The Heart Of The Patriot Missile: The MPQ-53 Radar

Anyone who saw the First Gulf War in 1991 was glued to the television set looking at the majestic sight of the United States Army’s newest Theater Anti-Missile System, the now famous MIM-104 Patriot. Night after night, the vaunted weapon was launched in an attempt to intercept Iraq’s unsophisticated and terribly inaccurate Scud mid range missile. The image of America’s missile intercepting an incoming
object, captured the attention of almost everyone. As new and sensational as the Patriot looked in that conflict, the system was actually in its third decade of life.

Born during the height of the Cold War (1963) in an attempt by the US to overlap their complex HAWK air defense platform, the Army decided to develop the Air Defense System (AADS). More than thirty summers has passed since the first blue print for the MIM-104 was submitted for initial review. Baptized under fire in the gulf and in many other theaters, the Patriot has become America’s top defensive weapon. Multiple upgrades were performed since that summer. Changes that had improved dramatically the capability of the system.

One of the most significant modifications came in the spring of 2005 when the Patriot was fitted with the most advanced targeting array in the world, the now famous MPQ-53V. The 53V is a phased array radar and associated processor that controlled the missile’s trajectory from its launch. The radar is a multifunctional, electronically scanned array mounted on the M-860 trailer which is towed by an Engagement Control Center. For target identification, the 53V used the powerful Hazeltine (TPX-46-7) Target Identification Friend or Foe (IFF). A self-contained data link is used to communicate with the rest of the missile package.

The Patriot was designed to operate in all weather conditions without losing operational effectiveness. It can destroy aircraft and missiles at all altitudes. It can direct several missiles to engage multiple targets simultaneously even in the toughest electronic jamming environment. For this, the MPQ utilized a top tier lens array which operated an optical feed. Sum and difference patterns are individually optimized with a monopulse feed optimizing its efficiency. The aperture is round and utilized a 5000 ferrite phase shifter. A four bit, flux driven, non-reciprocal ferrite phase shifter and waveguide radiators are located at both temperatures. A separate, redundant array for missile guidance and IFF is also part of the overall platform profile.

The most recognizable feature of the radar is its face. A huge, phased array face dominates the upper part of the antenna unit. The ‘face’ performs as both, surveillance and tracking mechanism. Below the face lays an almost circular, 5000 element phase shifter which has two smaller units (each with 50 elements a piece). A row of 18 rectangular boxes divided the antenna almost in half, with access boxes. Two slightly larger planar arrays are for the command-guidance and for receiving its links directly for the missile.

Before an engagement is achieved, the radar array has to be aligned to cover as much of the expected direction of attack. During the engagement, the radio beam is steered electronically in azimuth and
elevation. The system was designed in such a mater than it can prioritize a single target from several locations.

The radar utilized a Track-via-Missile (TVM) System in order to suppress its overall cost. In semi-active systems, the radar illuminates the target and a seeker in the missile’s head tracks the reflecting energy. Then the missile computes the interception pattern based on its bearing to the engaging object. The TVM allows the missile to relay the same bearing data to the engagement control station via the radar. The platform’s powerful processors comb through the information with the absolute position of the target, the missile and the profile (velocity, altitude, bearings) of the engaging object and generates tracking commands to guide the warhead to the optimum interception point. In the terminal phase, the missile’s acquisition system acquires the target and relays the data to the phase array where the final intercepting calculations are performed.

The main advantage the TVM system has over its competitors is that the powerful ground based processors are used mostly for guidance thus allowing more data interpretation time. This processing technique makes it’s difficult for countermeasures to jam the Patriot’s targeting trajectory. Even when the Patriot’s targeting radar is receiving jamming strobes, its missile can still maintain missile-to-target bearing data from the TVM system. On top of this, the ground based processors have sufficient computing power to resolve troubling jamming issues such as blinking jamming, where two aircrafts in formation jam alternatively to frustrate home-on-jam modes.

Raytheon, the Patriot’s primary contractor (its has all the Defense Department contracts for the system that surpassed the $5 million mark) had produced a reported 128 MPQ-53V units for the US Army and an estimated 26 for Japan’s Self Defense Force (2007 totals). Price for each unit is around $ 2.5 million.

Technical Data

• Weight 79,008lb
• Length 56.08ft
• Height 11.83ft
• Width 29.42ft
• Frequency 4-6 GHz
• Range 68km
• Detection Sector 120deg
• Engagement Sector 90deg
• Target Capacity 50 simulations
• Missile Control Capacity 9 in final engagement

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

United States Deterrence Systems and Strategies at the Beginning of the Cold War

When World War II ended in September 1945, the United States of America was the most powerful economic and military country in the world. Sole possessor of the mighty atom bomb, in possession of the most advance conventional weapon systems in the world and the world power that was the least affected by the destruction of four dramatic years of fighting. The US, confident that peace would reign in the world for at least a decade, started demobilizing its massive armed force apparatus and curtailed the development of new weapon systems. World events changed all this very quickly. The wartime military relationship that existed between America and the Soviet Union promptly soured. In the years that followed the end of the war, the Soviet regime moved to consolidate its hold on the countries of Eastern Europe. They did not stop there. The Soviets wanted to spread communism to all parts of the globe. After Eastern Europe, they planned to move towards Asia. In America, the US armed forces continued their downsizing in 1946 despite the increasing evidence that Red Russia were continuing to build their military forces. During the early years of World War II, the Soviet Union was forced to move most of its industrial base outside their capital, Moscow. As a result, by mid to late 1940s, they possessed a large, albeit crude, military complex. The Soviets started a crash course to develop new weapon systems to increase their already massive land and air forces. Gathering information from espionage activities around the world, their own scientific research data and capture of German scientists, the Soviet Union was by mid 1946 in a full rearmament mode. In the meantime, their leaders were moving promptly in securing their country’s position as an equal to that of the United States. Political and military leaders in the West watched these disturbing developments within their former allied with uneasiness.

