A Brief Look at the United States Defensive Missile Systems from 1945 to 2004 - Part 1

During the years that followed the end of World War II, the Western Democracies, lead by the United States, and the Soviet-lead Eastern Bloc were locked in a political, economical, ideological and sometimes military battle known as the Cold War. In the military arena, both main superpowers, were developing more advanced offensive weapon systems like the long-range bomber and the new intercontinental ballistic missile system as a mean to safeguard each country against the possibility of a preemptive strike by the other superpower.

A counterweight was needed to be found in order to defend the United States against this possibility. With the development of the nuclear bomb and later the thermonuclear bomb, the battlefield was changed for ever. All existing defensive systems were rendered obsolete the moment the bomb was delivered to Nagasaki. The awesome power of this new weapon altered the Pentagon’s defense strategy.

In the past, the United States mainland defenses were focused at an conventional invasion attempt. Now, with the realization that a massive nuclear attack could cripple most of the country in hours, the United States military planners began to construct a new defense posture. The new posture was centered around the means of stopping the enemy ability to produce a surprise nuclear strike. This means stopping the bombers and the offensive ballistic missiles. By the mid 1950s, after an extended period of research and the development, the U.S. was able to field a first generation antiaircraft missile system that was capable of delivering conventional or nuclear warheads at incoming bomber formations. At the same time, both the United States and the Soviet Union were moving ahead with the development of a series of offensive missile platforms that could deliver a bigger nuclear payload against ground targets located thousand of miles away. The need to defend the home land was more imperative now that at any time in the history of the United States. The development and fielding of workable defensive missile system was giving top priority by the U.S. government.

These missile systems were the ultimate in weapon development of the era. Massive amounts resources were invested in the research and development of these missile systems. This book will provide the reader with an overview of the fixed, land-based defensive missile systems developed by the United States during the years of the Cold War. The NIKE, BOMARC and Safe Guard programs will be discussed as well as the deterrence missile systems, the Atlas, Titan, Minuteman and Peacekeeper will also be discussed. The book end with a brief look at the future of the United States antiballistic missile defenses in the 21st century.

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

Air Attack on the German Oil Industry

The swift focus of the Allied bomber campaign against the German’s oil industry had immediate and far-reaching effects, compared with the 175,000 tons of aviation fuel it produced in April 1944. In June of that same year, German oil production fell to just over 55,000 tons, less than a third of the previous years output. Unless something was done, and done very soon, the Luftwaffe could find itself with insufficient aviation fuel to continue to sustain air operations. As an initial move to change the situation, large numbers of anti-aircraft batteries were transferred from other areas inside Germany, to protect the oil industry refineries. The 14th Flak division was assigned responsibility for the defense of the industry district at Leipzig, which included the most vaunted oil production plants at Leuna-Merseburg, Bohlen, Troglitz, Espenhain and Mucheln. All would receive the bulk of the anti aircraft pieces, a move made in order to strengthen the Division. By the beginning of May, the Division had in its possession 374 heavy caliber guns, 342 of the 8.8cm caliber, 24 of 10.5cm and 8 of 12.8cm caliber. Immediately after the combined allied offensive against the oil industry commenced, the energetic General Adolf Gerlach was appointed to the command of the Division. He received a visit from Riechsminiter Albert Speer, who made it clear that unless the sector refineries were kept working, the war was as good as lost. When Gerlach assumed command of the Division, there had been 104 heavy guns protecting the large Leuna-Merserburg production complex, he demanded, and received, sufficient weapons to bring about a six fold strengthening of the flack defenses ringing that particular target.

Having secured as much of the larger guns he needed, Gerlach set about to increase its tactical effectiveness. During the attack at the plant, US heavy bombers dropped huge quantities of “chaff” and radiated a cacophony of noise jamming that effectively neutralized the German Wuzburg flack control radar system. As a result of this tactic, during day bombing, the gunners were forced to abandon the use of radar-laid fire and resorted to optical predicted fire. If the clouds and enemy countermeasures prevented accurate predicted fire, the gunners would put up a box barrage. All guns fire at the same point in the sky just short of where it was calculated that the bombers would release the bombs, by disrupting the bombing run in this way, the accuracy of the attack could be greatly reduced. This method was highly extravagant in the use of ammunitions, however, and it was permitted to be used only in the direct defense of high priority targets such as oil refineries. US bomber crews rated the oil refineries and chemical plants around Leipzig as the most heavily defended areas against air attack. In addition to these active defense measures, passive measures were also introduced to lessen the effects of the constant bombing. Concrete reinforced blast walls were built around items of vulnerable machinery, and a warren of deep shelters under the plants enable its workers to remain near at hand during the bombing attacks and emerge afterwards to extinguish the fires before they took hold. Although by this time the German Army was short of skilled manpower, they shifted seven thousand engineers for employment in rapid repair brigades at the refineries and a large number of slave workers, primarily Russian prisoners of war, were drafted in to assist with this work. Finally, to ensure that morale at these facilities did not flag under the intense Allied bombardment, the work force came under “special supervision” from Heinrich Himmler’s feared Security Service.

As a further measure to safeguard German’s precious oil production, Edmund Geilenberg was appointed head of a far reaching program to build a network of new refineries that would be far less vulnerable to air bombardment. For the indispensable production of aviation fuel, he and his staff laid plans for the construction of seven underground hydro generation plants. Lower grade motor fuel was to be produced in 41 much smaller facilities situated above ground but widely dispersed in woods and quarries, each carefully camouflaged and individually too small to make an attractive target to the bombers. Geilenberg made full use of the authority given to him to tale labor and materials from other industries, and his labor force was built up rapidly to more than a third of a million workers. He was planning to have several of the motor fuel producing plants ready to enter service by the autumn of 1944, but despite great efforts by Geilenberg and his staff, the first underground plant was not due to produce aviation fuel until well into the spring of 1945. In fact, no aviation fuel came from this source as the war ended on April 1945. During this period, German rocket fighters went into action several times in defense of refineries in the Leipzig area. On the 16th of August, the US Eighth Air Force, known as the Mighty Eight, put up a thousand bombers to attack a spread of targets in central Germany, including the oil refineries at Bohlen. Five Me 163s were scrambled, and two were promptly shot down without inflicting any damage to the raiding force.

