovo.

Spain made its movement into full pledge membership to NATO in 1982.

IV. Current Structure and base location

The Ejercito del Aire is divided into five operational commands. The first is the Battle Air Command (BAC) based at Torrejon Air Base, Madrid. General Air Command (GAC) has its headquarters in Madrid. Personnel (PC) and Logistic Commands (LC) are also located in the Spanish capital. The only other active command posted outside the Madrid region is the Canary Island Air Command, which reside at Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Canary Islands.

The Ejercito utilized 15 operational Air Bases.

1. Alcanatarilla

2. Armilla

3. Four Winds

4. Gando

5. Getafe (built in 1911 and widely consider the cradle of Spanish aviation)

6. Los Llanos

7. Matacan

8. Moron Air Base is located in southern Spain, roughly 35 miles southeast of the city of Seville. Negotiations for US bases in Spain were conducted between June 1951 and September 1953 under the direction of a Joint United States Military Group, commanded by Major General A. W. Kissner.


In 1957, the Sixteenth Air Force was realigned under the Strategic Air Command. Main operating bases in Spain were used for SAC B-47 rotational alert aircraft until April 1965. 16th AF also operated SAC bases in Morocco from 1958 through 1963. In 1966, a year after SAC withdrew its B-47 alert force from Spain, 16th AF was reassigned to US Air Forces in Europe. On 13 May 1958, the first flight of B-47s were assigned to Morón Air Base to conduct Reflex operations and 6 weeks later the first rotational fighter squadron, F-100s from George AFB CA, arrived for temporary duty to conduct air defense alert.


In April 1960, Morón was placed under the command of Colonel Henry C. Godman. Morón kept operating primarily as a “Reflex” base until 29 April 1962, when the first Chrome Dome KC-135 aircraft arrived.


On November 1971, Morón was relegated to a “modified caretaker status. Torrejon Air Base was designated as the Primary Support Base (PSB) with support services to start in April 1972. Military personnel were reduced to a staff of approximately 100 members of the 7473 CSS. All flying activity was halted except for occasional exercises.


On May 14th 1983 US Spanish bilateral Agreement of Friendship, Defense and Cooperation authorized the United States to station up to 15 tanker aircraft at Morón Air Base. A manpower change request was developed to increase blue-suit manning, based on the tanker task force and the increased War Reserve Materiel (WRM) requirements. The Morón Air Base work force, including all military, civilian, contractor and tenant personnel, was approximately 300 personnel.


In 1984, Morón became NASA’s Space Shuttle Transoceanic Abort Landing Site. Since that time, Morón and NASA have developed a lasting partnership in service to Shuttle ventures. In March 1984, Morón Air Base was selected by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as a Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL) site for the space shuttle program. Special navigation and landing aids are in place, and personnel are highly trained to recover landing of the orbiter vehicle. Major enhancements were completed in 1986, and included the permanent installation of a Microwave Landing System. Morón Air Base is the only TAL site in the world situated to support high, mid, and low inclination launches. For this reason, Morón Air Base activates for almost all space shuttle launches.


In August 1990, SAC deployed 22 KC-135 and KC-10 tankers to support Operation DESERT SHIELD. In January 1991, SAC changed Morón Air Base from refueling to bomber operations for DESERT STORM. The 801st Bomb Wing (Provisional) at Morón Air Base consisted of 24 B-52s, 3 KC-135s and over 2,800 personnel. This was the largest deployed bomber wing during the war.


Since January 2000, Morón is a critical link in supporting the rotation of Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF) — deployed in EUCOM and CENTCOM Areas of Responsibilities. Tanker Task Forces (KC-135 and KC-10), Fighter Units from the Air Force and Marine Corps, and airlifters (C-141, C-17 and C-5s) use Morón as a staging base for AEF operations. The base also frequently welcomes rotating US Army personnel.


Moron currently housed F-18 Hornet fighters and P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft - was once one of three bases the US used in Spain and home to about 2,000 active-duty people and their families. The Defense Department closed Torrejon and Zaragoza Air Bases, and trimmed Moron to little more than a handful of people keeping an eye on the runway and buildings in case the Air Force needed to return to the Iberian Peninsula.