In March 1946, former wartime British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, gave a powerful and prophetic speech at Westminster College stating that: “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across Europe”. He was right of course. Tension would increment when on October 23rd, 1947, American intelligence officials noted the existence of a high number of Soviet made Tu-4 “Bull” bombers. The Bull was a textbook case of reverse-engineering a copy of the huge Boeing B-29 bomber. The Soviets got their hands on a few examples of the B-29 when they crash landed on Soviet territory after sustaining damages during bombings runs over Japan late in the war. These bombers gave the Soviet Union for the first time the ability to hit targets in continental America. By the beginning of 1948, all but the essential communication links between the one-time allies had ceased. Then on the morning of April 1st, 1948, the Soviets closed all land access to the divided city of Berlin, deep behind the Soviet Occupation Zone. The land blockade lasted until September 30th, 1949; three days after President Harry Truman informed a stunning nation that the Russians had succeeded in exploding an atom bomb, ending the short-lived United State monopoly on nuclear weapons. All these developments, occurring in such a short times span, prompted concern in the ability of the US armed forces to defend the homeland. Accordingly to the times in 1947, the United States government proceeded to make one of the most overwhelming reorganizations of its political and military structure. The War Department, stabled since the incorporation of the Colonies, was replaced with the new Department of Defense. The Army retained all of its ground forces, the Navy retained their assets, but the air arm of the Army became a separate service, the newly and independent military service was the US Air Force. As soon as the new Air Force enters service, it started to flex its political power. It was often at odds with the Army brass over the control of nuclear weapons systems as well as who should be in control of the country’s air defenses. As the 1940s passed and the 1950s began, US weapons development systems were in constant turmoil because of the inter service rivalry that was forming between the three services. Both the Army and the Air Force fought feverishly for control over the development and deployment of a surface-to-air missile system, and the three services sought to develop independently long range ballistic missile programs.

The outbreak of hostilities in the Korean Peninsula in 1950 put all the squabbling to rest. The US Army de-activated most components of its artillery department and reorganized them in the newly created Army Anti-Aircraft Command (ARAACOM). The ARAACOM was assigned the task to deploy antiaircraft artillery on sixty six key locations inside the United States as a stopgap until a missile defense system were available. About the same time, the US Air Force was assigned control of America’s ballistic missile research and developing program. In the mid 1950s the Air Defense Command (ADC) became the main strategic command, coordinating the defenses of continental United States. With this massive undertaking, the Air Force was awarded a bigger piece of the budgetary pie. Funds were now available for the development of new types of nuclear weapons, new long range heavy bombers and the big prize, the guided long range ballistic missile. The priority of funding went to the research and development of a strategic long range surface-to-surface missile, an offensive missile system. The leaders at the Pentagon envisioned an offensive missile system so powerful that it by itself deterred any possible preemptive nuclear attack by the Soviets. The deployment of these missiles clearly implies the ability of the US to achieve a massive retaliation capability upon the attacker. The role of these missile and that of their ability to lunch a massive un-surviving counterattack would be discussed during most of the years of the Cold War. Military, as well as political leaders would use the leverage that this system gave to them to bargain and to achieve political and military concessions from the Soviets and America.

Because the design and development of an operational guided long range ballistic missile system seems to many in Washington as a more technical plausible weapon platform than the development of a comprehensive strategic missile defense system. The decision was made to pursue the offensive ballistic missile system first. Working on the strategic defense system was put on the back burner. America’s strategic doctrine underwent numerous changes during the course of the Cold War. Then, during the 1950s, the Eisenhower Administration pursued a military doctrine that called for a scale back in conventional force military expending and increasing the nuclear strike force in order to make it clear to the Soviet Union that the United States had the weapons and the means to deliver a massive nuclear blow at the Soviet Union if they decided to launch a first strike campaign. Critics of this new policy, known as New Look, pointed to the administration that there was no assurance that the US arsenal could survive a Soviet nuclear attack. When the new Kennedy Administration took office in 1961, they brought a fresh look at the world strategic situation. Flexible Response was born. This new military doctrine called for a mixture of conventional and nuclear forces, which could be tailor made to threats in a proportionate manner. The success of this new policy would be the backbone of United States Military posture during the next thirty five years.

A Brief Look at the United States Defensive Missile Systems from 1945 to 2004 - Part 1

During the years that followed the end of World War II, the Western Democracies, lead by the United States, and the Soviet-lead Eastern Bloc were locked in a political, economical, ideological and sometimes military battle known as the Cold War. In the military arena, both main superpowers, were developing more advanced offensive weapon systems like the long-range bomber and the new intercontinental ballistic missile system as a mean to safeguard each country against the possibility of a preemptive strike by the other superpower.

A counterweight was needed to be found in order to defend the United States against this possibility. With the development of the nuclear bomb and later the thermonuclear bomb, the battlefield was changed for ever. All existing defensive systems were rendered obsolete the moment the bomb was delivered to Nagasaki. The awesome power of this new weapon altered the Pentagon’s defense strategy.

In the past, the United States mainland defenses were focused at an conventional invasion attempt. Now, with the realization that a massive nuclear attack could cripple most of the country in hours, the United States military planners began to construct a new defense posture. The new posture was centered around the means of stopping the enemy ability to produce a surprise nuclear strike. This means stopping the bombers and the offensive ballistic missiles. By the mid 1950s, after an extended period of research and the development, the U.S. was able to field a first generation antiaircraft missile system that was capable of delivering conventional or nuclear warheads at incoming bomber formations. At the same time, both the United States and the Soviet Union were moving ahead with the development of a series of offensive missile platforms that could deliver a bigger nuclear payload against ground targets located thousand of miles away. The need to defend the home land was more imperative now that at any time in the history of the United States. The development and fielding of workable defensive missile system was giving top priority by the U.S. government.

These missile systems were the ultimate in weapon development of the era. Massive amounts resources were invested in the research and development of these missile systems. This book will provide the reader with an overview of the fixed, land-based defensive missile systems developed by the United States during the years of the Cold War. The NIKE, BOMARC and Safe Guard programs will be discussed as well as the deterrence missile systems, the Atlas, Titan, Minuteman and Peacekeeper will also be discussed. The book end with a brief look at the future of the United States antiballistic missile defenses in the 21st century.

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

The Incredible B-70 Valkyrie Bomber

The B-70 Valkyrie supersonic heavy bomber was one of the most elegant planes that ever took to the skies. It was not only a remarkable looking aircraft but also the most advanced flying platform of its time. Its elegant design and airborne avionic systems were decades ahead of its peers. Just the sight of a Valkyrie flying sent chills down the collective spines of military leaders in both America and the Soviet Union. But, as with most revolutionary weapons platforms, the B-70 was also an aircraft without a true dedicated mission profile. In an ironic twist of fate, the B-70, once conceived and designed with the intention of penetrating the most complex of the Soviet’s air defensive systems, as well as their most advance fighters. In the end it was terminated by advances in those same systems, specifically the Soviet’s surface to air missile (SAM) systems. The new Soviet SAMs made the Valkyrie’s great advantage and sheer speed, somewhat irrelevant.