The Messerschmitt 163 achieved its first aerial victory just one week after the event, on August 24th. Eight of the smaller fighters took off from fields on Brandis to engage a bomber force of some 185 B-17s running into attack the refinery at Marseburg. Feldwebel Siegfried Schubert carried out a successful interception of the force and shot down two Flying Fortresses, other pilots from the same unit shot down two more units. Two Me 163s were damaged, one by return fire from a B-17 gunner and the other by a landing accident. It had been a successful day for this new jet fighter and seemed to be important for its future as a bomber-destroyer airplane. But in the end, when the Me163s scored four bombers destroyed that day, were to be the high mark point of its operational career. On September 24, Squadron 400 reported that it had nineteen Messerschmitt Me 163s in operation, of which just eleven were serviceable. By that time over a hundred of these jet fighters had been delivered to the Luftwaffe, and it is clear that the factor limiting operational employment was not aircraft but trained pilots. Now it was clear that the hope for salvation for the German Fighter Force was not going to come from this quarter. During September, Squadron 400 operated on five different occasions, the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and the 28th. The largest of these operations was the last one, when nine of the diminutive planes were committed.

The relative short range of the Me 163 meant that accurate ground control was essential if the fighters were to be used effectively. Such controled operations was not always forthcoming, however, and only a small proportion of the fighters reached firing positions. During September 1944, the Me 163 program suffered a disaster from which it would never recover fully. In bombings attacks on the towns of Leverkusen and Ludwigshaven that month, two of the main sources of hydrazine and hydrate suffered serious damage and production was greatly reduced by it. For the remainder of the war, shortages of this chemical fuel would dog the 163. A major competitor for this limited chemical fuel was the Fi 103 flying bomb, which used it to power the catapult system that fires them into the air. The Fi 103 enjoyed a higher priority for supplies than the Me 163 programs. At the same time, the piston engine fighter units continued to mount defensive attacks against bomber formations, and from time to time they were able to pick their way past the American fighter screens and deliver their special brand of saturation attacks on an unexpected bomber. On September 27th, Squadron 4 delivered a sharp attack on the 445th Bomber group and in three furious minutes, it shot down 28 Liberator bombers out of a total of 37 dispatched. It would be the heaviest loss ever suffered by the US Bomber Group on a single mission. On the following day, the Squadron No. 3 assailed the 41st Combat Wing and shot down eighteen Flying Fortresses before the arrival of strong forces of escorts, preventing the slaughter to continue. Just over a week later, October 6th, a Squadron drawn from the 4th and 300th fought a similarly brisk battle with the 4th combat Bomber Wing and shot down fourteen B-17s.

Despite that such actions brought disaster upon the individual bomber units involved, their effect on the US bombing offensive as a whole was not. During the three days mentioned before, heavy bombers of the US Eight Army Air Forces flew a grand total of 3,275 successful sorties for a loss of some 81 units, less than 2.5 percent of the total. And that, it must be stressed, was on three days when the German defenders were relatively successful. Each passing day, when the weather permitted, the US Eighth and Thirteen Air Forces would send more than a thousand heavy bombers to attack targets across Germany and the occupied territories and on most days, losses were less than 1 percent of the total force involved. The German night fighter force had not recovered from the neutralization of its early warning radar system when it suffered a further calamity. The loss of French territory to the Allies had torn a gapping hole on Germany’s early tracking radar chain, which the Royal Air Force now exploited by routing bombers from that direction during attack on the south and western parts of Germany. Even as signals personnel struggled to reposition radar dishes to plug this breach there came a further blow; the fuel famine started to take effect and forced a curtailment of night fighter activities.

Then, to add to the worsening situation, No 100 Group of the RAF began to make its present felt during the night air battles. The Group operated five squadrons of heavy bombers modified into special jamming aircrafts, B-17 Fortresses, B-24 Liberators, Halifaxes and Stirlings. These aircraft were able to carry a large quantity of “windows” of all types, as well as noise-jamming equipment to counter the German’s Wurzburg fire control system and the Freya, Mammut, Wassermann and Jagdschloss radars that made up the German early warning chains. In addition, some of the aircraft carried “Jostle”, a high power jammer to blot out the night fighter’s radio communication channels. No 100 comprised of six squadrons of Mosquito night fighters carrying special systems to enable them to operate against their Luftwaffe counterparts deep inside the Third Reich. Homing on to radar emissions was a game that two could play, and in addition to AI radar some of the Mosquitos carried “Serrate”, which enabled them to home in on emissions from the German night fighter’s SN-2 radars. Other Mosquitos carried “Perfectos”, which transmitted interrogating pulses to trigger the identification friend or foe (IFF) sets of German aircraft in the area. When Germans IFF sets replied, their signals betrayed the range and bearing of the aircraft and identified it to the Mosquito crews as hostile. Several German aircrafts were shot down following “Perfectos” contacts, and many others were lost when German crews, having heard of the system, flew with IFF switched off and were shot down by their own flak.

But despite the presence of the Mosquito in the night battles, the German night fighter force suffered a far lower rate of attrition than its day fighter counterparts. But No. 100 group’s operation imposed considerable pressure on the German defenses, which in combination with the other factors, allowed the RAF night bombers to operate at will over the German sky with minimal losses. Throughout this period, the German oil industry was hit hard and repeatly. An example of the fate of the German oil industry, in the hands of the Allied bombing offensive happened in the spring of 1944, when one of the largest producers of synthetic oil, the Amoniakwerk Merseburg plant at Leuna, who produced about one sixth of the total German production. The huge plant sprawled over an area of 757 acres, and in addition to liquid fuels it produced ammonia, methanol and various types of industrial alcohol from coke and brown coal. The first large scale attack that happened at the plant was from 224 Flying Fortresses of the Eighth Air Force, which took place on May 12th, even before the Allied main offensive against the German oil industry began. That initial attack brought a halt to fuel production. During the next six months, the plant was attacked twelve more times. Time after time the plant was hit hard and production halted, as if one of the prize-fighters had been knocked to the ground. But each time it picked itself up and production resumed. At first the recovery was quickly and almost complete, but as the accumulation of punishment began to tell, the recovery became progressively slower and less complete.

Compared with 175,000 tons of aviation fuel produced in April, in August there were only 16,000 tons and in September a mere 7,000 tons. Throughout that summer, the Luftwaffe kept going on its fat, the reserves of over half a million tons of aviation fuel it had accumulated previously. With consumption running far in excess of production, by the beginning of September more than half this reserve had been consumed; from a high point of about 580,000 tons at the beginning of May, stocks were only about 180,000 tons at the end of September. Now the harsh reality of the shortfall of fuel production could not be avoided. Operation by the Luftwaffes medium and heavy bombers were sharply curtailed, the use of aerial reconnaissance was limited, air operations in support of the Army were permitted only in decisive situations, and the number of night fighter sorties was cut back. Only day fighter operations in defense of the Fatherland were allowed to continue at their previous level. Meanwhile, in Germany the production of combat aircrafts, and in particular fighter types, had risen to unprecedented levels. The Luftwaffe was about to stage a remarkable recovery in fighting strength.