9. San Javier

10. Santiago

11. Son San Joan
12. Talavera

13. Torrejon Air Base was a major military airport in Spain. During the hey days of the Cold War, Torrejon was headquarters of the United States Air Forces in Europe Sixteenth Air Force as well as the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing. Aircrafts stationed at Torrejon were usually rotated to other USAFE airbases located in Italy and Turkey.
The Air Base was originally the home of the Spanish National Institute of Aeronautics, but after the U.S.-Spanish Defense Agreement of 1953, the US funded the construction at Torrejon of a brand new 13,400′ concrete runway in order to replace the 4,266-ft grass airstrip. A massive concrete apron and other necessary maintenance and shelter facilities were erected to accommodate the biggest of the United States Air Force Strategic Air Command’s bombers which mainly supported the Command’s strategic Reflex missions.
Today, among other things, the base housed the Torrejon-Madrid Airport.

14. Villanubla
15. Zaragoza

V. Operational Activity

The main Spanish air formation is the Wing or ‘Ala’. Each Wing is composed of up to three squadrons (escuadrones). Between 19 and 24 aircrafts are housed in an escuadron or air unit. The Ejercito also operates a number of Groups and special operation squadrons.

Total aircraft inventory is estimated to be around 660 operational airframes. Here’s a list of current air activity platforms and base units.
a. Fighter Attack Planes
” Dassault Mirage F-1M (36 units) Wing 14th
” Dassault Mirage F-1BM (3) Wing 14th
” McDonnell-Douglas F/A-18 Hornet F-18M (68) Wing 12th & 15th
” McDonnell-Douglas F/A-18 Hornet F-18A (17) Wing 46th
” Eurofighter Typhoon EF2000 (36) Wing 11th
” Eurofighter Typhoon EF2000T (14) Wing 11th

b. Maritime Reconnaissance Systems
” Fokker F-27 (3) 802nd Squadron
” Lockheed Orion P-3A (2) Wing 11th
” Lockheed Orion P-3B (2) Wing 11th
” Lockheed Orion P-3M (3) Wing 11th

c. Transport Aircraft
” Airbus A310 (2) 45th Group
” Beechcraft C-90 (4) 42nd Group
” CASA C-212 T.12 (74) Distributed on various commands such as Wing 37th, 801st Group, 47th Group, Wing 48th, and 721st Squadron.
” CASA C-212 T.12B (10)
” CASA C-212 T.12B modified (6)
” CASA CN-235 (20) Wing 25th
” CASA C-295M (13) Wing 35th
” Dassault Falcon 900 (2) 45th Group
” Dassault Falcon 900B (3) 45th Group
” Lockheed C-130H (6) Wing 31st
” Lockheed C-130H-30 (1) Wing 31st
” Lockheed KC-130H (5) Wing 31st

d. Aerial Refueling Airplanes
” Boeing 707-300KC (3) 47th Group

e. Trainers
” Beechcraft Bonanza F-33C (23) 42nd Group
” CASA C-101EB-01 (73) General Air Academy
” Northrop F-5BM (20) Wing 23rd
” LET L.13 (5) Wing 79th
” PZL Bielsko SZD-30 (4) Wing 79th
” Schiebe SF-28A (1) Wing 79th
” ENAER T-35C (37) General Air Academy

f. Helicopters
” Aerospatiale SA 330J (4) 801st Squadron
” Eurocopter EC 120B (15) Wing 78th
” Eurocopter AS 532UL (2) Wing 46th & 48th
” Eurocopter Super Puma AS 332 (9) Wing 46th & 48th
” Sikorsky S-076C (8) Wing 78th

Other aircrafts included (6) CASA 127 VIP transports, (2) Cessna Citation V C-560 recon platforms, (4) Dassault Falcons 20D and E naval survey aircrafts, (12) Canadair CL-215 fire attack planes. Ten additional Canadair, version CL-415 acts as firefighting systems. The Ejercito operates one IAI B-707 351C Intelligence gathering aircraft.

On standby orders, the Spanish AF have 71 single-seat Typhoon fighter/attack aircrafts. Sixteen two-seat dedicated attack Typhoons are also expected to join the Ejercito within a ten year radius. Between 25 and 28 Airbus A400Ms are also ordered.

VI. Current Deployments and Future Operational Profile

The Ejercito del Aire has been very active since the end of the Kosovo War. Spain’s F-1s has been employed in the skies over Iraq and more recently, Afghanistan. It’s believed that some of Spain’s powerful Typhoon aircraft will soon see action in the Afghan theater of operations. Based on Herat Air Force Base, Ejercito’s F/A-18s and transport airplanes had been operating since the early 2005.

Spain also has a small detachment in the former Soviet republic of Kirgizstan. Elements of the 35th Wing are stationed there for logistic and medevac support operations.