Conceived to replace the United States Air Force’s fleet of Boeing’s B-52 heavy bombers, the XB-70 program commenced at earnest in the spring of 1955. The Air Force, fresh out of the complex and highly technical B-58 program, wanted the new bomber to be incorporated with the latest of the so called “next generation” technology package available. It was towards this end, that the Air Force was willing to give total weapons system design responsibility to the winner of the contract. During the design phase, two companies emerged as the leading contenders for the contract to build the most advanced aircraft in the world: Boeing and North America. After a relative short test design stage, North America was awarded a developmental contract. Work commenced on the project late in 1958 and in 1964, the first of two ordered prototypes performed its maiden flight.

The XB-70 was indeed an elegant flying machine. One that concealed its true nature: the nuclear showering of targets deep inside the Soviet Union. This amazing aircraft had a fuselage length of 196 feet with a height of 31 feet. Its estimated maximum gross operational weight was of 521,000 pounds. The bomber was manned by a crew of four: a pilot, copilot bombardier and a defensive weapon systems operator. The aircraft was fitted with a thin delta wing structure that spanned 105 feet. Six massive General Electric YJ-93 engines, capable of producing 30,000 pounds of thrust each with afterburners. They were located in a side-by-side configuration on a large pod underneath the airframe. Two rectangular inlet ducts provided the engines with a two dimensional airflow profile. The aircraft’s fuel tanks where housed on the delta wing structure. The high drag ratio of the B-70 while flying at Mach 3, required a total fuel load comparable to that of a B-52. This in turn limited the operational range of the bomber to around 5,000 nautical miles. The wing structure was swept at an angle of 65.5 degrees, and the wing tips were folded down hydraulically 25 to 65 degrees to improve the aircraft’s stability while performing at speeds of Mach 3. While flying at this speed envelop, the XB-70 was designed to “ride” in its own shock wave. A large canard fore-plane (28 feet, 10 inches) installed near the front of the fuselage was utilized for stability moderation. Two large vertical tail units, each of them possessing hydraulic-moving sections, were fitted on the aft of the airframe. The Valkyrie was made completely out of titanium and brazed stainless steel materials. These composite materials were incorporated to enable the aircraft to withstand the heat during the sustained high Mach portions of the bomber’s flight. The aircraft’s fuselage was painted with a nuclear blast reflecting white-looking paint cover which did not stand up well to the Mach 3 kinetic heating. The aircraft did not have any defensive armament system and could only carry its ordinance inside due to its speed profile. The B-70’s had a massive payload capacity. Up to 50,600 pounds of free falling nuclear bombs could have been stored inside the aircraft’s underbelly.

As the first series of trials began, the aircraft started to demonstrate that it could accomplish almost all of the Air Force’s mission requirements, including the most important one: the achievement and sustaining of flying operations at three times the speed of sound. While the Valkyrie was enduring its test trial stages, one aspect that eventually would lead to the cancellation of the entire program surfaced. At high altitude, an aircraft operating at Mach 3 speeds could not maneuver well enough to evade even the Soviet’s second generation SAM missiles of the early 1960s. Also, the aircraft’s straight and level trajectory profile, which Mach 3 speed requires, would have provided the Soviets with nearly pin-point information on the B-70’s projected directional path, enabling their fighters to intercept the bomber’s path instead of the aircraft itself. There was also another unexpected situation that rose out of the bomber’s speed profile: the Valkyrie radar cross section signature was huge. This was due to the technology, airframe material and avionics package, implemented on the aircraft in order to make sustainable Mach 3 operational speeds feasible. The trials also revealed the aircraft’s poor low level operational capability. The B-70 was not adaptable to low level penetration because its thin delta wing structure did not provided the bomber with the necessary in-flight modifications for sustain low level operations. As the trials continued, it was becoming apparent to engineers at North America that the XB-70 did not possess the necessary characteristics to perform as a stable bombing platform. Thus, the aircraft’s profile was changed from a deep penetration heavy bomber, to a reconnaissance and strike platform. This change in profile actually occurred while the aircraft was still in its developing stages in late 1959.

Wing Span 105′-2″
Fuselage Length 189′-0″
Height 29′-11″
Total Wing Area 6,295sq ft
Maximum Speed 2,000mph at 73,000′
Service Ceiling 73,982′
Weight 550,000lb fully loaded
Operational Range 8,283 nautical miles un-refueled
Armament 50,600lb bomb load capacity

In mid 1961, the Kennedy Administration officially removed the program from its active operational status to a purely research project. The high cost of the aircraft program, between 500 to 700 millions at the time, and its perceived vulnerability to the latest Soviet SAM batteries, were cited as the cause of the shifting in the program status. Eventually, two units were built by North America. The first plane took to the air in 1964. The second prototype followed the next year. Initial testing showed the brilliance of the aircraft’s aerodynamic design. During its test flight test, the B-70 consistently demonstrated its ability to achieve and sustain speeds above the 1,988mph threshold. But the trials also demonstrated the plane’s vulnerability. At the same time, the US Air Force began to shift its nuclear deterrence resources from manned bombers and nuclear capable strike aircrafts to the relative easy to develop and maintain Inter Continental Ballistic Missile force which had began to eat more and more of the Air Force’s budgetary pie.

The end of the Valkyrie program came quikly. On the morning of June 8th, 1966, the first prototype was flying an experimental mission with a formation of NASA operated F-104 Starfighters, piloted by the experienced Joe Walker, who strayed too close to the Valkyrie’s vortex generated by its down turned wingtips. The F-104 was thrown across the massive bomber’s wing structure, smashing one of its tailfins as it exploded. The XB-70 was able to flight for a few short seconds before it spirally out of control until it crashed deep inside California’s Mojave Desert. Only one man survived the accident. Following the incident, what was left of the political support for the program promptly evaporated. The program was officially canceled in the spring of 1969. An undistinguished ending for such an elegant and advanced flying platform, but an end that was scripted the minute the aircraft’s plan was on North American’s drawing board.