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

Revolution in the Air: Gallaudet’s D-5, DM-5 and D-7 Models

In the winter of 1917, the Gallaudet Engineering Company finally completed their much anticipated land monoplane that used their patented Gallaudet-Drive Mechanism, a revolutionary engine driving a remote, mid-fuselage mounted propeller. The newly produced aircraft, call signed D-5, were to be the Company’s first true landplane platform after years of experimenting with the famous D-2 biplane.

In early January 1918, the company was submerged in developing the D-4 project, a tactical fighter for which they would receive a construction contract the following month from the United States Navy. But despite the immense work being done on the 4 model, Gallaudet engineers still found time to explore new ideas such as the 5 type. This new design was to use the reliable Liberty engine, first tested years before on American Expeditionary Force’s Farmans. Gallaudet designers use the D-5 project as a test bed for new technology. Chief among them was a cantilever wing structure with a thick airfoil, which have the distinction of being the first such wing design fitted into an American-develop air platform.

On the morning of January 7th, the company officially submitted a proposal to W.F. Durand; chairman of the influential NACA, for transmittal to the Aircraft Board for the building of what Edson Gallaudet called a “200-mph fighting monoplane”. The 5’s general arrangement is dated January 6th, so this proximity to the proposal and the lack of another competing design at this period, makes it almost certain that the D-5 was the 200-mph plane. Attached to the letter Durand received on the 7th were several detailed blueprints and specification sheets, with one of them being the D-5.

The designed D-5 was a mid-winged monoplane powered by a Liberty engine mounted on the nose. It had a 39′ wing span. The fuselage was 30′4″ in length and possessed a height of 7′-9″. The vaunted Liberty drove a mid-frame two blade propeller. The pilot was seated in an open cockpit between the engine and the propeller. The reconnaissance officer or observer as was call at the times, sat behind the propeller. Two fuel tanks were fitted at the front and the rear of the pilot’s seat. Tail surfaces were identically to the D-4, except for the absent of stub fins. The tail skid was an extension of the small rudder post. A cantilevered, thick and tapered wing gave the plane a distinct look.

Another departure from the D-4 was the use of rectangular spars in the fuselage’s cross section. The ailerons had an inverse taper with a wide base at the tips. A tall, fixed landing gear was fastened between the two wing spars near the wing root, which is estimated to be at 12 percent, thicker than usual for the era. The relative small air frame made it a necessity for the Liberty engine’s upper and down sections to be expose to the air stream.

During the early part of the March 1918, Gallaudet surprised the nascent aviation industry with another monoplane design, DM-5. the ‘M’ designation suggest a modified version of another platform, although no official documentation has been found to prove it. At the heart of the new version lay basically an improved D-5. The airframe was extended to 3′6″ wide and by 4′ high in order to fully enclose the Liberty engine. Still, the motor was big enough, in comparison with the mid frame, that the bottom oil sump was not covered. The wing was now a constant chord with a thin airfoil and no longer cantilevered, with a streamlined bracing line on top and bottom to the front and rear spars.

The ‘M’ concept called for two rectangular outlines on the wing’s surfaces near the root, which served as airfoil radiators similar to the ones used on the D-4. The biggest departure from the D-5 model was the incorporation of a retractable landing gear. A single leg per wheel retracted forward into the nose section beside the engine. The front of the airframe was composed on tubular longerons connected with cast bronze fittings braced by thin wires. The engine bearers appeared to have been built-up, sheet metal channel type as used on the D-4. There were three wing spars. All widest at the brazing wires attachment points and tapered from there towards both the tips and fuselage. The spars were rectangular in section and constructed out of metal sheet. The top and bottom parts of the aircraft were channel-shaped of .0625″ of thickness and the webs were .025″. All held together by an eight to a quarter diameter rivets.

Another of Gallaudet’s lesser known designs is the D-7 Mail Carrier. The drawing, which probably was made accordingly to a mid-1918 request by the United States government, was the project less coveted by Edson Gallaudet at that time frame. Unfortunately, little is know about the concept beyond its indented purposes of transporting mail through the air. But the few sketches that had survived pain a picture of a truly remarkable aeroplane. The design looks like a slightly larger, fixed landing gear version of the ‘M’ version. There are no indications of pilot seating or cockpit arrangement. No engine area is visible on the incomplete blue print. Span was to be around fifty feet. Fuselage length was 30′3″ with a total wing area of 337.5 square feet. The wing had two spars which were only indicated by a single dotted line on the paper. The rest of the data is missing or inconclusive.

It’s a testament to his innovating vision that almost a century later, all three models, D-5, DM-5 and D-7, are once again gaining the interest of aviation aficionados the world over.

The Aeroplane as a Long Range Gun, Journal of the Royal Artillery, R.G. Cherry, June 1919
Alpha, Bravo, Delta: Guide to the U.S. Air Force, Walter J. Boyne, editor, Penguin Books 2003
The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, Robert Jackson, Parragon Publishing, 2002
The Early Aviation History, American Years, Edward Von der Porten, Crowell Company, 1969

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

The Dreadnaught No. 1

Aviation was in its infancy when the Great War began in August 1914. Still, many historians point towards the ‘War to End All Wars’ as the single, most important event in the transformation of the aircraft from a novelty to a much sough out commodity. No one will look at aviation the same way after 1914. That’s because the antagonist on this cataclysmic period utilized the airplane as a pure tool of war, rather than for communication or reconnaissance duties as it was customary during the first years of the twentieth century.

By the outbreak of hostilities, all combatants had an air force of some sort. The Germans had the biggest force with about 250 aircraft on inventory. The French, although outnumbered 3 to 2 in airplanes by the Germans, had a much greater understanding of aviation tactics. A base that would serve them well as its country became the main battlefront throughout the four year struggle. Farther behind the Germans and French were the British. The Royal Flying Corps, created in 1912; two years after France had done the same, could only field 60 airframes by July 1914. For the first two years of the war, Great Britain depended heavily on French engines and airframes. However, with its much larger industrial base, the island nation quickly caught and surpassed, both the Germans and French in aircraft output. On the other side of Europe, Russia was in possession of more planes than the British and French combined. They also had a better command structure than the French. But the confusing variety of types made maintenance of their aircraft difficult. Meanwhile, the chief culprit of instigating the war, Austria-Hungary, had only a tiny force by comparison.