As for the immediate future, the Spanish Air Force is fast becoming one of the better equipped units in the European Continent. It ranks 9th in total combat power, just below Poland and on top of countries such as the Ukraine and Finland. The country’s rank will likely remain the same as other European nations incorporate new types of air platforms to its active inventory.

References
How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare in the 21st Century, James F. Dunnigan, HarperCollins Books 2003
Air Power: The men, machines and ideas that revolutionized war, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II; Stephene Budiansky, Penguin Books 2004
Modern Military Aircraft in Combat, Editor Robert Jackson, Amber Books 2008
www.globalsecurity.org
www.ejercitodelaire.mde.es

The Red Air Force: 1974 - 1985

The years between 1974 and 1985 brought many changes to the Soviet Union’s Air Force (SAF). Changes that augmented the SAF’s overall combat capability almost to a point of challenging the West’s invaluable air dominance in the projected battlefield. This was a dramatic shift that caught many Westerner observers by surprise. After decades of overall decay in the SAF’s structural profile, the 1970s ushered in a new era in air operational planning. The Kremlin had finally awoken to what conventional air power was really about.

Since its creation, the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) had planned to counter the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact ground and air forces with their high tech air forces. At the front point of this assumption rested the idea that the Western powers could bring heavy concentration of fire to bear with extreme speed and unmatched accuracy at any point in the battle. It was always understood that even if NATO had the manpower in strategic reserves to counter an all out attack by the Warsaw ground forces, the incorporation of those forces into the defensive forward positions would have taken time. It would not arrive in time to stall a Soviet-lead push into Western Europe.

For NATO, air power filled this gap. It offered the ability to strike hard and repeatedly at the choke points along the two German frontiers where the Warsaw land offensive would have to squeeze through. At the same time, tactical implementation of air power would be projected strategically because a large amount of American tactical aircraft would fly to Europe in the event of an all out attack. The concept of Allied air power holding the front against a Soviet ground incursion, provided there were enough deployed aircraft to do it. This was valid and reassuring, especially since the performance of modern tactical Allied aircrafts and the effectiveness and accuracy of their weapons had climbed exponentially on the back of commercially competitive Western technology to achieve an overall capability undreamt of. Inside NATO’s war planning, this air superiority had long been a comfortable thought of state that many believed would endure forever. But by the early 1980s, the situation looked different.

Red Air Force combat aircraft made its world debut in the Korean skies during the 1950s affair. By the early 1970, all of those first generation aircraft, were withdrawn from active service. The second generation of fighters and bombers, originally designed in the late 50s and early 60s, reached its developmental peak in the early 70s.

By the mid 80s, only about 10 to 15 percent of second generation air platforms remained in front line service as the third generation began to assert itself on the overall force structure. Third generation fighters and bombers made their debut in the early 1970s thus its numbers rose steadily through the decade. It was this generation that gave the Red Air Force a broad force structure comparable to that of its Western counterparts, although the later were still reckoned to have a margin in detail capability in all aspects, especially where this was dependent on electronics and weapon technology.

On sheer numbers of available airframes, the Warsaw Pact had always outstripped those of the Allies, in the mid 80s; broad parity in performance was also within its grasp. Added to the equation was the Soviet’s monumental investments in research and development dwarfed that of all NATO nations combined, with the exception of the US. A fourth generation platform was well under development by the middle of US President Ronald Regan’s first term. By 1985, the Red AF was in the process of completing pre-evaluation of its fourth generation air superiority fighter. A platform sorely intended to out maneuver the premier US air superiority aircraft, the vaunted F-15 Eagle. The Soviets were also working on a dedicated V-STOL aircraft for naval operations.

In the summer of 1985, analysis estimated Russian tactical air forces in the western section of the country had increased by 35 percent. The Soviet naval air arm was also climbing. The number of strategic airlift airplanes and attack helicopters quadrupled between 1974 and 1985. In twenty five years, 1970 onward, the Red AF increased their operational scope and war-load capacity by a staggering 1000 percent. The air force progress was as equally impressive as the Red Navy’s. Admiral Gorshkov gets much of the credit, and deservedly so, for the development of the Navy’s Blue Water aspects; but Soviet AF generals are to be praised for the formation of a top rated force.

With its overall new power projection capability, the Red Air Force possessed the capability to venture into the Atlantic and engage NATO’s European targets, including the most important air bridge base in the Continent; the United Kingdom. A thought inconceivable in 1970. The newfound Red air power could, if the pattern continued for one more decade, have made the deployment of US strategic reserve units into Continental Europe that much more difficult, if not impossible. In conclusion, Soviet generals believed that they were just 10 to 15 years away from having a war winning air strategy.