The World Encyclopedia of Bombers, Francis Crosby, Herms House 2004
Behind Valkyrie: The Amazing Story of the XB-70, Martin Cooper, Penguin Books, 1978
Concept Aircraft: Prototypes, X-planes and Experimental Aircraft, Edit Jim Winchester, Thunder Bay Press, 2005

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

The Ejercito Del Aire - The Spanish Air Force

I. Early History

The Spanish Air Force has been around since the first operational balloons began to appear over the Iberian Peninsula back in 1895. But it was not until April 10th, 1910, that the country formally introduced the nascent military air service as part of its overall armed forces structure. On the afternoon of November 5th, 1913, a rudimentary fitted Spanish squadron had the distinction of being the first true organized force to stage an offensive operation. On that tragic day, Spanish airplanes dropped a few simple shrapnel-type bombs on a number of rebellious Moroccan villages.

After almost two decades of mitigating action, Spain’s military air force was completely unprepared when the country’s Civil War erupted on July 18th 1936. During the war, two distinct air arms existed within the integrated structure of the force. The Spanish Republic Air Force was developed by the Republican forces fighting with the established government. At the beginning, the Republican AF was understaffed and more importantly, poorly equipped to influence events on the ground. They were fitted with obsolete Nieuport-Delage NiD-52 fighters, Breguet 19 reconnaissance bombers, a small fleet of Vickers Vildebeest torpedo-bombers and other old foreign aircraft.

The other air force unit derived from the base force was the National Aviation Force. The ‘Aviacion Nacional’ was created by the Army formations that revolted against what they believed was a repressive government The Nationalist, as this group was called, were lead by the charismatic, albeit, ruthless general Francisco Franco. If the Republican AF was undermanned, then the Nationalist’s was a hallow shell.
Nazi Germany promptly figured out a theater of war where they can test their new equipment and tactics: the Spanish skies. By late July, scores of German-built Junkers Ju-52/3m bomber -transport planes were ferrying Nationalist troops from Spanish Morocco to the mainland. By mid August, Italian-made Savoia Marchetti SM-81, Fiat CR-32 and German Heinkel He-51 were filling the Iberian sky.

The Republican AF also got a boost from foreign countries. Sixty French Dewoitine (D.372, 372, 501 and 510) as well as twenty Potez 54s and a squadron of Bleriot-Spad S.510s; joined the force.

Before the war ended on March 28th 1939, Dorniers, Messerschmitt and other top of the line aircraft tilted the balance of power in favor of the rebels. Franco himself secured the victory when his forces entered Madrid on March 27th.

II. World War II

After the war ended, Franco and his staff, clearly impressed by the role air power played in their ascension to power, established the modern Spanish air force; the ‘Ejercito del Aire’ (EDA). Formed on October 7th, 1939, the ‘Ejercito’ would play a relatively small but significant part in World War II.

When news of the German invasion of Red Russia reached the Spanish government, the new Fascist government’s Foreign Ministry, Ramon Serrano Suñer; offered military assistance to the Nazis by way of the German Ambassador, Eberhard von Stohrer. Adolph Hitler wanted a full pledge declaration of war against the Allies, but Franco and Serrano were kindly aware that any such move will place the country’s struggling economy at the mercy of Great Britain’s oil embargo.

If they could not assist Germany directly, then Franco, though an all volunteer force, similar to the German-deployed Condor Legion during the Civil War, could be mustered. On July 1941, 18,000 men from all walks of life joined in what would be called the Blue Division; a ground force unit that would see heavy action in the Eastern Front. Attached to the division was a limited air expeditionary force known as the Blue Squadron or ‘Escuadrilla Azul’.

The Blue Squadron was part of the overall Army Group Center assets from 1941 until 1944. A total of five Spanish Squadrons flying BF-109 and later FW-190, flew a total of 1,918 sorties as part of Jagdgeschwader 51, also known as “Molders”. The squadrons worked in succession beginning with the first arriving on early June 1941 until the last official one on February of 1944. They had the distinction of being the only Spanish unit to have fought in the Battle of Kursk. Its combat record consisted of 277 air kills and 74 aircraft destroyed, with a total combined loss of seven Spanish pilots.

III. Post War Organization

Following the end of the War, the Spanish government allied themselves with the Western countries in their struggles against the Soviet Union. On March 18th 1946, Spain’s first dedicated paratroop unit was formed. The establishment of a mobile force and key changes in the Ejercito mid level structure made it possible for the country to receive, on a continuing base, top flight aircraft from the United States.

Between the fall of 1950 and the spring of 1959, the Ejercito incorporated its first jet powered platforms; US-built F-86 Saber fighters, Lockheed T-33 trainers and DC-3s and 4s transports were delivered to the Spanish government. Most of those first generation jet systems were replaced in the mid-to-late1960s. It was in the spring of 1968 that the Spanish government initiated an aggressive re-armament effort that culminated with the incorporation of top shelf F-4Cs Phantoms and F-5s Freedom Fighters.

The 1970s brought in another refurbishing phase with the assimilation into the Ejercito of French-developed Mirage III and F-1s. Dassault’s deltas, as the III was commonly refer to, formed the backbone of the Spanish AF for much of the 1970s and early 80s. The Mirage III was one of the biggest success stories in the field of post-WW II combat aircraft design. The vaunted Mirage III first flew on November 17th, 1956 which made the system more than a decade old when it joined the Ejercito.

The other major platform utilized by the AF was the Mirage F-1. The F-1 is a single seat strike fighter which made its maiden flight on December 23rd, 1966. It became operational with the French Air Force in the spring of 1974. The F-1 was one of Dassault’s biggest export success stories.

In the middle of the 80s, the Ejercito received its most advanced air weapon up to date, the US-supplied F/A-18 Hornet. Since its operational deployment in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Hornet became the cornerstone of Spain’s air deterrence and offensive strike capability. A fact that became apparent during NATO’s air war over Kosovo.

Spain made its movement into full pledge membership to NATO in 1982.

IV. Current Structure and base location

The Ejercito del Aire is divided into five operational commands. The first is the Battle Air Command (BAC) based at Torrejon Air Base, Madrid. General Air Command (GAC) has its headquarters in Madrid. Personnel (PC) and Logistic Commands (LC) are also located in the Spanish capital. The only other active command posted outside the Madrid region is the Canary Island Air Command, which reside at Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Canary Islands.

The Ejercito utilized 15 operational Air Bases.

1. Alcanatarilla

2. Armilla

3. Four Winds

4. Gando

5. Getafe (built in 1911 and widely consider the cradle of Spanish aviation)

6. Los Llanos

7. Matacan

8. Moron Air Base is located in southern Spain, roughly 35 miles southeast of the city of Seville. Negotiations for US bases in Spain were conducted between June 1951 and September 1953 under the direction of a Joint United States Military Group, commanded by Major General A. W. Kissner.