In the later part of the nineteen century, in the vast territory controlled by the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungry, many aviation pioneers started developing and testing indigenous flying platforms. In the Czechoslovakia part of the empire, some aircraft inventors like Jan Kaspar began gaining a reputation for excellence in designs and development. Many aspiring pioneers became fixated with Kaspar’s achievements. One of those people who felt in love with Kaspar’s blue prints was Jan Stastik. The life of this remarkable, yet, less know aviation trailblazer is one of the most mysterious ones. The holes and hiatuses in his curriculum vitae are one of history’s greatest travesties.

The bits and pieces of what is known are tantalizing. What is certainly accepted is that his public life started in the spring of 1911, when he applied as a student pilot in Kaspar’s flying school at Pardubitze. After this period, little information is available, but it is safe to assume that Stastik was fulltime alum at the Technical University in Prague. By 1912, he introduced to the public his first aircraft model mockup in front of a jam packed crowd at the Prague Car Exhibition. He called the biplane on display at the exhibition that day Bomber Project Number One or Dreadnought No.1. According to the October 30th, 1914 issue of Flight, a prestigious British aviation magazine, Stastik’s biplane bomber mockup has several similarities in design with that of Igor Ivanovich Sikorsky’s famous Ilya Moroumetz heavy bomber, prompting many to conclude this was a copycat. Little do they know that the entrepreneur has secretly commenced work on his dream plane almost two years before the great Russian inventor.

In 1913, the Stastik began full work on his concept. The hard part of transforming a design mockup to a full size aircraft was a daunting task. One that required time and money. Time he had but money was in short supply. It was at that time that he turned to fellow countrymen Horak and Vonka to sponsor the project. The banking duo, famous for establishing several financing regulations in Imperial Austria, gave Stastik the important amount of 130,000 koruny (crowns). With money in tow, a year later, Stastik was able to present its semi-completed aircraft to an impressed gathering at the Prague Car Exhibition. In May, with the initial funds dwindling, he managed to finish the installation of the wing fittings and power plant. The final pieces needed before the aircraft could take to the air. By early June, and with his beloved bomber completed, Stastik began to plan for the initial flight test phase. At the time of his completion, Dreadnought No.1 was the Danube Monarchy’s first operational-capable bomber.

The Dreadnought was a remarkable flying machine for its time. It was a three strutted biplane design, built from wood coverings and fiber. It was powered by two Gnome rotary engines capable of generating up to 100 horse power per unit. The power plants were placed at the front and rear sections of the fuselage. Each of them drove a two-bladed airscrew, rotating in opposite directions. Originally, the front faced Gnome engine got a cover hood. But it was soon removed due to problems associated with the cooling of the motor. The rear engine was never housed. The upper wing structure of the airplane was fitted with two sets of ailerons for additional control and had a span of 18 meters. The lower wing area was shorter by a couple of meters.

The tailplane was assembled in two frames meeting at the ruder post that carried one rudder and one elevator which was built in a T-configuration. Below the tailplane sat a tailskid. The main undercarriage was completed with another carriage that was mounted under the cockpit and used two metal wheels without rubber tires. These metal wheels had S-shaped spokes that served as additional suspension for the airplane. On the air frame, fitted in a compact cabin, sat the two man crew. Behind the pilot and co-pilot, was an intriguing apparatus for mounting the bomb load. The mechanism looked like a revolver drum. A remarkable close looking system was used by the United State’s B-1A Lancer bomber for the deployment of cruise missiles in the early 1980s. The handling of the system was performed by lever controls and a special indicator that noticed the number of bombs attached to the barrel.

Next to the bomb-barrel were the fuel tanks. The empty weight of this twin-engine plane was 750kg. It soared to 1,200kg when fully fitted. Stastik planned to enhance that capacity two-fold, to around 2,000kg. Top operational speed for the bomber was estimated at 150 to 160 kmh, with a maximum flight endurance time of nearly six hours. By the middle of the summer of 1914, the massive Dreadnought began its flight test phase at Pardubitze. A year and a half later, the biplane finally joined the K.U.K. Fligerarsenal, the technical test center for the fledgling Luftschifferabteilung, the forerunner of the K.U.K Luftfahrtruppen (Austro-Hungarian air force), at Fischamend, downriver from the imperial capital of Vienna. From there, the aircraft will never emerge.

During the initial test flight, the aircraft began to gather speed for the takeoff before the front carriage broke, propelling the plane to a somersault crash. As the pilot emerged from the crash site, he managed to see what remained of the bomber catching fire. The end came quickly as ground crews were ill prepared to extinguish the fire. After the debris was removed, Stastik was contacted to do a follow-up project. But this never made it out of the discussion table. In an unfortunate side bar, the end of Dreadnought No.1 also signaled the end of Stastik’s aviation career, as he and his remarkable plane, faded away in the fog of history.

No longer an Island: Britain and the Wright Brothers, 1902-109, Stanford Press University, 1984
The R.F.C. in the War, Flight Magazine No.6, 1914
Jane’s Fighting Aircraft of World War I, Random House, 2001
Bombers and X-planes, from 1901 to 1915, Carson Palmer, Rodger Press Books 1971

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

HIII

The Incredible B-70 Valkyrie Bomber

The B-70 Valkyrie supersonic heavy bomber was one of the most elegant planes that ever took to the skies. It was not only a remarkable looking aircraft but also the most advanced flying platform of its time. Its elegant design and airborne avionic systems were decades ahead of its peers. Just the sight of a Valkyrie flying sent chills down the collective spines of military leaders in both America and the Soviet Union. But, as with most revolutionary weapons platforms, the B-70 was also an aircraft without a true dedicated mission profile. In an ironic twist of fate, the B-70, once conceived and designed with the intention of penetrating the most complex of the Soviet’s air defensive systems, as well as their most advance fighters. In the end it was terminated by advances in those same systems, specifically the Soviet’s surface to air missile (SAM) systems. The new Soviet SAMs made the Valkyrie’s great advantage and sheer speed, somewhat irrelevant.

Conceived to replace the United States Air Force’s fleet of Boeing’s B-52 heavy bombers, the XB-70 program commenced at earnest in the spring of 1955. The Air Force, fresh out of the complex and highly technical B-58 program, wanted the new bomber to be incorporated with the latest of the so called “next generation” technology package available. It was towards this end, that the Air Force was willing to give total weapons system design responsibility to the winner of the contract. During the design phase, two companies emerged as the leading contenders for the contract to build the most advanced aircraft in the world: Boeing and North America. After a relative short test design stage, North America was awarded a developmental contract. Work commenced on the project late in 1958 and in 1964, the first of two ordered prototypes performed its maiden flight.

