Air Attack on the German Oil Industry

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The swift focus of the Allied bomber campaign against the German’s oil industry had immediate and far-reaching effects, compared with the 175,000 tons of aviation fuel it produced in April 1944. In June of that same year, German oil production fell to just over 55,000 tons, less than a third of the previous years output. Unless something was done, and done very soon, the Luftwaffe could find itself with insufficient aviation fuel to continue to sustain air operations. As an initial move to change the situation, large numbers of anti-aircraft batteries were transferred from other areas inside Germany, to protect the oil industry refineries. The 14th Flak division was assigned responsibility for the defense of the industry district at Leipzig, which included the most vaunted oil production plants at Leuna-Merseburg, Bohlen, Troglitz, Espenhain and Mucheln. All would receive the bulk of the anti aircraft pieces, a move made in order to strengthen the Division. By the beginning of May, the Division had in its possession 374 heavy caliber guns, 342 of the 8.8cm caliber, 24 of 10.5cm and 8 of 12.8cm caliber. Immediately after the combined allied offensive against the oil industry commenced, the energetic General Adolf Gerlach was appointed to the command of the Division. He received a visit from Riechsminiter Albert Speer, who made it clear that unless the sector refineries were kept working, the war was as good as lost. When Gerlach assumed command of the Division, there had been 104 heavy guns protecting the large Leuna-Merserburg production complex, he demanded, and received, sufficient weapons to bring about a six fold strengthening of the flack defenses ringing that particular target.

Having secured as much of the larger guns he needed, Gerlach set about to increase its tactical effectiveness. During the attack at the plant, US heavy bombers dropped huge quantities of “chaff” and radiated a cacophony of noise jamming that effectively neutralized the German Wuzburg flack control radar system. As a result of this tactic, during day bombing, the gunners were forced to abandon the use of radar-laid fire and resorted to optical predicted fire. If the clouds and enemy countermeasures prevented accurate predicted fire, the gunners would put up a box barrage. All guns fire at the same point in the sky just short of where it was calculated that the bombers would release the bombs, by disrupting the bombing run in this way, the accuracy of the attack could be greatly reduced. This method was highly extravagant in the use of ammunitions, however, and it was permitted to be used only in the direct defense of high priority targets such as oil refineries. US bomber crews rated the oil refineries and chemical plants around Leipzig as the most heavily defended areas against air attack. In addition to these active defense measures, passive measures were also introduced to lessen the effects of the constant bombing. Concrete reinforced blast walls were built around items of vulnerable machinery, and a warren of deep shelters under the plants enable its workers to remain near at hand during the bombing attacks and emerge afterwards to extinguish the fires before they took hold. Although by this time the German Army was short of skilled manpower, they shifted seven thousand engineers for employment in rapid repair brigades at the refineries and a large number of slave workers, primarily Russian prisoners of war, were drafted in to assist with this work. Finally, to ensure that morale at these facilities did not flag under the intense Allied bombardment, the work force came under “special supervision” from Heinrich Himmler’s feared Security Service.

As a further measure to safeguard German’s precious oil production, Edmund Geilenberg was appointed head of a far reaching program to build a network of new refineries that would be far less vulnerable to air bombardment. For the indispensable production of aviation fuel, he and his staff laid plans for the construction of seven underground hydro generation plants. Lower grade motor fuel was to be produced in 41 much smaller facilities situated above ground but widely dispersed in woods and quarries, each carefully camouflaged and individually too small to make an attractive target to the bombers. Geilenberg made full use of the authority given to him to tale labor and materials from other industries, and his labor force was built up rapidly to more than a third of a million workers. He was planning to have several of the motor fuel producing plants ready to enter service by the autumn of 1944, but despite great efforts by Geilenberg and his staff, the first underground plant was not due to produce aviation fuel until well into the spring of 1945. In fact, no aviation fuel came from this source as the war ended on April 1945. During this period, German rocket fighters went into action several times in defense of refineries in the Leipzig area. On the 16th of August, the US Eighth Air Force, known as the Mighty Eight, put up a thousand bombers to attack a spread of targets in central Germany, including the oil refineries at Bohlen. Five Me 163s were scrambled, and two were promptly shot down without inflicting any damage to the raiding force.

The Messerschmitt 163 achieved its first aerial victory just one week after the event, on August 24th. Eight of the smaller fighters took off from fields on Brandis to engage a bomber force of some 185 B-17s running into attack the refinery at Marseburg. Feldwebel Siegfried Schubert carried out a successful interception of the force and shot down two Flying Fortresses, other pilots from the same unit shot down two more units. Two Me 163s were damaged, one by return fire from a B-17 gunner and the other by a landing accident. It had been a successful day for this new jet fighter and seemed to be important for its future as a bomber-destroyer airplane. But in the end, when the Me163s scored four bombers destroyed that day, were to be the high mark point of its operational career. On September 24, Squadron 400 reported that it had nineteen Messerschmitt Me 163s in operation, of which just eleven were serviceable. By that time over a hundred of these jet fighters had been delivered to the Luftwaffe, and it is clear that the factor limiting operational employment was not aircraft but trained pilots. Now it was clear that the hope for salvation for the German Fighter Force was not going to come from this quarter. During September, Squadron 400 operated on five different occasions, the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th and the 28th. The largest of these operations was the last one, when nine of the diminutive planes were committed.