In 1957, the Sixteenth Air Force was realigned under the Strategic Air Command. Main operating bases in Spain were used for SAC B-47 rotational alert aircraft until April 1965. 16th AF also operated SAC bases in Morocco from 1958 through 1963. In 1966, a year after SAC withdrew its B-47 alert force from Spain, 16th AF was reassigned to US Air Forces in Europe. On 13 May 1958, the first flight of B-47s were assigned to Morón Air Base to conduct Reflex operations and 6 weeks later the first rotational fighter squadron, F-100s from George AFB CA, arrived for temporary duty to conduct air defense alert.


In April 1960, Morón was placed under the command of Colonel Henry C. Godman. Morón kept operating primarily as a “Reflex” base until 29 April 1962, when the first Chrome Dome KC-135 aircraft arrived.


On November 1971, Morón was relegated to a “modified caretaker status. Torrejon Air Base was designated as the Primary Support Base (PSB) with support services to start in April 1972. Military personnel were reduced to a staff of approximately 100 members of the 7473 CSS. All flying activity was halted except for occasional exercises.


On May 14th 1983 US Spanish bilateral Agreement of Friendship, Defense and Cooperation authorized the United States to station up to 15 tanker aircraft at Morón Air Base. A manpower change request was developed to increase blue-suit manning, based on the tanker task force and the increased War Reserve Materiel (WRM) requirements. The Morón Air Base work force, including all military, civilian, contractor and tenant personnel, was approximately 300 personnel.


In 1984, Morón became NASA’s Space Shuttle Transoceanic Abort Landing Site. Since that time, Morón and NASA have developed a lasting partnership in service to Shuttle ventures. In March 1984, Morón Air Base was selected by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as a Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL) site for the space shuttle program. Special navigation and landing aids are in place, and personnel are highly trained to recover landing of the orbiter vehicle. Major enhancements were completed in 1986, and included the permanent installation of a Microwave Landing System. Morón Air Base is the only TAL site in the world situated to support high, mid, and low inclination launches. For this reason, Morón Air Base activates for almost all space shuttle launches.


In August 1990, SAC deployed 22 KC-135 and KC-10 tankers to support Operation DESERT SHIELD. In January 1991, SAC changed Morón Air Base from refueling to bomber operations for DESERT STORM. The 801st Bomb Wing (Provisional) at Morón Air Base consisted of 24 B-52s, 3 KC-135s and over 2,800 personnel. This was the largest deployed bomber wing during the war.


Since January 2000, Morón is a critical link in supporting the rotation of Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF) — deployed in EUCOM and CENTCOM Areas of Responsibilities. Tanker Task Forces (KC-135 and KC-10), Fighter Units from the Air Force and Marine Corps, and airlifters (C-141, C-17 and C-5s) use Morón as a staging base for AEF operations. The base also frequently welcomes rotating US Army personnel.


Moron currently housed F-18 Hornet fighters and P-3 Orion surveillance aircraft - was once one of three bases the US used in Spain and home to about 2,000 active-duty people and their families. The Defense Department closed Torrejon and Zaragoza Air Bases, and trimmed Moron to little more than a handful of people keeping an eye on the runway and buildings in case the Air Force needed to return to the Iberian Peninsula.

9. San Javier

10. Santiago

11. Son San Joan
12. Talavera

13. Torrejon Air Base was a major military airport in Spain. During the hey days of the Cold War, Torrejon was headquarters of the United States Air Forces in Europe Sixteenth Air Force as well as the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing. Aircrafts stationed at Torrejon were usually rotated to other USAFE airbases located in Italy and Turkey.
The Air Base was originally the home of the Spanish National Institute of Aeronautics, but after the U.S.-Spanish Defense Agreement of 1953, the US funded the construction at Torrejon of a brand new 13,400′ concrete runway in order to replace the 4,266-ft grass airstrip. A massive concrete apron and other necessary maintenance and shelter facilities were erected to accommodate the biggest of the United States Air Force Strategic Air Command’s bombers which mainly supported the Command’s strategic Reflex missions.
Today, among other things, the base housed the Torrejon-Madrid Airport.

14. Villanubla
15. Zaragoza

V. Operational Activity

The main Spanish air formation is the Wing or ‘Ala’. Each Wing is composed of up to three squadrons (escuadrones). Between 19 and 24 aircrafts are housed in an escuadron or air unit. The Ejercito also operates a number of Groups and special operation squadrons.

Total aircraft inventory is estimated to be around 660 operational airframes. Here’s a list of current air activity platforms and base units.
a. Fighter Attack Planes
” Dassault Mirage F-1M (36 units) Wing 14th
” Dassault Mirage F-1BM (3) Wing 14th
” McDonnell-Douglas F/A-18 Hornet F-18M (68) Wing 12th & 15th
” McDonnell-Douglas F/A-18 Hornet F-18A (17) Wing 46th
” Eurofighter Typhoon EF2000 (36) Wing 11th
” Eurofighter Typhoon EF2000T (14) Wing 11th

b. Maritime Reconnaissance Systems
” Fokker F-27 (3) 802nd Squadron
” Lockheed Orion P-3A (2) Wing 11th
” Lockheed Orion P-3B (2) Wing 11th
” Lockheed Orion P-3M (3) Wing 11th

c. Transport Aircraft
” Airbus A310 (2) 45th Group
” Beechcraft C-90 (4) 42nd Group
” CASA C-212 T.12 (74) Distributed on various commands such as Wing 37th, 801st Group, 47th Group, Wing 48th, and 721st Squadron.
” CASA C-212 T.12B (10)
” CASA C-212 T.12B modified (6)
” CASA CN-235 (20) Wing 25th
” CASA C-295M (13) Wing 35th
” Dassault Falcon 900 (2) 45th Group
” Dassault Falcon 900B (3) 45th Group
” Lockheed C-130H (6) Wing 31st
” Lockheed C-130H-30 (1) Wing 31st
” Lockheed KC-130H (5) Wing 31st

d. Aerial Refueling Airplanes
” Boeing 707-300KC (3) 47th Group

e. Trainers
” Beechcraft Bonanza F-33C (23) 42nd Group
” CASA C-101EB-01 (73) General Air Academy
” Northrop F-5BM (20) Wing 23rd
” LET L.13 (5) Wing 79th
” PZL Bielsko SZD-30 (4) Wing 79th
” Schiebe SF-28A (1) Wing 79th
” ENAER T-35C (37) General Air Academy

f. Helicopters
” Aerospatiale SA 330J (4) 801st Squadron
” Eurocopter EC 120B (15) Wing 78th
” Eurocopter AS 532UL (2) Wing 46th & 48th
” Eurocopter Super Puma AS 332 (9) Wing 46th & 48th
” Sikorsky S-076C (8) Wing 78th

Other aircrafts included (6) CASA 127 VIP transports, (2) Cessna Citation V C-560 recon platforms, (4) Dassault Falcons 20D and E naval survey aircrafts, (12) Canadair CL-215 fire attack planes. Ten additional Canadair, version CL-415 acts as firefighting systems. The Ejercito operates one IAI B-707 351C Intelligence gathering aircraft.