The XB-70 was indeed an elegant flying machine. One that concealed its true nature: the nuclear showering of targets deep inside the Soviet Union. This amazing aircraft had a fuselage length of 196 feet with a height of 31 feet. Its estimated maximum gross operational weight was of 521,000 pounds. The bomber was manned by a crew of four: a pilot, copilot bombardier and a defensive weapon systems operator. The aircraft was fitted with a thin delta wing structure that spanned 105 feet. Six massive General Electric YJ-93 engines, capable of producing 30,000 pounds of thrust each with afterburners. They were located in a side-by-side configuration on a large pod underneath the airframe. Two rectangular inlet ducts provided the engines with a two dimensional airflow profile. The aircraft’s fuel tanks where housed on the delta wing structure. The high drag ratio of the B-70 while flying at Mach 3, required a total fuel load comparable to that of a B-52. This in turn limited the operational range of the bomber to around 5,000 nautical miles. The wing structure was swept at an angle of 65.5 degrees, and the wing tips were folded down hydraulically 25 to 65 degrees to improve the aircraft’s stability while performing at speeds of Mach 3. While flying at this speed envelop, the XB-70 was designed to “ride” in its own shock wave. A large canard fore-plane (28 feet, 10 inches) installed near the front of the fuselage was utilized for stability moderation. Two large vertical tail units, each of them possessing hydraulic-moving sections, were fitted on the aft of the airframe. The Valkyrie was made completely out of titanium and brazed stainless steel materials. These composite materials were incorporated to enable the aircraft to withstand the heat during the sustained high Mach portions of the bomber’s flight. The aircraft’s fuselage was painted with a nuclear blast reflecting white-looking paint cover which did not stand up well to the Mach 3 kinetic heating. The aircraft did not have any defensive armament system and could only carry its ordinance inside due to its speed profile. The B-70’s had a massive payload capacity. Up to 50,600 pounds of free falling nuclear bombs could have been stored inside the aircraft’s underbelly.

As the first series of trials began, the aircraft started to demonstrate that it could accomplish almost all of the Air Force’s mission requirements, including the most important one: the achievement and sustaining of flying operations at three times the speed of sound. While the Valkyrie was enduring its test trial stages, one aspect that eventually would lead to the cancellation of the entire program surfaced. At high altitude, an aircraft operating at Mach 3 speeds could not maneuver well enough to evade even the Soviet’s second generation SAM missiles of the early 1960s. Also, the aircraft’s straight and level trajectory profile, which Mach 3 speed requires, would have provided the Soviets with nearly pin-point information on the B-70’s projected directional path, enabling their fighters to intercept the bomber’s path instead of the aircraft itself. There was also another unexpected situation that rose out of the bomber’s speed profile: the Valkyrie radar cross section signature was huge. This was due to the technology, airframe material and avionics package, implemented on the aircraft in order to make sustainable Mach 3 operational speeds feasible. The trials also revealed the aircraft’s poor low level operational capability. The B-70 was not adaptable to low level penetration because its thin delta wing structure did not provided the bomber with the necessary in-flight modifications for sustain low level operations. As the trials continued, it was becoming apparent to engineers at North America that the XB-70 did not possess the necessary characteristics to perform as a stable bombing platform. Thus, the aircraft’s profile was changed from a deep penetration heavy bomber, to a reconnaissance and strike platform. This change in profile actually occurred while the aircraft was still in its developing stages in late 1959.

Wing Span 105′-2″
Fuselage Length 189′-0″
Height 29′-11″
Total Wing Area 6,295sq ft
Maximum Speed 2,000mph at 73,000′
Service Ceiling 73,982′
Weight 550,000lb fully loaded
Operational Range 8,283 nautical miles un-refueled
Armament 50,600lb bomb load capacity

In mid 1961, the Kennedy Administration officially removed the program from its active operational status to a purely research project. The high cost of the aircraft program, between 500 to 700 millions at the time, and its perceived vulnerability to the latest Soviet SAM batteries, were cited as the cause of the shifting in the program status. Eventually, two units were built by North America. The first plane took to the air in 1964. The second prototype followed the next year. Initial testing showed the brilliance of the aircraft’s aerodynamic design. During its test flight test, the B-70 consistently demonstrated its ability to achieve and sustain speeds above the 1,988mph threshold. But the trials also demonstrated the plane’s vulnerability. At the same time, the US Air Force began to shift its nuclear deterrence resources from manned bombers and nuclear capable strike aircrafts to the relative easy to develop and maintain Inter Continental Ballistic Missile force which had began to eat more and more of the Air Force’s budgetary pie.

The end of the Valkyrie program came quikly. On the morning of June 8th, 1966, the first prototype was flying an experimental mission with a formation of NASA operated F-104 Starfighters, piloted by the experienced Joe Walker, who strayed too close to the Valkyrie’s vortex generated by its down turned wingtips. The F-104 was thrown across the massive bomber’s wing structure, smashing one of its tailfins as it exploded. The XB-70 was able to flight for a few short seconds before it spirally out of control until it crashed deep inside California’s Mojave Desert. Only one man survived the accident. Following the incident, what was left of the political support for the program promptly evaporated. The program was officially canceled in the spring of 1969. An undistinguished ending for such an elegant and advanced flying platform, but an end that was scripted the minute the aircraft’s plan was on North American’s drawing board.

The World Encyclopedia of Bombers, Francis Crosby, Herms House 2004
Behind Valkyrie: The Amazing Story of the XB-70, Martin Cooper, Penguin Books, 1978
Concept Aircraft: Prototypes, X-planes and Experimental Aircraft, Edit Jim Winchester, Thunder Bay Press, 2005

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

The Incredible M-4: The Birth of the Bison

After spending almost a decade ‘outside’ the bomber design business, Vladimir Myasishchev officially returned with a bang in the mid 1940’s. By early 1950, one of the most prolific Soviet aircraft designers of all time, in collaboration with GN Nazarov from Experimenta Design Bureau (OKB) # 22 and the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI), commenced a full, state-funded study into the feasibility of developing a strategic long range bomber or SDB (Strategichesky Dahl’ny Bombardirovschchik). The concept, originally devised by Myasishchev in the summer of 1948, embraced the parameters he and his engineering team had set up as part of TsAGI’s overall specifications.

In February 1951, Myasishchev made his first serious proposal for an advanced SBD. The preliminary study showed an aircraft powered by six VK5 engines that would give the concept speeds in the vicinity of 470 miles per hours. Total payload was estimated at 6,614 pounds with an operational range of 7,460 nautical miles. TsAGI specifications called for total carrying load of 44,092lbs and an absurd range of just short of the 7,500nm mark. To be able to achieve these mindboggling characteristics, Myasishchev needed to radicalize the design. A high tense, swept flying surface will hold a shoulder mounted wing structure. Four massive Mikulin AMRD-3 engines will be housed on the center wing sections. At the time of its conception, Project M, as the program would be referred to by Soviet authorities, was the largest ever undertaken by an aircraft Bureau. The Soviet Union Ministry officially authorized the project on March 24th 1951.