The relative short range of the Me 163 meant that accurate ground control was essential if the fighters were to be used effectively. Such controled operations was not always forthcoming, however, and only a small proportion of the fighters reached firing positions. During September 1944, the Me 163 program suffered a disaster from which it would never recover fully. In bombings attacks on the towns of Leverkusen and Ludwigshaven that month, two of the main sources of hydrazine and hydrate suffered serious damage and production was greatly reduced by it. For the remainder of the war, shortages of this chemical fuel would dog the 163. A major competitor for this limited chemical fuel was the Fi 103 flying bomb, which used it to power the catapult system that fires them into the air. The Fi 103 enjoyed a higher priority for supplies than the Me 163 programs. At the same time, the piston engine fighter units continued to mount defensive attacks against bomber formations, and from time to time they were able to pick their way past the American fighter screens and deliver their special brand of saturation attacks on an unexpected bomber. On September 27th, Squadron 4 delivered a sharp attack on the 445th Bomber group and in three furious minutes, it shot down 28 Liberator bombers out of a total of 37 dispatched. It would be the heaviest loss ever suffered by the US Bomber Group on a single mission. On the following day, the Squadron No. 3 assailed the 41st Combat Wing and shot down eighteen Flying Fortresses before the arrival of strong forces of escorts, preventing the slaughter to continue. Just over a week later, October 6th, a Squadron drawn from the 4th and 300th fought a similarly brisk battle with the 4th combat Bomber Wing and shot down fourteen B-17s.

Despite that such actions brought disaster upon the individual bomber units involved, their effect on the US bombing offensive as a whole was not. During the three days mentioned before, heavy bombers of the US Eight Army Air Forces flew a grand total of 3,275 successful sorties for a loss of some 81 units, less than 2.5 percent of the total. And that, it must be stressed, was on three days when the German defenders were relatively successful. Each passing day, when the weather permitted, the US Eighth and Thirteen Air Forces would send more than a thousand heavy bombers to attack targets across Germany and the occupied territories and on most days, losses were less than 1 percent of the total force involved. The German night fighter force had not recovered from the neutralization of its early warning radar system when it suffered a further calamity. The loss of French territory to the Allies had torn a gapping hole on Germany’s early tracking radar chain, which the Royal Air Force now exploited by routing bombers from that direction during attack on the south and western parts of Germany. Even as signals personnel struggled to reposition radar dishes to plug this breach there came a further blow; the fuel famine started to take effect and forced a curtailment of night fighter activities.

Then, to add to the worsening situation, No 100 Group of the RAF began to make its present felt during the night air battles. The Group operated five squadrons of heavy bombers modified into special jamming aircrafts, B-17 Fortresses, B-24 Liberators, Halifaxes and Stirlings. These aircraft were able to carry a large quantity of “windows” of all types, as well as noise-jamming equipment to counter the German’s Wurzburg fire control system and the Freya, Mammut, Wassermann and Jagdschloss radars that made up the German early warning chains. In addition, some of the aircraft carried “Jostle”, a high power jammer to blot out the night fighter’s radio communication channels. No 100 comprised of six squadrons of Mosquito night fighters carrying special systems to enable them to operate against their Luftwaffe counterparts deep inside the Third Reich. Homing on to radar emissions was a game that two could play, and in addition to AI radar some of the Mosquitos carried “Serrate”, which enabled them to home in on emissions from the German night fighter’s SN-2 radars. Other Mosquitos carried “Perfectos”, which transmitted interrogating pulses to trigger the identification friend or foe (IFF) sets of German aircraft in the area. When Germans IFF sets replied, their signals betrayed the range and bearing of the aircraft and identified it to the Mosquito crews as hostile. Several German aircrafts were shot down following “Perfectos” contacts, and many others were lost when German crews, having heard of the system, flew with IFF switched off and were shot down by their own flak.

But despite the presence of the Mosquito in the night battles, the German night fighter force suffered a far lower rate of attrition than its day fighter counterparts. But No. 100 group’s operation imposed considerable pressure on the German defenses, which in combination with the other factors, allowed the RAF night bombers to operate at will over the German sky with minimal losses. Throughout this period, the German oil industry was hit hard and repeatly. An example of the fate of the German oil industry, in the hands of the Allied bombing offensive happened in the spring of 1944, when one of the largest producers of synthetic oil, the Amoniakwerk Merseburg plant at Leuna, who produced about one sixth of the total German production. The huge plant sprawled over an area of 757 acres, and in addition to liquid fuels it produced ammonia, methanol and various types of industrial alcohol from coke and brown coal. The first large scale attack that happened at the plant was from 224 Flying Fortresses of the Eighth Air Force, which took place on May 12th, even before the Allied main offensive against the German oil industry began. That initial attack brought a halt to fuel production. During the next six months, the plant was attacked twelve more times. Time after time the plant was hit hard and production halted, as if one of the prize-fighters had been knocked to the ground. But each time it picked itself up and production resumed. At first the recovery was quickly and almost complete, but as the accumulation of punishment began to tell, the recovery became progressively slower and less complete.

Compared with 175,000 tons of aviation fuel produced in April, in August there were only 16,000 tons and in September a mere 7,000 tons. Throughout that summer, the Luftwaffe kept going on its fat, the reserves of over half a million tons of aviation fuel it had accumulated previously. With consumption running far in excess of production, by the beginning of September more than half this reserve had been consumed; from a high point of about 580,000 tons at the beginning of May, stocks were only about 180,000 tons at the end of September. Now the harsh reality of the shortfall of fuel production could not be avoided. Operation by the Luftwaffes medium and heavy bombers were sharply curtailed, the use of aerial reconnaissance was limited, air operations in support of the Army were permitted only in decisive situations, and the number of night fighter sorties was cut back. Only day fighter operations in defense of the Fatherland were allowed to continue at their previous level. Meanwhile, in Germany the production of combat aircrafts, and in particular fighter types, had risen to unprecedented levels. The Luftwaffe was about to stage a remarkable recovery in fighting strength.

An article by Raul Colon: rcolonfrias@yahoo.com