On standby orders, the Spanish AF have 71 single-seat Typhoon fighter/attack aircrafts. Sixteen two-seat dedicated attack Typhoons are also expected to join the Ejercito within a ten year radius. Between 25 and 28 Airbus A400Ms are also ordered.

VI. Current Deployments and Future Operational Profile

The Ejercito del Aire has been very active since the end of the Kosovo War. Spain’s F-1s has been employed in the skies over Iraq and more recently, Afghanistan. It’s believed that some of Spain’s powerful Typhoon aircraft will soon see action in the Afghan theater of operations. Based on Herat Air Force Base, Ejercito’s F/A-18s and transport airplanes had been operating since the early 2005.

Spain also has a small detachment in the former Soviet republic of Kirgizstan. Elements of the 35th Wing are stationed there for logistic and medevac support operations.

As for the immediate future, the Spanish Air Force is fast becoming one of the better equipped units in the European Continent. It ranks 9th in total combat power, just below Poland and on top of countries such as the Ukraine and Finland. The country’s rank will likely remain the same as other European nations incorporate new types of air platforms to its active inventory.

References
How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare in the 21st Century, James F. Dunnigan, HarperCollins Books 2003
Air Power: The men, machines and ideas that revolutionized war, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II; Stephene Budiansky, Penguin Books 2004
Modern Military Aircraft in Combat, Editor Robert Jackson, Amber Books 2008
www.globalsecurity.org
www.ejercitodelaire.mde.es

The Red Air Force: 1974 - 1985

The years between 1974 and 1985 brought many changes to the Soviet Union’s Air Force (SAF). Changes that augmented the SAF’s overall combat capability almost to a point of challenging the West’s invaluable air dominance in the projected battlefield. This was a dramatic shift that caught many Westerner observers by surprise. After decades of overall decay in the SAF’s structural profile, the 1970s ushered in a new era in air operational planning. The Kremlin had finally awoken to what conventional air power was really about.

Since its creation, the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) had planned to counter the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact ground and air forces with their high tech air forces. At the front point of this assumption rested the idea that the Western powers could bring heavy concentration of fire to bear with extreme speed and unmatched accuracy at any point in the battle. It was always understood that even if NATO had the manpower in strategic reserves to counter an all out attack by the Warsaw ground forces, the incorporation of those forces into the defensive forward positions would have taken time. It would not arrive in time to stall a Soviet-lead push into Western Europe.

For NATO, air power filled this gap. It offered the ability to strike hard and repeatedly at the choke points along the two German frontiers where the Warsaw land offensive would have to squeeze through. At the same time, tactical implementation of air power would be projected strategically because a large amount of American tactical aircraft would fly to Europe in the event of an all out attack. The concept of Allied air power holding the front against a Soviet ground incursion, provided there were enough deployed aircraft to do it. This was valid and reassuring, especially since the performance of modern tactical Allied aircrafts and the effectiveness and accuracy of their weapons had climbed exponentially on the back of commercially competitive Western technology to achieve an overall capability undreamt of. Inside NATO’s war planning, this air superiority had long been a comfortable thought of state that many believed would endure forever. But by the early 1980s, the situation looked different.

Red Air Force combat aircraft made its world debut in the Korean skies during the 1950s affair. By the early 1970, all of those first generation aircraft, were withdrawn from active service. The second generation of fighters and bombers, originally designed in the late 50s and early 60s, reached its developmental peak in the early 70s.

By the mid 80s, only about 10 to 15 percent of second generation air platforms remained in front line service as the third generation began to assert itself on the overall force structure. Third generation fighters and bombers made their debut in the early 1970s thus its numbers rose steadily through the decade. It was this generation that gave the Red Air Force a broad force structure comparable to that of its Western counterparts, although the later were still reckoned to have a margin in detail capability in all aspects, especially where this was dependent on electronics and weapon technology.

On sheer numbers of available airframes, the Warsaw Pact had always outstripped those of the Allies, in the mid 80s; broad parity in performance was also within its grasp. Added to the equation was the Soviet’s monumental investments in research and development dwarfed that of all NATO nations combined, with the exception of the US. A fourth generation platform was well under development by the middle of US President Ronald Regan’s first term. By 1985, the Red AF was in the process of completing pre-evaluation of its fourth generation air superiority fighter. A platform sorely intended to out maneuver the premier US air superiority aircraft, the vaunted F-15 Eagle. The Soviets were also working on a dedicated V-STOL aircraft for naval operations.

In the summer of 1985, analysis estimated Russian tactical air forces in the western section of the country had increased by 35 percent. The Soviet naval air arm was also climbing. The number of strategic airlift airplanes and attack helicopters quadrupled between 1974 and 1985. In twenty five years, 1970 onward, the Red AF increased their operational scope and war-load capacity by a staggering 1000 percent. The air force progress was as equally impressive as the Red Navy’s. Admiral Gorshkov gets much of the credit, and deservedly so, for the development of the Navy’s Blue Water aspects; but Soviet AF generals are to be praised for the formation of a top rated force.

With its overall new power projection capability, the Red Air Force possessed the capability to venture into the Atlantic and engage NATO’s European targets, including the most important air bridge base in the Continent; the United Kingdom. A thought inconceivable in 1970. The newfound Red air power could, if the pattern continued for one more decade, have made the deployment of US strategic reserve units into Continental Europe that much more difficult, if not impossible. In conclusion, Soviet generals believed that they were just 10 to 15 years away from having a war winning air strategy.