Armed with a new ‘referral’, Myasishchev was able to re-establish his beloved OKB at the famous Factory 23, on the outskirts of Moscow, and recruit the best and the brightness from the Moscow Aviation Institute. By the summer, work on the project, now known as VM-25, was at full swing. Hundreds of engineers and managers were hard at work in developing what they and the government believes was the most advanced program of its kind. Heading the program was Leonid Selyakov who was pushed to complete the first blue print in a three month period so the Soviet Union could chip away the United State lead in the real bomber race.

Selyakov’s first design featured an aircraft with straight wings; wing root power plants and sweep back V-tail structure. In his next concept, the wings were swept. In his third design, the VM-25 was fitted with a conventional swept fin and tail. The engines still were housed on wing roots. It was not until the fourth blue print that the enormous engines were placed on under wings pods, one per side with two units in each nacelle. The fifth design was similar to the last. Eight powerful Kuznetsov TV-2F turboprops driving an eight-bladed, counter rotating propeller mechanism which was placed back-to-back in the nacelles. The forward engine on each structure acted out as a tractor while the aft served as pusher.

The aircraft Selyakov envisioned were to be a 165′8″ behemoth. It would have a total wing area of 3,269 feet. Maximum takeoff weight would have been 385,800 pounds. But the fifth wasn’t the final version. Not by a long shoot. Two more attempts were realized before Selyakov and the rest of Myasishchev settle on a final layout. The new and now final design was a compromise between version two, four and fifth. A swept wing tail unit model powered by four AM-3 engines would give the USSR, accordingly to the OKB engineering team, the best and most advanced bomber in the world. The decision to go with the highly productive but poor takeoff action performance engines was made because the AL-5 power plant did not meet the OKB’s standards.

By August 1st 1952, the prototype blue print was finalized and on May 15th the aircraft itself entered the final assembly phase. By mid November, the first VM-25 was cleared for manufacture flight testing. Then, in December, the much anticipated rollout was made. Hundreds of OKB personnel and SovMin officials crowded Factory 23 to see the homeland’s newest technical marvel. On the clear morning of January 20th 1953, VM-25 took to the air for its maiden flight. The initial test phase went smoothly. It also confirmed the aircraft’s operational profile which was set at a 6,650 nautical mile range with a top payload of 11,023lbs.

Several small modifications were made to the concept in order to expand both parameters. Although the planes performance met the entire specifications request, it still falls short of the new Andrei Tupolev’s design, the incomparable Tu-95. The M-4, as the Myasishchev heavy bomber was named, could fly faster than its turboprop driven competitor. The problem was that the Tu95 had a longer operational range, nearly 3,000 mile more, than the M-4. To close this gap, Selyakov thought the idea of installing four NK-12 turboprops contra-rotating engines to power the massive bomber. But this concept was contrary to Myasishchev’s insistence for elegance in the model. As it was, the concept never made it out of the pre-design stages.

Nevertheless, the shortfall in profile needed to be addressed. Two ideas came to the forefront. The first was to change several aspects of the M-4’s aerodynamic structure to fit new power plants with a lower consumption rate. The other was to introduce an In Flight Refueling System (IFR). The first Soviet foray into the complex field of IFR took place on December 18th 1953 when the SovMin approved the development of the experimental Tu-16 tanker. Even without an adequate answer to the range question, the SovMin gave the M-4 full Operational Service Status with a short decree signed in on April 17th 1954.

In May 1954, the M-4 participated in the important USSR’s Mayday Parade. It was there that the West got their first look at the new strategic bomber. Call signed ‘Bison’ the new, streamline concept sent chills through the West defense apparatus which immediately considered the Bison the first true threat to Continental United States. In all, only 35 M-4s were built, including two units designated to be test bed aircrafts. From the summer of 1958, production M-4s were converted into refueling tankers. A role they performed admirable for more than a decade.

Soviet X-planes, Yefim Gordon and Bill Gunston, Midland Publishing 2000
Early Soviet Jet Bombers, Yefim Gordon, Midland Publishing 2004
Myasishchev M-4 and 3M-The First Soviet Strategic Jet Bomber, Yefim Gordon, Midland Publishing 2003

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

Project Tom-Tom

Project Tom-Tom was originated by the United States Air Force’s Strategic Air Command as a way to provide its long range heavy bomber fleets with a fighter umbrella by towing them on semi-fixed wing links.

The concept of the MX-1018, the programs official call-sign, was devised from the FICO (Fighter Conveyor) system. A program initiated by the US Air Force in the 1950s to test the feasibility of utilizing a B-29 Superfortress bomber as a ‘mother ship’ from which a pair of Republic’s F-84 Thunderfalsh fighters would operate. FICO became fully operational in 1955, but only a handful of missions were ever flown.

In the Tom-Tom structure, the parasite fighter plane would shut down its engine to save fuel while it’s been towed. It will restart and detach from the moving airplane to intercept enemy aircrafts, rejoining the bomber once it has accomplished the mission.

For this configuration, two F-84Ds (versions 48-641 and 48-661) from the BASUT based at Wright-Patterson AFB in Ohio were especially modified to carry a lance-like structure on their port and starboard wingtips platforms. The re-configurated aircraft was given the EF-84D designation.

For the initial test phase of the concept, a modified EB-29A-60-BN, tail number 44-62093 was selected. The bomber was fitted with booms installed at the wing tips onto which the F-84D’s lance would be attached to just before being withdrawn into the mother ship’s wing to lock both planes together.

The first hook-on trials were carried out on July 21st 1950 in the skies above Long Island, New York. With Major Clarence Anderson flying the starboard and Major John Davis running the port plane, the initial connecting test proved a resounding success. In the beginning both F-84Ds experienced heavy turbulence in their pitch and yaw while in the process of hooking into the booms, but after that the ride proved to be more smothering than many anticipated. Re-engaging the Thunderflash’s engine was also relatively easy and after several months, the program was ready for it next phase.

The morning of September 15th 1952 marked another milestone in the project’s life when the Thunderfalsh made their first, long lasting link up with the bomber. That was followed by another 43 additional connections. After a brief, inactive period, testing resumed in full swing on March 1953.

A month later, tragedy hit the program. On April 24th during an engaging maneuver, Major Davis’s F-84D lost surface control, rolling upside down hitting the upper wing structure of the EB-29A. Both aircrafts plummeted into the Peconic Bay with the lost of Davis and the entire bomber crew.