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

Air Power In Venezuela’s 1992 Coup Attempt

If compared to the rest of it’s South American counterparts, Venezuela enjoyed a relative stable form of government for much of the 1970s and 80s. As with the rest of the country’s military arms, the Fuerza Aerea Venezolana (FAV) suffered from a prolong period of budgetary restrictions and limitations that started in the mid 70s and lasted until the early mid-to late 80s. This period of stagnation left the once powerful FAV in a state of flux. During that time, most of the FAV assets became non-operational. But by 1987, the situation was commencing to improve with the acquisition by the Venezuelan government of top shelf equipment such as the powerful United States’ built F-16A Falcon. The FAV also began a crash program to upgrade its Mirage units to 2000’s standards.

On February 24th 1992, the paratroop units of Grupo Paracaidista Aragua, led by Lieutenant Colonel, and current president of the republic, Hugo Chavez; staged a coup attempt. Although the coup was quickly squashed, feelings inside the air force remained high and volatile. So much so that on the 27th of November, a further attempt to rest power from the civilian government was made. Lead by the charismatic Brigadier General Francisco Visconti, lead elements of the FAV used the Air Force Day preparations to move units into the El Libertador Air Force Base at Palo Negro, Aragua.

The units included a sole NF-5B, five T-2Ds, six OV-10As, three OV-10Es and two A-27s. At 0330 on the morning of the 27th, Visconti’s forces seized control of the important base. Supported by the vaunted 10th Special Operations Group, which operated most of the air force’s helicopter fleet, and the Grupo de Caza 11, Visconti’s men met little opposition. But this does not mean that all base personnel were onboard with the coup. Two QRA aircraft from Grupo de Caza 16, managed to escape to Barquisimeto. A base that remained loyal to the republic’s president. The rest of Caza 16’s assets were captured. While the El Libertador operation was underway, supplemental units of the 10th were capturing the nearby Mariscal Sucre air force base at Boca Del Rio, Maracay. Mariscal Sucre was the home of the FAV’s training fleet of EMB-312 Tucanos and T-34As trainers.

That same morning in Caracas, three French-built Mirage 50EVs from Grupo 11 began strafing the Army’s barracks. Another force composed of Broncos, Tucanos and Buckeyes; attacked the presidential palace, the foreign ministry building, the police headquarters and the Presidential Guard barracks. Unlike previous attacks on El Libertador and Sucre, this time the attacking force met resistance. Suddenly and almost out of nowhere, the two F-16 Falcons that escaped Libertador appeared over the skies of the Venezuelan capital. It did not take long before the modern Falcons chased away the Tucanos and Broncos. Then, the heavily armed F-16s moved to Sucre and Libertador, strafing anything that moved on the ground with their powerful 20mm cannons.

Also on the morning of the 27th, and while forces loyal to the government started to counterattack the rebel positions, insurgence Mirages and Broncos took off from Sucre to commence their attacks on Barquisimeto. There they proceeded to destroy three CF-5As and a civilian MD-80 airliner. Unfortunately for the attackers, Grupo de Caza 12 managed to scramble one F-16 and a NF-5A. They were able to shoot down two of the OV-10s. The F-16 also downed a sole Tucano without much effort.

When the afternoon hit, the once promising coup attempt started to unravel. Another slow moving Bronco was downed over Caracas, most likely by small caliber ground fire. By 1300, with La Carlota Air Force Base completely secure, government forces began their countermove. Elite elements of the Army and some paratroop formations loyal to the government began their ground assault on Libertador and Sucre. Supported by two tanks columns, the Army regulars entered the bases almost without firing a shot.

Visconti knew the attempt was over and at 1400 ordered a complete evacuation of the bases. He and 92 co-conspirators took off of a Grupo 6’s C-130H Hercules transport bound for Peru, where they sought political asylum. Two Mirage 50Es from Grupo 11 made their way to the Island of Aruba in the Caribbean Sea. Only one rebel operated Bronco escaped. This OV-10 landed on another Caribbean Island, Curacao.

Almost one thousand officers, non commissioned officers and enlisted men where rounded up and arrested by Army police units. By the late hours of the evening, the November 27th coup attempt was history.

Air Power: The men, machines and ideas that revolutionized War; from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II, Stephen Budiansky, Penguin Books 2004
Americas’ Wars, Joseph Thomas and Gregory Henn, Herms Publishing, 2000

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

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