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

The Air Defense of the Continental US in the first years of the Cold War

When World War II ended in September 1945, the United States of America was the most powerful economic and military country in the world. As the sole possessor of the mighty atom bomb, in possession of the most advance conventional weapon systems in the world and the world power that was the least affected by the destruction of four dramatic years of fighting, the US, confident that peace would reign in the world for at least a decade, started demobilized its massive armed force apparatus and curtails the development of new weapon systems. World events changed all this very quickly. The wartime military relationship that existed between America and the Soviet Union promptly soured. In the years that follow the end of the war, the Soviet regime moved to consolidate its hold on the countries of Eastern Europe. They did not stop there. The Soviets wanted to spread communism to all parts of the globe. After Eastern Europe, they planned to move towards Asia. In America, the US armed forces continued their downsizing in 1946 despite the increasing evidence that Red Russia were continuing to build their military forces. During the early years of World War II, the Soviet Union was forced to move most of its industrial base outside their capital, Moscow. As a result, by mid to late 1940s, they possessed a large, albeit crude, military complex. The Soviets started a crash curse to develop new weapon systems to increase their already massive land and air forces. Gathering information from espionage activities around the world, their own scientific research data and capture of German scientist, the Soviet Union was by mid 1946 in a full rearmament mode. In the meantime, their leaders were moving promptly in securing their country’s position as an equal to that of the United States. Political and military leaders in the West watched these disturbing developments within their former allied with uneasiness.

In March 1946 former wartime British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, gave a powerful and prophetic speech at Westminster Collage stating that: “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across Europe”. He was right of curse. Tension would increment when on October 23rd, 1947, American intelligence officials noted the existence of a high number of Soviet made Tu-4 “Bull” bombers. The Bull was a textbook case of reverse-engineering copy of the huge Boeing B-29 bomber. The Soviets got their hands over a few example of the B-29 when they crash landed on Soviet territory after sustaining damages during bombings runs over Japan late in the war. These bombers gave the Soviet Union for the first time the ability to hit targets in continental America. By the beginning of 1948, all but the essential communication links between the one-time allied had ceased. Then on the morning of April 1st, 1948, the Soviets closed all land access to the divided city of Berlin, deep behind the Soviet Occupation Zone. The land blockade lasted until September 30th, 1949; three days after President Harry Truman informed a stunning nation that the Russian had succeeded in exploding an atom bomb ending the short-lived United State monopoly on nuclear weapons. All these developments, occurring in such a short times span, prompted concern in the ability of the US armed forces to defense the homeland. Accordingly to the times, in 1947, the United States government proceeded to make one of the most overwhelming reorganization of its political and military structure. The War Department, stabled since the incorporation of the Colonies, was replaced with the new Department of Defense. The Army retained all of its ground forces, the Navy retained their assets, but the air arm of the Army became a separated service, the newly and independent military service was the US Air Force. As soon as the new Air Force enters service, it started to flex its political power. It was often at odds with the Army brass over the control of nuclear weapons systems as well as who should be in control of the country’s air defenses. As the 1940s passed and the 1950s began, US weapons development systems were in constant turmoil because of the inter service rivalry that was forming between the three services. Both the Army and the Air Force fought feverish for control over the development and deployment of a surface-to-air missile system, and the three services sought to develop independently long range ballistic missile programs.

The outbreak of hostilities in the Korean Peninsula in 1950 put all the squabbling to rest. The US Army de-activated most components of its artillery department and reorganized them in the newly created Army Anti-Aircraft Command (ARAACOM). The ARAACOM was assigned the task to deploy antiaircraft artillery on sixty six key locations inside the United States as a stopgap until a missile defense system were available. About the same time, the US Air Force was assigned control of America’s ballistic missile research and developing program. In the mid 1950s the Air Defense Command (ADC) became the main strategic command coordinating the defenses of continental United States. With this massive undertaking, the Air Force was awarded a bigger piece of the budgetary pie. Funds were now available for the development of new types of nuclear weapons, new long range heavy bombers and the big prize, the guided long range ballistic missile. The priority of funding went to the research and development of a strategic long range surface-to-surface missile, an offensive missile system. The leaders at the Pentagon envisioned an offensive missile system so powerful that it by itself deterred any possible preemptive nuclear attack by the Soviets. The deployment of these missiles clearly implies the ability of the US to achieve a massive retaliation capability upon the attacker. The role of these missiles and that of their ability to lunch a massive un-surviving counterattack would be discussed during most of the years of the Cold War.

Because the design and development of an operational guided long range ballistic missile system seems to many in Washington as a more technical plausible weapon platform than the development of a comprehensive strategic missile defense system. The decision was made to pursue the offensive ballistic missile system first. Working on the strategic defense system was put on the back burner. America’s strategic doctrine underwent numerous changes during the course of the Cold War. Then, during the 1950s, the Eisenhower Administration pursued a military doctrine that called for a scale back in conventional force military expending and increasing the nuclear strike force in order to make it clear to the Soviet Union that the United States had the weapons and the means to deliver a massive nuclear blow at the Soviet Union if they decided to lunch a first strike campaign. Critics of this new policy, known as New Look, pointed to the administration that there was no assurance that the US arsenal could survive a Soviet nuclear attack. When the new Kennedy Administration took office in 1961, they brought a fresh look at the world strategic situation. Flexible Response was born. This new military doctrine called for a mixture of conventional and nuclear forces, which could be tailor made to threats in a proportionate manner. The success of this new policy would be the backbone of United States Military posture during the next thirty five years.

As the tactical integration of the continental defenses of the United States in the later stages of World War II, the airplane emerged as the main offensive weapon platform. It had demonstrated that its strategic advantage was un-rival at the time. The airplane, specially the bomber, was capable of delivering a heavy bomb payload to far and away locations with devastating effects. This concept was proven over the skies of Spain during the country’s civil war and then over the first two years of the war. But the action that really made the bomber a weapon of fear was the indiscriminating bombing of Dresden, a major German city, in the latest stages of the war. The city’s destruction in just one day is widely recognized as the starting point for the development of the strategic annihilation of a city-wide target. As these developments were taking place overseas, the United States began to develop and deploy Interceptor Commands Units all around the costal areas as late of 1941.These units were a combination of two major assets that were to be re-arrange in order to provide a more reliable antiaircraft system. The first, were the attachment of units of Army Air Forces to Interceptor Command and their deployment near major costal cities in America. Also, on March 1942, the United States Army constituted the Army Antiaircraft Command (AA). The newly created command would have control over all Costal Artillery Anti aircraft Army Units as well as that of the Army’s Interceptor Commands. During the next months, the United States Army develops more advance antiaircraft weapon systems. At this time, rockets were staring to appear as accepted weapon systems. Radar, developed in the early stages of the war, was rapidly becoming a serious method of detecting and tracking incoming targets. When the war ended in Japan on August 1945, the United States had over 331 active AAs battalions world-wide, with around 246,000 troops at their disposal.