The news of the accident hit the program hard, but it did not end it. After several months, the program was back on track. Now two new RF-84s, this time an F variant (tail number 51-1848 and 51-1849) would attempt to connect, but not with a now obsolete B-29, but with the new and massive B-36 Peacemaker. JRB-36F, serial number 49-2707, was fitted with a new link up platform that would cope with the small fighter’s swept wing arrangement. The system consisted on a hinged arm on the ‘mother ship’ that trapped the fighter in a jaw-type position on its wingtip structure. The first test connection was made on April 24th 1956. With Beryl A. Eickson at the controls, the improved Thunderfalsh performed several quick, connection-detachment operations.

Almost 50 hookups were made during a five month period. Then, on the afternoon of September 26th, tragedy almost hit the program again. While engaging the connecting mechanisms, Eickson’s plane began to rift out of control, very much like Davis’ did three years before. Fortunately for both aircrafts, he was able to detach in time and both airplanes were able to land at Carswell AFB in Texas.

Although only minor damages were reported, most of them on the RF-84F, the AF decided to cancel the entire program soon after the incident.

Concept Aircraft: Prototypes, X-Planes and Experimental Aircraft, Editor Jim Winchester, Thunder Bay Press 2005
Air Power: The men, machines, and ideas that revolutionized war, from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II, Stephen Budiansky, Penguin Books 2004
Air Power in the Age of Total War, John Buckley, Indiana University Press 1999

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

When “Virginia” Ruled The Skies

By the late 1910s, the small company founded by Edward Vickers and George Naylon had become a giant in the booming aero plane developing business. Chief among its designs was the venerable Vimy Bomber, the backbone of the Royal Air Force strategic forces since late 1918. But by the early 1920s, Vickers and the RAF became painfully aware than in the fast pace aircraft design world, its mainstay was rapidly approaching obsoleteness.

A new airplane was need. In the summer of 1921, the Air Ministry issued Specification Order Number 1/21 calling for a heavy bombing platform with more payload capacity. Vickers’ engineers commenced work on its entry in the fall of that same year and by November 1922, the first sample, Mk I (J-6856), was ready for test operations.

The prototype was structurally different from the Vimy. It had a lowered frontal gunner platform, a large wingspan and a longer frame. Its initial Napier Lion engines were housed in a rectangular nacelles structure. But all production aircraft featured smaller, oval section nacelles instead.

The new bomber took to the air for the first time in the morning of November 24th, 1922. The J-6856 was fitted with two Lion 335kg engines and its fuselage was basically built out of wood, fabric and heavy wire bracing. After a short testing phase, the Air Ministry gave Vickers the go-ahead for full production. A total of 124 Virginias were built for the RAF in ten different versions. Marks I to V are easy identified by the dihedral on the bottom of the wing only. The Mark VIIs introduced a longer and redesigned nose section, while the X was the first version to be constructed of metal alloys. Fifty of the 124 Virginias were Mark X.

Mk I-Test platform. Only one built.
Mk II-Test and operational bombing platform fitted with two Rolls-Royce 490kg engines. Only one built.
Mk III-Operational, heavy bomber powered by two Lion II 349 engines. Six built.
Mk IV-Operational, heavy bomber equal in specifications to the III. One built.
Mk V-Operational, heavy bomber fitted with an additional third tail rudder. Twenty two units built.
Mk VI-Operational bomber, fitted with a wing folding mechanism. Twenty five built.
Mk VII-Operational bomber with a revised nose section, longer fuselage and sweepback wing structure. Eleven built thirty eight conversions.
Mk VIII-Test aircraft. One built.
Mk IX-Operational bomber with automatic slats and a wheel break system. Eight built, twenty nine conversions.
Mk X-Operational bomber. Fifty built, fifty two conversions.

Besides being an all metal aircraft, the Mk X introduced the first operational auto-pilot mechanism. The X also had the distinction of being the most numerous bombing platform in the RAF from its introduction in 1924 until it was replaced by the Heyford in the fall of 1934.
After being removed from frontline service, the Virginias still were deployed as experimental assets. Mk Xs were use for early in-flight refueling experiments with a Westland Wapati as well as parachute design testing utilizing jump-off areas in the rear of the engine sections.
They remained in the experimental role until November 1941 when the last of the mighty Virginias were officially disbanded.

Power Plant: Two Napier Lion VBW-12 piston engines
Wingspan: 26.72m
Fuselage Length: 18.97m
Height: 5.54m
Total wing area: 202.34m square
Maximum takeoff weight: 7990kg
Top speed: 174kph
Operational ceiling: 4725m
Range 1585km
Climb rate: 152m per minute
Armament: One 7.7m heavy machine gun in nose area. Two more in the tail. Total bomb load was 1362kg.

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

The L33 Raid

During the afternoon hours of September 23rd 1916, one of the ‘next generation’ super-Zeppelins, the L33, took to the air for its first operational mission: the bombing of downtown London. Just a few months before, the L33 was on the ground, getting its final fittings and adjustments. It was truly a remarkable piece of engineering. She was 649′ long, with a 78 feet diameter and with a total gas capacity of 1,949,000 cubic feet. Six powerful Maybach 240hp Hslu engines gave the lumbering giant a top speed of 59 mph at a maximum operational ceiling of 13,500 feet. Besides the sheer size, what separated the L33 from its predecessor was its bomb load capacity. An impressive five tonnes of ordinance could be stored.

That fateful afternoon, L33 was accompanied by ten additional super-Zeppelins of the Imperial German Navy. The mission called for the eleven to reach the British coastline at the same time. After which, each craft will take off to its pre-designed target area. Eight Zeppelins were assigned to strike targets around Wash. The remaining three units were to hit the British capital. Taking part of the London raid was L31, under the command of Heinrich Mathy. The L32 was lead by the enigmatic Werner Peterson and the L33, controlled by Alois Bocker.

The L33, which departed Nordholz, was fitted with almost three tons of free fall bombs. At approximately ten o’clock GMT, L33 flew over Britain’s coast. The huge dirigible was spotted by some local boys near Thames Estuary. From the Estuary, it moved on towards the north east in order to avoid the heavy saturated British defenses on the east. At the same time, L31 and L32 were crossing the coast headed towards Dungeness, a path seldom explored by German and British planners.

At 11:48 pm, Bocker ordered L33’s bombs to be dropped. Six high explosive bombs landed on Hornchurch. Twenty minutes later, the L33 craft was seen passing West Ham by a couple of street policemen. They promptly alerted the authorities. Searchlights blanketed the pass between Ham and London. After five intensive minutes of search, no Zeppelin was devised, thus, the search was called off, at least for the time being.
A little over 12:05 in the morning, London’s powerful searchlights were turned on. The spotters must have seen the undisputed sight of the German slow moving dirigible as an intense ground attack commenced shortly thereafter. Bocker’s airship was cruising at 12,000 feet following the Ham’s banks when fire erupted. Despite it all, he and his crew kept L33’s attack direction all the way up to Bromley-by-Bow, where the gas giant dropped its main ordinance. One 100kg bomb and five small incendiary bomblets, which landed on St. Leonard’s and Empress Streets.
Four urban houses were damaged and six people were killed in the early stages of the raid. L33 went on to deliver several more bombs in and around Bow. But by this time, the airship was shadowed by British defenses. Low trajectory shells began to find its mark. Several fragments of high detonation shells exploded only a few feet away from the ship’s skin, puncturing one gas cell. Now the big air platform was in trouble. It began losing altitude fast. At 12:20 am, L33 was seen crossing Buckhurts Hill, leaking gas. Besieged by heavy ground fire and declining altitude, Bocker decided to dump water from the ship’s ballast tanks, which caused the L33 to regain some of the height it had loss. But the damage was done.

Near Kelvedon Common, a new and more ominous treat arrived: a British pursuit airplane. Second Lieutenant Alfred de Bathe Brandon was ready for the opportunity to engage the German ship. He had gained valuable experience in March 1916 when he almost singlehanded severely damaged L15. Brandon met L33 head on, emptying its Lewis gun, fifty explosive incendiary bullets, into the airship’s stern section. He swung around a hit the stern again but his gun jammed forcing him to call off the engagement. L33 escaped, at least for the moment.

It was now 12:45 and the dirigible was passing by Chelmsford, still losing precious altitude. In an attempt to steam the decline, all non-essential materials aboard were jettisoned. Twenty five minutes after, at 1:10, Bocker’s ship passed over the Essex coastal area near Mersea Island. Its destination was the security of the Belgium skies. Unfortunately for Bocker and his crew, L33 was doomed. The Zeppelin was almost out of gas, losing altitude fast and its structure was compromised. It would go down, the only question for Bocker was where.

A crash landing at sea, at that hour, was deemed too risky. Better off, the commander thought, make a semi-controlled decent in British territory, then deal with the imprisonment issue. Immediately the ship began to turnaround, now heading back to Essex. She managed to enter the coast. Two and a half miles inland, at 1:20am, L33 went down on a deserted field near Peldon and Little Wigboroug church. The crew managed to escape before the gas giant was engulfed in a fire storm.

Soon after the fire died down, and with the metal frame still standing, Bocker ordered his men to climb back into what was left of the super-Zeppelin to destroy any classified material. Despite their best efforts, the British still were able to gather many essential documents and systems out of the wreck. Data that would be later incorporated on the R33 platform.

When the crew saw the first police cars arriving on the field, they promptly left the area. But the trip back to the coast was short lived. Specialist, Edgar Nicholas, apprehended the entire crew without even taking a shot.

The crew of L33 was questioned extensively by British military and scientific personnel. Even psychologists were brought in to exanimate the mens mental profile. Such was the depth of the debriefing phase. As for the dirigible’s debris, they were studied by engineers for days. After authorities were satisfied that every drop of information was collected, the ship’s frame was burn to the ground.

In the final analysis, the end of L33 did not alter the rate of Zeppelin attacks, but what it did was to enforce a view held by many German commanders, Zeppelins alone would not defeat Great Britain. A new weapon was needed. One year later, that weapon would make its presence felt.

World War I, HP Willmott, Covent Gardens Books 2003
The First World War, Hew Strachan, Penguin Books 2003
The Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft, Robert Jackson, Parragon Publishing Book 2002

The Supermarine Sea Otter

The Supermarine Sea Otter was a British designed anphibian biplane intended to replace the once venerable Supermarine Warlus in the Royal Air Force reconnaissance and search and rescue missions. It had the distinctions of being the last biplane flying boat to achieve front line service in Great Britain’s armed force.

The Otter was a result of an Air Ministry’s specification request codenamed S.7-38 (Stingray). There was a considerable effort placed on the development of Project Stingray’s power plant. The original S.78-38 called for a Bristol Perseus XI engine configuration with a two bladed propeller arrangement. The Bristol Perseus configuration did not give the platform the necessary thrust. A new arrangement was developed with a four blade propeller mechanism set at an angle of 35 degrees. A sharp departure from the frequently used 90 degree sets.

The first prototype, unit K8854, took to the air for its maiden flight on the morning of September 23rd 1938. Designed to take the place of the 1933-designed Warlus, the Otter differed from its predecessor in many characteristics. Most noticeable was its engine tractor configuration. The Warlus utilized a pusher system. The new aircraft was also faster, could fly farther and handled better in the water than its predecessor.
Production was carried out by the front runner of British flying boat designs, Saunders Roe who acted as the only subcontractor to the Otter project. By the spring of 1939, the Royal Air Force (RAF) and much of the British air industry was geared up to produce badly needed fighters and bombers, so the production of the Otter was delayed by almost three full years.

The first production Otter was delivered to the RAY on January 1943. The original Air Ministry order was for 592 aircrafts, but due to the tardiness of production and the end of World War II, only 290 were ever built. Production ran well into 1946 (July) before the halt order arrived.

The first operational Sea Otters were assigned to the RAF No. 277 Squadron. The Royal Navy (RN) also got into the act and acquired a number of Otters for costal recon operations. During WW II, Otters fielded nine RAF squadrons: No. 277, 278, 279, 281, 282, 292, No. 1350 Flight, 1351 and 1352. Other countries also operated the Otter. The Royal Australian Navy utilized the type to patrol the vastness of the Coral Sea. The Royal Danish Air Force, the Duct Naval Aviation Services and the French Colonial Service on Indochina; also employed the biplane.

After the Second World War was over, the RAF and RV promptly retired the Otter from front line service. This did not mean that the plane was useless. The RN Fleet Air Arm units remained in service until the spring of 1952.
Two versions of the Otter were produced, the Mk I and II. The amphibious Mk I carried bombs and depth charges while the Mk II was employed only as an air rescue platform. Of the 290 Otters built, only 40 were of the Mk II variety.

Today, only a nose section of a Royal Australian Navy Otter remains. Currently the section sits on permanent display at an Australian Naval Museum.

Power Plant One Bristol Mercury 855hp XXX radial piston engine
Wingspan 14.02m
Length 11.94m
Height 4.93m
Total wing area 56.67m square
Maximum Takeoff weight 4,912kg
Top Ceiling 4,877m
Operational Range 1,167m
Climb Rate 265m per minute

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com

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