On June 1945, Bell Labs, acting on a request from the Army, commenced the development the first integrated defensive missile system. The Army’s first surface-to-air missile system program was based on an internal Army memo suggesting that the United States must not waste any more time in the development, and ultimately, deployment of an advanced radio-controlled antiaircraft rocket system that could protect major cities in America against bombing from the air. The new program was code named Project Nike, after the winged goddess in the Greek mythology. Three months later, with the surrender of Imperial Japan, the U.S. Army started its massive de-mobilization. Most of the active AA units in Europe and the Far East were de-activated and shipped home along with their equipment, the same holds true for the AA battalions in Continental America. The majority of them were de-activated within weeks after the armistice. But the situation would change dramatically in three years. By 1948, the Cold War was over Europe, countries on the east side of the Iron Curtain were engulfed by the Soviet Union, and a new age of terror had arrived. America began a prompt process of re-arming and re-organizing its costal defenses and the U.S. Army re-started its missile development programs that had been shutdown by them after the war ended. At the beginning its was anticipated by high ranking officials in the newly created United States Air Force, that high flying interceptor fighters would be the main layer of defense against massive Soviet bomber formations and first generation Inter Continental Ballistic Missile coming inbound from Soviet mainland bases. U.S. Air Force’s Strategic bombers as well as the Navy carrier base attack planes would also participate in the defense of the continent, but it was clear early on, that a new mechanism of dealing with the bomber and, more importantly, with the offensive ballistic missile; was needed. A missile defense system that could replace the outmoded conventional Anti-Aircraft-Artillery guns was imperative to the defense of America. The three services, Navy, Army and the Air Force, revamped their respected missile development programs with the idea of fielding a continent-wide defense missile platform as quickly as possible. In the end, the Navy dropped out of the running, but the Air Force and the Army would fight for the next two decades over control of the missile systems and its funding. A fight that would make a possible deployment of a workable defense missile system a long and tedious process. The main responsibility for the defense of the United States against bomber attacks was assumed by the Air Force in the early 1950s. The Air Force went on to develop the Defense in Depth Strategy that would form the backbone of the U.S. Cold War continental defenses. The new strategy called for the use of high-frequency early warning radar stations along with ready-for-takeoff interceptor fighters and long-range antiaircraft missiles positioned around the perimeter of the U.S. If these defense system was breached by a Soviet force, the U.S. Army would activated its own batteries of antiaircraft missile systems located around key U.S. industrial and military sites.

In the mid 1960s, the United Stated Air Force was ready to deploy its first advance surface-to-air missile defense system, the BOMBARC. The BOMBARC was to have a 440 mile range of operation but constant problems with their guided system limited the deployment of the system from nation-wide, integrated system to a more regional. On the other hand, the U.S. Army had fielded its own missile defense system since 1953, the NIKE. The initial deployed surface-to-air NIKE system used the Nike-Ajax liquid fueled missile with an operational range of thirty miles as its main interceptor asset. By the late 1958, there were over two hundred NIKE missile batteries in the U.S., primarily defending nuclear research facilities and depots. On December of 1958, the Army began the process of supplanting its Nike-Ajax missile with the more advance Nike-Hercules. The Hercules was a leap forward in the development of a surface-to-air missile. It was propelled by solid-fuel which gave the missile an operational range in excess of seventy five miles. The Hercules was also the first interceptor missile with a nuclear warhead capability. About one hundred NIKE sites were upgraded with the Hercules. Of these facilities, around fifty were redeployed to defend the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command bomber bases. The Air Command was the United States primary source for massive nuclear retaliation after a Soviet attack. The key component of the NIKE system was the advance, early-warning radar. The U.S. Defense Department was committed from the beginning to build a series of interlocking radar stations that would allow the Army to monitor the perimeter and selecting interior parts of the North American continent. The goal of the system was to provide the Air Force and Army with up-to five hours of warning to response in case of a Soviet bomber attack. The U.S. Air Force took the lead in the design, development and deployment of radar systems. The first significant antiaircraft radar platform was the LASH-Up system. It was designed by the Air Force to cover America’s costal centers and major nuclear production facilities. In 1949, LASH-Up radar stations numbered just seven, but by the end of 1951, the system grew to fifty stations. The LASH-Up system was eventually replaced by the PERMAMNENT system, which was to number seventy-four radar locations by mid 1952. The U.S. early warning radar system was supplemented by the thirty four stations of the PINETREE LINE system located across the vast Canadian territory, which in theory could provide the Air Force with two additional hours of warning in a case of a surprise attack.

In the summer of 1957, the U.S. Department of Defense approved the production of its more ambitious early detection radar system, the Distant Early Warning radar line and the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) air defense control system. The DEW consisted of a series of radar stations fifty miles part, stretching along the northern boundary of the North American continent, several miles north of the Artic Circle. In 1962, the system was upgraded to include an imaginary line from Midway Island to Scotland. The DEW radar line was the outmost line of early warning and it was assisted by the MID-Canadian Line, the PINETREE Line, the PERMANENT radar system and the Gap Filler Radar System. By the mid 1960s, the U.S. Navy had joined the club with its ship and air-borne radar picket units. With all of these layers of protection, America was still susceptible to one weapon platform, the intercontinental ballistic missile. The SAGE system incorporated the latest in computer technology to support the estimated fifty Air Force Combat Direction Centers it was schedule to defend. The Combat Direction Center was the predecessor of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD. Its main function was to coordinate all aspects, radar, sensors, the interceptor aircraft squadrons and the antiaircraft missile batteries, of the continental air defense system. SAGE became partial operational in 1958 and was fully deployable in early 1961. Each of the massive 275 ton SAGE tracking and targeting computers were housed on four-story windowless buildings. Because of their immense size and the fact that they needed to be located above ground, they were extremely vulnerable to any air attack. Still, SAGE was the first truly integrated tactical command system in the United States. It linked the Air Force’s Air Defense, Tactical Air and Strategic Command with the Army Air Defense Command and ARADCOM’s NIKE missile system. This capability gave NORAD the necessary resources to detect and track and inbound aircraft coming to the North American continent.

Story By: Raul Colon e-mail:rcolonfrias@yahoo.com